Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

455. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, April 8, 1957—1 p.m.

1660. From Richards. First meeting morning 7th was half-hour call on King Faisal given over largely to amenities, King expressing cordial welcome to mission.

Mission with Ambassador Gallman and two Embassy officers then spent hour and half with Nuri during which he expanded in rather general terms on what he considers principal dangers peace and stability ME and made plea for assistance largely military items.

Nuri found three main threats ME stability: Israel, Nasser, and Soviets.

Israel

Nuri recalled his conversations with Secretary during latter’s visit Baghdad 1953² and mentioned how he had suggested that negotiations looking to peaceful settlement be undertaken on basis 1947 UN resolution. He recognized Israel entitled areas given it by resolution but Israel’s claims to additional territory seized not legitimate and Israel must be prepared bargain over disposition these areas. Arab fear of Zionism was weapon Hitler used against West and now Soviets had laid hold of it for same purpose.

Nasser

Nuri views him now as Soviet tool through whom Russians have gotten control Syria and will soon get Jordan also. Nasser will do all he can to thwart US efforts to improve situation in Syria and Lebanon. Noting number of missions exchanged between Egypt and Communist China, Nuri concludes Nasser is anxious imitate latter. He believed from moment he heard of Egypt’s acceptance Soviet arms these weapons were intended to be used not against Israel but against West.

Threat From Soviet Union

Nuri referred with pride to his refusal to continue diplomatic relations with Soviet Union “since we regard each other as criminals”. Following their failure in Iraq, however, Soviets seemed to have transferred center their efforts to Damascus. Resulting instability in Syria has created further trouble for Iraq.

Nuri then discussed what he believes Iraq must have for defense against (1) open aggression; (2) subversive activity.

(1) He commenced with words of gratitude for aid Iraq had received so far mentioning particularly the 8-inch howitzers and tanks. Later asserted this aid had been tremendously important attributing “50 percent of my success in keeping order” to favorable impression made on Iraqi people and army by arms received from US. Two of Iraq’s divisions are now nearly complete and although a third reserved division and armored unit require material most important need at moment is air cover. This Nuri believes requires 4 squadrons of interceptors. Iraq possessing ME oil fields geographically closest to USSR must be in position hold off Soviet attack for at least few hours until US help arrives. He would like two squadrons from the US and two from British. Latter, of course, require cash for all arms which Iraq does not have for purpose. Iraq with 70 percent of its oil revenue committed for its vital development program and 60 percent of its ordinary budget going into defense cannot afford purchase unaided air squadrons it needs. Nuri pointed out additional airfields also needed. Iraqi airfields will be available to all those who have interest in defense of area including US, Iran and Britain. Legally Development Board could not give money for airfields. He himself would in fact be most reluctant see development funds diverted military purposes. He mentioned also need for defense purposes of improved rail and road communications in northern Iraq particularly those connecting with Turkey. Nuri also urged need for closer consultation between US and Iraqi officers on strategy and operations.

(2) Nuri reiterated Iraq’s needs police wireless communications, transport and small arms equipment all of which are important for adequate defense against Communist subversive activity.³

In response Ambassador Richards stressed financial limitations his mission and explained fundamental aspect of American Doctrine, i.e. to provide those countries which desire it sense of security against threat of Communist attack. By this means we hope give nations of ME confidence which will enable them successfully to preserve their own internal security and time to settle the intra-regional problems on which Communism feeds. Ambassador pointed out he faced difficult problem in trying make just division of comparatively small sum among some 18 countries. Stressed he was anxious not make promises which could not be kept.

Nuri warned mission against rewarding those who plan to “blackmail” US by dealing with Soviets. In his view the mission might visit Syria or Jordan if both governments issued a clear invitation but only to discuss Doctrine’s objectives; aid should not be extended. On other hand he expressed pleasure at result mission’s visit Afghanistan.⁴

In closing Ambassador Richards reminded Nuri of onerous and worldwide character US defense burdens. US is determined maintain its commitments but it cannot do everything its friends wish. Nuri replied by urging that US concentrate its own defense efforts on ability to hit vital targets (i.e. Moscow) and help countries like Iraq to prepare defend themselves against local Russian attacks. US should not allow its defense strength to be dissipated in protection of remote less important areas such as Formosa or SE Asia.

Immediately following private meeting with Nuri morning April 7 Richards Mission and Baghdad country team met under Nuri’s chairmanship with Iraqi Cabinet committee which has been assembling projects for Richards Mission consideration. Nuri gave each of five Ministers present opportunity describe need their departments. CGS Rafig Arif present but did not speak no doubt because Nuri had in his talk concentrated on Iraq’s military needs.

Minister Development⁵ described overall shortages which had resulted from Syrian oil line severance. Development program and requirements for military installations were placing Iraq in a financial squeeze. Minister Finance⁶ expanded same line reasoning. Minister Interior⁷ discussed briefly Iraq’s police equipment request. Minister Communications⁸ described need for certain projects beyond his budget allotments. Minister Economics⁹ described in further detail setback Iraq’s expectation resulting from Syrian situation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–857. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, Dhahran, Tehran, London, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, Tripoli, Ankara, Athens, Rabat, Karachi, and Paris.
2. Memoranda of Dulles’ conversations on May 18, 1953, with Iraqi officials, including Nuri, who was then Minister of Defense, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 90 ff.
3. Nuri had requested additional police equipment in discussions with the Embassy on January 8 and February 13. (Telegrams 1195 and 1380 from Baghdad, January 8 and February 14, respectively; Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/1–857 and 787.5–MSP/2–1457) On February 15, the Department agreed in principle to assist Iraqi internal security forces. See Document 453.
4. The Richards Mission visited Afghanistan, April 1–3; see Document 216.
5. Dhia Ja’far.
6. Khalil Kunna.
7. Said al-Qazzaz.
8. Salih Sa’ib al-Jaburi.
9. Nadhim el-Pachachi.