Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

456. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, April 9, 1957—10 p.m.

1667. From Richards. I submit following comments on Iraq:

1. Iraq is booming, Texas fashion. Sense vigorous purposeful activity immediately apparent on arrival Baghdad.

2. Through Development Plan, supervised by non-political competent board, Iraq appears to be making really effective use of oil revenues for benefit country as whole. Impact of development program beginning to reach through to people and board making some adjustments in plans (i.e., more low cost housing) to provide people visible evidence of results. Success of plan is most encouraging and most striking sign of progress I have seen on trip.

3. Development Plan plus greater efficiency of internal security forces reportedly are principal factors accounting for major improvement in public order since riots of 1952.

4. Stability present government appears good and Nuri firmly in control. He takes almost paternalistic attitude towards his ministers. No indications received of serious political opposition to Nuri at present.

5. Group now in power determined to resist international communism. Particular stress placed by Nuri on importance of guarding against subversion.

6. Iraq gives strong support to BP but during our discussions Iraqis put less emphasis on pact than had been done by leaders in other pact countries. Nuri cautioned that as Arab state Iraq must look towards Arab world as well as pact countries.

7. I asked Nuri’s advice on Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. He replied— Do not visit in absence firm invitation and do not allow those countries to bluff you. Nuri considers Nasser prime source of trouble in Syria and Jordan and in effect tool of Communists. He mentioned possibility change in government in Syria “Maybe not next few weeks but sooner or later.” However, on whole Nuri did not seem anxious to talk about area problems or advance suggestions re approach to situations in Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

8. Nuri raised question of Israel suggesting “bargained” settlement on basis 1947 UN resolution. However, he did not press subject.

9. Nuri took occasion to express pleasure results mission visit to Afghanistan stating he had not thought such good communiqué would be issued by country on border USSR.²

10. Nuri inferred that our failure to extend greater help to Iraq stemmed from fear of Saudi Arabian reaction. I rebutted this contention.

Nuri admitted he himself recognized importance better relations with Saudi Arabia and would work toward that end. Foreign Office Under Secretary Gailani told me privately Iraqis plan make major effort remove Saud’s fear of Hashemite ambitions to return to Hejaz.

11. Cutback in oil revenue because of destruction of pumping stations in Syria is continuing serious problem, despite partial resumption of oil flow, to which no quick solution in sight. Loss in oil revenue now running at annual rate estimated at $120 million. Although regular budget balanced for coming fiscal year through IPC loan, continuation of expenditures for development program at planned levels can only be made by operating at deficit and drawing upon reserve funds. Slowing down development program obviously would bring undesirable psychological and political reactions. However, Iraq has no external debt, has good credit standing and should be able borrow necessary funds from such organizations as IBRD.

12. No economic justification exists for grant economic development assistance. However Iraq does need technical assistance in form advisers and consultant services and I believe we should be prepared to help in this regard. Also Iraq should be able to acquire and support without outside grant assistance sufficient military forces to maintain security and legitimate self defense. Nevertheless, compelling political reasons exist for present grant program and I believe increase authorized by mission is sound. Armed forces are stabilizing influence in country. Nuri said fifty percent of credit for maintenance of order after attack on Egypt last fall attributable to US military aid. Furthermore, younger [garble—folks?] previously critical Western alignment more cooperative now equipment arriving.

13. I believe development program should have first priority in Iraq and that we should discourage any tendency divert funds from development to finance largely [larger] military establishment than Iraqis themselves able to support.

No difficulties arose in presenting Doctrine. Nuri asserted Iraqis believe in sincerity of US and “99%” of them support spirit of Doctrine.

In discussions of aid, Iraq officials concentrated strongly on military assistance. Nuri set example and General Rafik made impassioned plea to Defense representative for jet air wing, air field improvement, radar, more tanks, establishment of ammunition factory, and mine watching facilities in the Shaat-al-Arab River.

After discussions with country team I decided to offer following package on grant basis:

1. Equipment for civil police up to $1 million, US technicians to assist in training, and study of police communications need.

