Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, September 17, 1955—3:23 p.m.

460. Department recognizes import problems raised your 370² and 391.³ Broad aspects under consideration (since your 164)⁴ by interested agencies. Meanwhile, suggest you explain following to Shah and Ala:⁵

1) Department concerned by Iranian tendency (implicit in Ala memo) regard accession Baghdad Pact as favor to U.S. for which latter should pay high price. U.S. position is we believe Iran will find it in her interest to join but Iran must make up own mind strictly on basis own interests. Basic principle regional pacts is coherent defense based on broad participation. Iran must decide whether inherent advantages this principle as well as advantages regular military political liaison with ME neighbors and increased Iranian prestige are sufficiently important to warrant accession to pact.

2) As for guarantee Iran’s frontiers against USSR aggression, you may reiterate your point that Korea experience shows Iran has great protection in commitments undertaken by U.S. in U.N. GOI will recall effective U.S. help in Azerbaijan crisis. However, U.S. cannot commit itself to conditions, some relating to military problems which cannot be settled outside regional context and others which not germane, e.g. Bahrein.

3) U.S. surprised Ala would raise Bahrein claim, legal basis of which extremely doubtful.⁶ If GOI attempts link Bahrein question with ME defense, it might well provide Govt’s internal enemies with new vehicle for launching move unseat Govt, start chain reaction dubious claims involving other Iranian frontiers, and perhaps culminating in repetition irrational Mosadeq period which made possible by fanatical and Commie exploitation oil issue. Such irresponsible action would not only make ME defense pact impossible but might well impede successful continuation U.S. aid programs in Iran.

4) U.S. doubts USSR would go so far as take actions which would prejudice its assiduously developed current peace campaign. Believe Shah’s reported answers to Lavrentiev well-taken.⁷ As Iran knows, USSR continually probes for weak spots by making threats which it fails implement when confronted by strength or firmness. In 1954 Soviets adopted milder policy and negotiated frontier-financial agreement with strongly anti-Commie, pro-West Iranian Govt rather than with previous vacillating, Commie-infiltrated Mosadeq regime. As for internal sabotage this is matter for Iran security forces. U.S. gratified by effective anti-Commie campaign of last 2 years which appears have given security forces effective control, to benefit of Iran as well as free world.

5) As for U.S. assistance, we have in past demonstrated willingness aid Iran financially, economically and have given substantial military assistance without reference to Iran’s adherence to any regional pact. Your first speech to Shah explained decision continue military aid to Iran at somewhat higher level than in past, despite U.S. financial limitations. Surely no question can arise of sincerity and good intentions of U.S. toward Iran. U.S. now reviewing military equipment situation in effort find maximum assistance for Iran within current fund limitations and Iranian capabilities but unable make specific commitments at this juncture beyond those already made. Any event, believe Iran should consider question Pact adherence on own merits as outlined above. Although Shah and PriMin can be sure U.S. will do all it can to assist in strengthening armed forces, believe GOI would err if it based its policy toward regional defense solely upon the size of anticipated aid rather than upon its own self-interest and improved Iranian ME prestige.

6) If Turk President discusses Baghdad Pact, believe Shah should carefully consider what Bayar says since Turkey’s role of great importance in ME defense. Turks have considerable experience in multinational defense problems and intimate Turk-Iran exchange views would be especially desirable.

FYI: Although U.S. favors Iranian accession Baghdad Pact, extreme financial stringency which has developed in recent months, plus increased evidence Shah’s desire make accession contingent on large U.S. commitments, compel U.S. move slowly order counteract GOI inclination put increasing price tags on accession. Although U.S. Govt seriously re-examining equipment availabilities and seeking all possible ways assist Iran, nevertheless, for financial reasons we unable increase dollar aid substantially to any country simply because of adherence Baghdad Pact. In view retarded status regional defense planning, U.S. cannot commit itself, even indirectly, to any specific concept ME defense. Furthermore, U.S. not prepared join Pact pending substantial alleviation Arab-Israel conflict. Therefore, to extent possible, U.S. desires separate question adherence Baghdad Pact from level of military aid.

U.S. does not desire so to discourage Shah that he loses heart for Western association, interest in Baghdad Pact or confidence in his internal position. However, given above factors it would be dangerous mislead him into believing U.S. prepared purchase Iran’s adherence. Difficult though it be, U.S. object now is maintain Shah’s appreciation importance laying political foundation of Northern Tier while persuading him specific questions re level and types of aid are long-run continuously changing problems which cannot be irrevocably decided at any given moment.

Will provide further guidance when available.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–1755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hannah and cleared with Baxter, Jernegan, Hoover, and DOD/ISA. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.
2. Document 324.
3. Document 326.
4. See footnote 4, Document 322.
5. Done, according to telegram 511 from Tehran, September 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–2355)
6. The Iranian claim to Bahrein was based in large part on the fact that Persia had ruled Bahrein from 1602 to 1783.
7. Reference is to a conversation between the Shah and Soviet Ambassador Lavrentiev, September 8, reported in telegram 424 from Tehran, September 9. Lavrentiev protested “in strongest terms” against “heavy pressure brought to bear upon Shah and Iranian Government to adhere to Baghdad Pact.” The Soviet Ambassador continued that Iran’s adherence to the pact “would be a blow to world peace and to international understanding, and distinctly prejudicial to friendly relations between USSR and Iran.” The Shah replied that “no pressure had or was being exerted upon him or Iran to join any pact. However, like all other independent countries and members of the United Nations, Iran reserved to itself complete liberty of action to take any defensive measures it might think fit. Iran had no aggressive intentions against Soviet Union, nor was it in position even if it wanted to resort to such aggression. Moreover, Shah requested Soviet Ambassador to inform his government that Iran did not intend to allow establishment upon Iranian soil of military bases of any country unless Iran were attacked.” (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–955)