Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

287. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, January 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

• United States Policy Toward Iran—NSC 5402/1²

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy titled “United States Policy Toward Iran” (NSC 5402/1), prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the Council at its meeting on 13 January 1955.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general accord with the objectives and courses of action set forth in the proposed policy, which are designed to orient Iran more positively toward the West and to change it from a liability to an anti–Communist asset in Asia.

3. Prominent among the courses of action proposed in the draft is the improvement of the effectiveness of Iran’s armed forces, by the provision of military and related defense support aid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the current military assistance program has already contributed materially to that end and should continue to do so. An expanded program would doubtless further enhance the effectiveness of Iran’s forces. However, in view of the limited MDAP funds which can be expected to become available, it is necessary that commitments requiring additional military assistance be restricted primarily to the fulfillment of military requirements and be carefully considered in the light of their relative worldwide importance. Among the primary considerations are (a) the role the recipient country is expected to play in the defense of the region of which it is a part, (b) its technical and moral [morale?] capacity to discharge that role, and (c) the progress the Iranian Army may show under the tutelage of the U.S. training teams.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipate that the forthcoming U.S.–U.K.–Turkey planning talks and the studies incident thereto will make possible a more definite determination of the role Iran should fulfill in the defense of the Middle East. It is considered that, pending such a determination and a demonstrated capacity on the part of Iran’s armed forces to utilize effectively the weapons they now have or will shortly receive, a decision at this time to expand significantly the military assistance program for that country would be premature.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the first sentence in paragraph 14 of the draft statement of policy³ overstates the U.S. expenditures required to develop significant delaying capabilities and recommend that the word “very” be deleted.

6. Paragraph 21 of the draft statement of policy sets forth the conditions which should govern the scope and pace of U.S. military assistance and defense support to Iran. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider these conditions, including those in the bracketed subparagraph e,⁴ to be appropriate criteria. Further, if the principle of subparagraph e is present by implication, as stated in the footnote on page 12,⁵ the Joint Chiefs of Staff can perceive of no objection to its inclusion as a statement of an essential criterion. With respect to the alternate phrasing in the lead–in of paragraph 21,⁶ they consider that either is acceptable provided the proposed subparagraph e is retained. In view of the fact that Iran already has accomplished some reorganization of its military establishment and in the interests of emphasizing the role of the U.S. training teams, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following changes in subparagraph 21 b:⁷

“b. Iran’s ability and willingness to continue reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training under the tutelage of U.S. training teams satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.”

7. Subject to the foregoing comments and recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the adoption of NSC 5402/1 as an acceptable statement of United States policy toward Iran to supersede NSC 5402.

8. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Robt. B. Carney⁸
Chief of Naval Operations

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–1055. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC for consideration at its January 13 meeting under cover of a memorandum from Lay, January 10.
2. See footnote 8, supra.
3. The first sentence in paragraph 14 of NSC 5402/1 reads as follows: “The development of significant defensive delaying capabilities in the Iranian armed forces would require a long–term program involving U.S. expenditures very substantially in excess of present levels.”
4. Subparagraph e reads as follows: “The availability of military assistance and defense support funds in light of U.S. world–wide commitments and duly established priorities.”
5. The footnote on page 12, referring to subparagraph e, reads as follows: “Defense–JCS proposal. The other Planning Board members believe the principle of this paragraph is present by implication in all NSC policies and hence need not be stated here.”
6. Paragraph 21 with the alternative language reads as follows: The amount and the rate of such military and defense support aid to Iran should be directly related to [controlled by]:”. The portion in brackets was a JCS–ODM proposal.
7. Subparagraph b originally read as follows: “Iran’s ability and willingness to institute reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.”
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.