Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, August 21, 1957—5 a.m.

445. Reference: Embtel 438.² (My interview with Prime Minister³ Istanbul delayed until afternoon August 20. Consequently this message drafted en route Izmir, flown back with Air Attaché Ankara and transmitted direct from Embassy, although I am at present Izmir for opening fair and planning return Ankara night August 21.)

Prime Minister desired tell me about meeting with Iraqis mentioned Embtel 416.⁴ Separately Embassy is telegraphing memo on that conference which held August 19⁵ (not August 18 as reported Embtel 438). Memo speaks for itself. Herewith are comments by Prime Minister.

Prime Minister found Iraqis much concerned about Syrian developments. They want to seek some means of alleviating situation. All taking part in conversations were in agreement re situation and desirability taking appropriate action.

He developed his ideas thus:

(Begin Prime Minister’s statement)

In present situation unless USA takes definite position and decisions, nothing can be done. Up to now USA has been very cautious, very diplomatic—she has been bound by diplomatic forms and theory.

USA always feared that measures might be taken might be considered intervention in the internal affairs of an independent nation. Consequently, we were very grateful last autumn for USA decision #1 which insured independence of the countries of the ME. This was a defensive measure but one that could not stop Communist infiltration in Syria. Now we see Syria unfortunately has become a Soviet satellite. Perhaps a little time remains to us in which to do something about this dangerous, unfortunate situation. Now is [in] a short time there will be achieved the formalities remaining for Syria to become a complete and typical Soviet satellite. That will mean USSR has come into the center of the ME, between Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and other countries. There will be “a very profound repercussion”. It will be felt no doubt in Jordan and Iraq. Of course, Lebanon will not be excepted. From today it is not a mistake to consider Syria a part of USSR. Therefore to deal with Syria will mean to deal with USSR. The danger is so great that Syria does not hesitate to challenge USA, dangerously and openly, with the purpose of destroying USA prestige in this area. Unless USA responds to our appeal to her, we cannot move in any way. Consequently, our first task is to let the USG know how we consider the situation. We are awaiting “solid decision” in order to be able to take appropriate measures.

Ninety percent of Syrian people, many deputies, many notables are against what is taking place in Syria. They may come to Turkey and Iraq. That would bring UN into picture. All future action will depend upon what USA is thinking about these developments.

We have considered situation of Saudi Arabia as important. Iraqis say that present situation and its great danger must be explained to all Arab countries, including Egypt and Nasser. All Arab countries must be aroused. At this time there should be no demonstrations (expressions) on behalf of Israel. They would only aggravate matters and also give Soviets ample ground for exploitation. Let me repeat: All of us are agreed upon the meaning of these developments and upon my remarks to you, the American Ambassador.

We consider this entire matter very urgent. Very important. In a short time we will face great difficulties and great dangers with Syria. Iraqis told me they will send similar message from Baghdad.

(End Prime Minister’s statement)

I then repeated from a carefully prepared talking paper⁶ the gist of information recently received in two messages from Amman and Tel Aviv. (See Amman 304⁷ and Tel Aviv 155⁸ to Department.) I passed it on as unevaluated information received from the south and stressed it was not from Washington. The Prime Minister remarked that the information only confirmed Turk-Iraqi understanding of situation. He added that Turk-Iraqis had advised Hussein to delay his trip to Turkey for time-being.

Comment: Esenbel was present for entire conversation and acted occasionally as interpreter. The Prime Minister was relaxed but serious and alert. He will be looking forward to Department’s reply.

Department please repeat as desired.

Warren

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8–2157. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:26 a.m. Repeated to Baghdad.
2. In telegram 438 from Ankara, August 20, Warren informed the Department of a request from the Turkish Foreign Office that he see Menderes as soon as possible. In particular, Menderes wished to discuss a recent meeting Turkish officials had had with the Iraqi royal party, headed by Crown Prince Amir Abdul-illah, which had been visiting Turkey. Telegram 438 also contained an update of recent discussions with Turkish officials on Syria. (Ibid., 783.00/8–2057)
3. Menderes.
4. Not printed, but its contents are included in Document 358.
5. Sent in telegram 446, August 19, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/8–2157)
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. Not printed, but its contents are included in Document 358.
8. In telegram 155, August 16, Baxter transmitted a report of conversations with a “well-informed, if somewhat extravagant” Israeli journalist and with Colonel Harkavi, the Chief of IDF intelligence. According to the journalist, Israeli officials were deeply concerned over the Soviet presence in Syria, and the impact which it would have on Syria’s neighbors, particularly Jordan and Turkey. Harkavi anticipated a spread of Soviet influence in the area and a decline of the Baghdad Pact, unless the United States could administer a “shock treatment in [a] large dose.” The Embassy in Tel Aviv commented that it had insufficient background on current developments in Syria to be able to evaluate these statements. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/ 8–1657)