Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

69. Notes Prepared by the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 17, 1955.

The basic facts are that the Arab countries are:

(1) Violently opposed to the existence of Israel and unwilling to tolerate that continuing existence except on terms, with references to territory and resettlement of refugees, which are totally unacceptable to Israel;

(2) Ardently sympathetic to the aspirations of the Arabs and Moslems of North Africa in their desire for independence and violent anti-French activities; and

(3) Opposed to the remnants of British, French and Turkish “colonialism” in the Arab area. At the moment the clash is most acute between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom with reference to the Persian Gulf area.

United States policy runs counter to the above desires of the Arabs in that:

(1) We were largely instrumental in the creation of the State of Israel, and both the American government and the American people give it today indispensable support;

(2) France is our ally in NATO; Algeria is part of the NATO area; our equipment is largely being used by the French in North Africa. We have bases in Morocco, and in general find it difficult to divorce ourselves from association with the French. To do so would jeopardize our European policies;

(3) Our basic sympathies are with Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom. Turkey, as an ally, is our mainstay in the Middle East, and we are unwilling to take the measures which the Saudi Arabians wish to pre-empt oil areas in the south which are claimed by local sheikdoms and supported by the British.

All of these factors combine to make the area a “natural” one for exploitation by the Soviet Union. It sees in this way the possibility of gaining control for itself, and denying to the West, the vast oil reserves of the area which represent almost two-thirds of all the known oil reserves of the world and upon which the military and industrial strength of Western Europe and the Mediterranean area depends. Also British economy is largely dependent for its foreign exchange upon the proceeds of the oil of the area. Furthermore, the Arab world, particularly Egypt, is a gateway to Africa, and the entire African continent could readily be lost to Europe through a development of the Soviet strategy to which we refer.

It is difficult to invoke the “spirit of Geneva” in a Middle East appeal to the Soviet Union because we ourselves take the position that the “spirit of Geneva” does not sanctify the status quo and we are committed, in the most solemn way, to seek the peaceful liberation of the European “satellites”. This attitude is deeply resented by the Soviet leaders. The Soviet action might be interpreted as a reply to our position with reference to the satellites. It is probably more realistic, however, to say that the Soviets now feel that they can move in the Middle East with less danger of this provoking a general war because of Geneva.

Also the Soviets doubtless resent the building up of the so-called “northern tier”, consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. They are particularly sensitive with reference to Iran.

The stakes in the present situation are immense and raise such questions as the following:

(1) Should we invite the Soviet Union into Middle East talks with us and the United Kingdom in the hope of arriving at some “spheres of influence” agreement?

(2) Should we toughen our line and in effect treat the Soviet action as destroying the “spirit of Geneva” and reopening the possibility of war?

(3) Should we shift our position on Israel and seek to compel Israel to resettle many of the Arab refugees and to surrender a substantial slice of the Negev?

(4) Should we attempt to collapse Egyptian economy by cutting economic aid, attempting via the United Kingdom and Sudan to get control of the Upper Nile waters, competing on cotton, etc.?

(5) Should we intensify the military and economic build-up of the northern tier?

(6) Should we try to split the Arab world via Iraq and give Iraq a “free hand” vis-à-vis Syria?

(7) Should we give up US bases in Saudi Arabia and/or Morocco?

(8) Should we encourage oil companies to shift production to Iran and Iraq, and away from Saudi Arabia?

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Arab-Israeli Situation— General. Secret. The source text bears Secretary Dulles’ typed initials as drafting officer. George V. Allen’s handwritten notes of a conversation between Dulles and Egyptian Ambassador Hussein on October 17 appear on the reverse side of two of the pages. Allen’s memorandum of the Dulles–Hussein conversation is printed in vol. xiv, p. 604.