70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 20, 19551
SUBJECT
- U.S. Support for Baghdad Pact
- PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Moussa Al-Shabandar of Iraq
- David D. Newsom, NE
Ambassador Shabandar said he appreciated this opportunity to see the Secretary. He said he knew how extremely busy he was preparing for the Geneva conference and wanted to wish him success. The Ambassador said he had two matters he wished to speak about.
It was nearly a year, said the Ambassador, since he had called to say farewell before returning to Baghdad. At that time, he said, the Secretary had indicated that, if Iraq joined the northern tier, it might be possible for the United States to increase its military assistance. He would now like to recall this possibility to the Secretary and to state that Iraq hoped the program would be fulfilled which called for the equipping of three Iraqi divisions.
The Secretary said he was certain that the program was proceeding as planned. Mr. Newsom said that twelve Centurion tanks, ten from the United States and two from the United Kingdom, were being loaded and would arrive in Iraq late in November.
The Secretary said this was only a part of the program and he hoped that more tanks would be furnished in the next fiscal year. He was not certain of the number which had been planned.
The Ambassador said he hoped these would meet their requirements.
The Secretary asked what Iraq’s requirements were.
The Ambassador said he was not certain of details, but he knew it included tanks and aircraft.
Mr. Newsom pointed out that the tank requirements were being met. He said there was no U.S. program for aid to Iraq’s Air Force, but he understood this matter was being discussed by Iraq with the United Kingdom.
The Ambassador then said he wished to transmit to the Secretary an invitation from Prime Minister Nuri as-Said to join the Baghdad Pact.
[Page 175]The Secretary replied that, although the United States welcomes the Pact, supports it, and hopes to be able to strengthen it through military assistance to its various members, it is not possible for the United States formally to adhere at this time. Perhaps, said the Secretary, we can adhere at a later time. If the United States should join the Pact at this time, however, he said, it would almost certainly have to give a security guarantee to Israel. The Secretary stressed that the United States was under great pressure to give such a guarantee, but did not wish to do so at this time.
Referring to his August 26 proposals,2 the Secretary pointed out that he had proposed guarantees on both sides against violent changes in the borders. He did not feel, he said, that the United States can give any such guarantees until there is some agreement on borders. The Israelis, he said, disagree, and wish a guarantee now.
Because of these attitudes, the Secretary pointed out, he did not believe the Senate would be agreeable to a ratification of a formal adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this time.
The Ambassador replied that he appreciated the problem and would report the position of the United States to the Prime Minister.
The Ambassador said he would just like to add that, if he were an Israeli, he would like to see the United States in the Pact. It is not an Arab pact, he said, and it serves as a counter to the extremists in the Arab world. He said he felt reasonable Israelis should be able to see this.
The Secretary asked the Ambassador about Syria. The Ambassador replied that Syria’s difficulties, like most of those in the Near East, were due to the Palestine problem. He urged that this problem needs to be solved and solved quickly. The longer we wait, the Ambassador said, the more difficult it is going to be to solve it. It was easier a year ago than it is now; it will be easier today than it will be a year from now.
The Ambassador pointed out that the Arabs had been beaten-eight nations were beaten by one small nation. This had hurt the Arab pride deeply and this pride must be respected in approaching a settlement. His nation was willing to discuss the matter on the basis of the United Nations resolutions and he was certain other Arab nations were also willing. This does not mean the solution will be in complete accordance with the resolutions; it does mean that this is an acceptable starting point for discussion.
The reason the Arabs are turning to Russia for arms, the Ambassador said, is because it restores their pride and confidence. They are not Communists, but they want arms in order to be on an equal basis with Israel. They consider the United States is the patron of Israel. [Page 176] They don’t understand when they read the statements of Mr. Sobeloff and Mr. Harriman that these men do not represent the State Department point of view.
We must try to settle the Palestine issue and remove this cause for trouble. Later, it may be too late.
The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for his remarks. The Ambassador wished the Secretary well at Geneva and thanked him for sparing him the time to call.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2055. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.↩
- Reference is to Secretary Dulles’ major address on the Arab-Israeli dispute, which was part of project “Alpha.” See footnote 2, Document 62.↩