100. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State1
Secto 14. Baghdad Pact. During meeting with Secretary afternoon March 5 Lloyd raised question of Baghdad Pact and said for prestige purposes he hoped we might be able to send fairly senior representative from Department to attend April 16 meeting Baghdad Council in addition to our permanent representative Ambassador Gallman.
Secretary replied he would have think about this and could not give answer this juncture. Lloyd smilingly suggested it might not be necessary since possibly US would have become member of Pact by that time. Secretary replied he did not think there was any chance of this.
Secretary made reference to comment Lloyd had made to him day before to effect it might still be possible to solve situation with Nasser. Secretary said if we tried to build up Baghdad Pact as rival organization to Nasser and Arab League at this time when there still seemed to be chance to get Nasser to do something on Johnston water plan and also with respect to moving Egyptian and Israeli forces back from Egyptian-Israeli frontier, we might increase our difficulties and precipitate action in an already dangerous situation. In other words, it might be preferable to have a standstill on Baghdad Pact and try to work something out with Nasser rather than having open break with him. Secretary went on to say UK must not count on our joining Baghdad Pact at this time. Certainly it was not possible to join this Pact without giving security agreement to Israel. If it were possible to do both, which just did not seem in cards at this time, Secretary felt we would only create greater difficulties for Iraq since Arab states would think Iraq, which they already regard as something of pariah, had agreed to US-Israel pact in return for US joining Baghdad Pact.
Lloyd agreed this would do more harm than good. Secretary reiterated we could not join Baghdad Pact without Congressional approval and this would give rise to irresistible demands for security pact with Israel.
Lloyd then mentioned he would be visiting Baghdad and Tehran March 9–10. He said it would be very helpful if he could tell Iraqis US had in mind financing additional Centurion tanks. Secretary said it did not seem possible for us to finance additional tanks out of this year’s [Page 252] budget. He said our purpose is to get funds in next year’s budget so that some additional tanks could be supplied but that Congressional action would not be taken on fiscal ’57 budget until late in spring.
Lloyd asked whether he could tell Iraqis that USG was interested in helping Iraq further and in its appropriation was seeking funds for some additional tanks. Secretary agreed Lloyd could inform Iraqis of our interest and our intention this respect and said he understood Eden had made reference to this in message to President and that President would reply giving our position.
Lloyd mentioned Iran briefly and inquired whether we were going try do anything more help Iran economically. The Secretary replied we were doing our best help Iran and also to do more for Pakistan. He added that it was difficult to get much support for helping Iran to balance its budget when Iranian legislation provided that 90% of its oil revenues should go to economic development rather than balancing its budget. Nonetheless, we fully recognized importance of economic development in Iran and we were doing our best help them.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–KA/3–756. Secret. Repeated to London.↩