Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

99. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 6, 1956—10 p.m.

Dulte 4. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Briefly discussed this evening with Lloyd possible US adherence now to Baghdad Pact. I told him President’s reply to Eden² would probably be negative. I said I could not conceive Senate approving adherence to Baghdad Pact without some security pact in favor of Israel and that combination, even if Senate accepted it, would probably worsen Iraq’s position rather than strengthen it. Lloyd agrees with this estimate. I told Lloyd I thought there was some hope that Nasser might take more constructive attitude toward Johnston plan and perhaps Israel peace if there was provisional standstill on Arab membership in Baghdad Pact.³ Lloyd doubted that he would do more than agree to abate anti-Western propaganda.

Lloyd pressed hard for favorable action on Centurion tanks for Iraq. I said I would recommend some favorable action although I doubted this could be provided out of FY 56 budget. Caccia implied that if they could get some executive expression of intent to provide funds out of FY 57 budget, this might meet their need.

Will repeat above from here to Cairo by special channel.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–656. Secret; Priority.
2. The text of Eden’s March 4 message to Eisenhower (supra) was transmitted to Secretary Dulles at Karachi in Tedul 5, March 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–556) The text of a suggested response, prepared in the Department of State, was transmitted to Dulles in Tedul 4, March 5. (Ibid., 780.5/3–556) For text of Eisenhower’s response to Eden, see vol. xv, p. 337. In his response, Eisenhower wrote, in regard to the Baghdad Pact: “I question whether adherence by the United States to the Baghdad Pact now is the right answer. Measures apart from actual accession to the Pact such as our recent decision to increase aid to Pakistan and Iran may be more effective support for our friends. This is particularly true when drawbacks to adherence are considered, such as the effect of the other Arab States and probable demands for arms and a security guarantee to Israel.”

3. Nasser had given this indication during a conversation with President Eisenhower’s special representative Robert B. Anderson in Cairo on March 5. Anderson, then on a secret mission to the Middle East in an effort to bring about an Arab-Israeli peace, had transmitted a report of the conversation to Washington and had asked for guidance on whether he could give such assurances to Nasser. Anderson’s report on the March 5 conversation and Acting Secretary Hoover’s response are printed in vol. xv, pp. 302 and 309.

   Secretary Dulles informed Anderson on March 6 that he agreed with Hoover that there would be “no further accession” to the Baghdad Pact. Dulles said he also assumed that there would be some assurances regarding Israel at least privately and preferably a public statement on Eric Johnston’s plan. (Kahi 2629 from Karachi to Cairo, March 6; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518 Alpha—Anderson talks w/BG & Nasser)