2. Telecommunications equipment for Iraq section of system recommended by BP economic experts—$1,150,000.

3. Consultant engineer contract for Baghdad-Kut-Basra Railroad—$350,000.

4. Military assistance consisting of following:

[Here follows a list of military equipment, totaling $14,084,000, including 20 medium Centurion tanks.]

CHMAAG is instructed to provide details of other categories.

Text aide-mémoire telegraphed separately.³

In discussions with Iraq officials I called attention to 15 day provision Joint Resolution.⁴ I made clear no assurances could be offered re assistance in FY 1958 but expressed personal belief Congress would approve substantial program for ME.

Iraqis expressed disappointment at magnitude aid offered particularly in economic field, and Nuri made mild try for additional aid for radar, airfields, education and broadcasting. However, I judge from attitude of Iraqis that they probably did not expect much more and believe they were reasonably satisfied. Nuri made point of thanking mission and said fact US not able meet all Iraqi requests would not reduce grateful feeling for what done. He added Iraqis will defend themselves against communism to best of their ability whether they receive help or not.

Re military aid—for political reasons mentioned above I concluded it in interest of US to grant small amount additional military assistance. Items included in DOD package number one valued at $6.676 million are same as those cited in paragraph 2 of memo handed General Daghestani in Washington February 15 (Army supplemental MAP II of 4 February 1957).⁵ However Iraqis appeared unsure whether this intended to be provided on grant basis. By confirming that equipment would be grant, mission able obtain some additional political impact. New MDAP funds committed by mission amount to $7,408 million. Significant departure from DOD proposed package was increase of Centurion tanks from 5 to 20 with compensatory elimination of 300 vehicles. This was necessary to obtain favorable impact in absence aircraft.

Re economic aid at economic committee meetings no request made for university, Abou Ghrai or other educational projects. Few big projects were trotted out, such as need for additional port, need for refinery and so forth. We deemed unnecessary urge upon Iraqis additional support of less expensive variety when they did not push for it. Reference was made to Iraq need for more technical assistance in almost all fields economic development. Railway survey approved was high priority, relatively inexpensive item.

Report on regional projects under auspices BP sent separately.⁶

Communiqué drafted jointly with Iraqis transmitted separately.⁷

Actions requested from Washington:

1 — Program military items listed above.

2 — Procure civil police equipment and dispatch police advisors and technician to complete communications study. USOM/Iraq submitting PPA listing equipment.⁸ I believe we should make special effort to move quickly on this program thereby increasing considerably its effects.

3 — Conclude contract for engineering consultants for railroad.

4 — I recommend that in preparation FY 1958 program for Iraq Department and ICA give particular consideration to technical assistance in fields of education and broadcasting. Re latter I understand Iraq has physical equipment needed but is woefully weak in technical and programming personnel. I told Nuri I would make these recommendations to Department.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–957. Secret. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, New Delhi, Rome, Beirut, Cairo, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Kabul, Ankara, Tehran, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Jidda, Athens, Damascus, and Amman.
2. Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Afghanistan, see Document 216.
3. This aide-mémoire, presented to the Iraqis on April 8, was transmitted in telegram 1668 from Baghdad, April 8. It repeated the information contained in telegram 1667, and added the statement that Ambassador Richards officially informed the Government of Iraq that the United States was prepared to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact only if invited. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–857)
4. The Joint Resolution known as the Eisenhower Doctrine (P.L. 85–7, approved on March 9) included a requirement that the additional authorization of funds contained in this resolution should not be used until 15 days after appropriate committees of Congress had received reports showing the object and recipient of the funds, and the particular appropriations from which the funds were proposed to be derived. (71 Stat. 6)
5. For a summary of the memorandum, see Document 453. A list of additional military equipment and services for Iraq tentatively approved by the Department of Defense, similar to the list contained in the February 15 memorandum, was attached to a February 4 memorandum from Rountree to Secretary Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–457)
6. This report is contained in telegram 1672 from Baghdad, April 9. (Ibid., 120.1580/4–957)
7. Text of this joint communiqué, issued in Baghdad on April 8, is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 841.
8. Not further identified.