Office of the Historian

334. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:37 p.m.1

Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:37 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO ALLEN DULLES

The Sec. told AWD about the British Amb.’s call2 and said he is not happy re our giving assurances etc. to Iran now as Russia might regard it as a reprisal against Egypt and any hopes of quieting the situation would disappear and it would lead to a step against us and things would be worse. AWD said that is his view. The Sec. said Radford is keen on getting Iran into the Pact and he sent a memo to Wilson that the JCS favor it.3 W. will call soon.4 AWD said he wishes they could delay this a bit. The Sec. said we have to get a cable off tonight5—it is the a.m. of the 7th [in Iran?]. AWD said his reaction is we are pressing it a bit. The Sec. said we are not—the Shah is ready to act. He read the Oct. 5 cable from Chapin.6 AWD said you are not in a position to give assurances of aid. The Sec. said pretty good size military but not much economic aid. AWD said he would prefer to see it deferred a bit until we analyze Egypt. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] AWD asked if we told about the aid they are going to get. He has been told about military aid and no budgetary assistance, but this cable says he wants it. He is trying to bargain as a condition to making the speech. Radford said we can step up military aid, but the Sec. doesn’t know where we will get it. We could take some from Egypt but we have already given it to Iraq. AWD would like to see it left as something that could be used in the overall negotiating position [Page 781] in that area rather than throw it away for nothing now. They agreed that then we may never get it. The Sec. said if the opposition is strong enough to prevent their joining the Pact a few months from now, he thinks they would not be strong enough to get much value from it now. AWD said an out could be in the time allowed we can’t be sure we can do better than what we have done, but can’t give the result now.

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.↩
  2. See the memorandum of conversation, October 6, vol. XIV, p. 558.↩
  3. Not further identified.↩
  4. See infra.↩
  5. Document 336.↩
  6. Supra.↩