Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

286. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson)²

Washington, January 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Increased Military Aid for Iran—National Security Council Meeting January 13

We have recommended to the Secretary that you accompany him to the NSC meeting on January 13 which will consider a new policy statement on Iran. We have also suggested that you be asked to give an oral report on the situation in Iran. In this connection and as a follow–up to our informal meeting in your office on Monday,³ I submit the following brief review of developments on the question of increasing the military aid program for Iran.

1. Current Military Assistance to Iran. Since 1950, a total of $124 million in military aid has been programmed for Iran.⁴ The objectives of this limited program, as presently constituted, will be met by 1957. The Defense Department considers that $10 million a year in military aid will then suffice to maintain the Iranian military establishment.

2. The Shah’s Request for Increased Military Aid. The Shah asked, while visiting Washington in December 1954, for “additional aid in the matter of training and also to furnish us, just as fast as we are prepared to make effective use of them, all the weapons required by a modern Army—weapons which in our case would be required not only for our own defense but also for that of the region”. He also asked for help in giving to the Iranian armed forces “food and clothing of the kind which men undergoing rigorous training should have … and funds with which to resettle some of our contingents in more strategic areas or to transfer our military stores to places where they will be less vulnerable”.⁵

3. The U.S. Response. U.S. military and civilian officials took the line, in response, that we are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to the defense of the Zagros Mountain line. However, until intensive training has improved the Iranian Army’s ability to make effective use of modern weapons it will not be possible for the US to evaluate the military role which Iranian forces should play. We do not want, furthermore, to develop a military establishment in Iran which would be an undue burden on the national economy. We would be prepared to ask Congress for some defense support funds for Iran in FY 1956 but we need assurances that, as oil revenues increase, the Shah will see to it there is enough set aside to make a major contribution towards supporting the armed forces and thereby reduce reliance on foreign aid. (See memorandum of conversation between Shah, Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense and high military officers—Tab A.)⁶

One of the principal elements in the situation will be the determination of Middle East defense requirements by the US, UK, Turkey military staff talks⁷ referred to later in this memorandum. We did not, of course, inform the Shah of these talks.

We have learned from reliable sources that the Shah received a good impression from his reception here, although he has expressed the hope that US Government decisions on the Iranian military problem will not be too long delayed.

4. Revision of NSC Policy Statement on Iran. Following the oil settlement, it was decided that the NSC statement of policy toward Iran should be revised to reflect recent developments and to project our future course of action. The major point discussed in the NSC Planning Board has been whether the US Government should decide now to increase military aid for Iran in order to take advantage of favorable political and psychological elements in the Iranian situation and take into account the impact of the Shah’s visit to the United States. The Department has recognized from the start that training and reorganization designed to improve Iran’s ability to utilize and absorb military equipment must precede shipments of additional equipment. The major point of dispute between Defense and State has been over the question of timing. Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold firmly to the view that no decisions can be taken on this matter until after a review of the purely military requirements for defense of the entire Middle East has been completed. In the meantime, additional training teams are being sent to Iran; but Defense admits that the effect of these teams will not be felt much before the end of this year nor can these teams make any useful recommendations concerning a military buildup in Iran until after July at the earliest.

The following language has been suggested as a new statement of “Objectives” as regards military aid:⁸

“Iranian armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and having defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense.

“Iranian participation at an appropriate time in Middle East defense arrangements.”

The “Courses of Action” designed to achieve the above objectives which have been agreed upon at NSC Planning Board levels are listed below:

• “I. Take the necessary steps, including, as appropriate, provision of military and related defense support aid for Iran, to help:

  a. Develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense.

  b. Improve the ability of the Iranian armed forces to maintain internal security.

  c. Enhance the prestige of the monarchy and the morale of the Iranian Government and the military services.

  d. Give the Iranian Government and the people a greater degree of confidence in the ability of the Iranian armed forces to defend Iran.

  In carrying out this course of action keep the UK informed in general of the program and its objectives, and coordinate the program with the capabilities and plans of the UK, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan for the defense of the area.

• II. The amount and the rate of such military and defense support aid to Iran should be directly related to:

  a. The attitude of Iran with regard to this aid and with regard to political, economic, and military cooperation with the free world, including Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq.

  b. Iran’s ability and willingness to institute reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.

  c. The role which Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense.

  d. The ability of Iran to make increasingly larger contributions toward supporting its military establishment by use of its own resources, thereby progressively reducing reliance on foreign aid.

• III. Encourage Iran to enter into military cooperation with its neighbors as feasible, and to participate in any regional defense arrangements at an appropriate time which may be developed for the Middle East.”

5. Defense–JCS Attempts to Set Limitations on Action. In the opening sentence of Paragraph II (above) Defense–JCS have proposed substituting “controlled by” for the words “directly related to”. This would run the risk, in our view, of giving undue weight to technical considerations without sufficient regard for the more important political and psychological elements of this problem.

Defense–JCS have also proposed the addition of the following subparagraph to Paragraph II above:

“The availability of military assistance and defense support funds in the light of US world–wide commitments and duly established priorities.”

This would, in our view, imply that this consideration, which affects all aid programs, should be especially applicable to Iran. We are recommending to the Secretary, in a separate memorandum,⁹ that he oppose these Defense–JCS suggestions.

6. Our Estimate of Defense–JCS Thinking. It can be expected that our military establishment will refer to Paragraph II (c) whenever political and psychological questions are raised as evidence of the need to move rapidly in expanding our military aid to Iran. Military talks between the US, UK and Turkey are to commence on January 18 in London.¹⁰ It is believed that the talks will concern the purely military requirements for defense of the Middle East. It is also believed that the Zagros Mountain line will be treated as the first line of defense. It is impossible to guess what these military talks will produce concerning the importance of an Iranian Army capable of defense against Soviet aggression.

The “McClure Plan”¹¹ submitted last fall by the Commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iran has been totally disregarded according to the Defense representative at the NSC Planning Board. So far as can be determined, there is no present intention in Defense of considering a program of the nature recommended by General McClure.¹²

2. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–755. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman and approved by Baxter and Kitchen.
3. January 3; no record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
4. At this point the following phrase was deleted from the memorandum: “of which about 70% has been delivered.”
5. Ellipsis in the source text. The quotes are taken from a memorandum handed to President Eisenhower by the Shah during his visit to the White House, December 13, 1954. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/12–1454) A summary of this memorandum is printed as Tab A to a memorandum from Jernegan to Dulles, December 9, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1066.
6. Attached but not printed. The discussion at this meeting was summarized in telegram 1187 to Tehran, December 15, ibid., p. 1076.
7. See Document 7.
8. The sentences quoted in the paragraphs below are revisions to draft NSC 5402/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” December 30, 1954. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402—Memoranda) NSC 5402/1 was prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted to the Council for its consideration at its meeting on January 13. NSC 5402/1 was a revision of NSC 5402, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” January 2, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 865.
9. Document 289.
10. At this point Jernegan deleted the following sentence: “Although an agenda has reportedly not yet been drawn up.”
11. Reference is to Brigadier General McClure’s memorandum of September 2, 1954, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army, not printed.
12. The following handwritten note from Jernegan to Henderson appears on the source text: “LWH: I was assured that the U.S.–U.K.–Turk talks in London have a much broader scope than merely to determine the manpower required to defend the Zagros line. JDJ”.