267. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council
Secretariat (Boggs)
to the National Security Council Planning
Board1
Washington, October 8,
1957.
SUBJECT
- Review of Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East
REFERENCES
- A. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, September 6, 1957, item
42
- B. Memo for Planning Board, September 5, 1957,3
and Memo for Board Assistants, September 16, 1957 (State)4
- C. Memo for Board Assistants, October 4, 1957 (Defense)5
- D. Memo for Board Assistants, September 13, 1957 (CIA)6
The enclosed draft list of questions on the subject is transmitted
herewith for use by the Board Assistants at an early meeting in
preparing a list of questions for Planning Board discussion pursuant to
Reference A.
The enclosure consists of a topical arrangement, prepared by the NSC Staff, of the State, Defense and CIA questions circulated by References B–D,
supplemented by NSC Staff questions not
previously circulated. All questions submitted by State, Defense and
CIA have been included in the
enclosure with the exception of No. 6 in the State list of September
5.
[Page 613]
[Enclosure]
REVIEW OF LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST: POLICY
QUESTIONS
- 1.
- U.S. Objectives. Are the following
objectives in the Near East the most important for the
protection of U.S. security interests?
- a.
- The elimination or reduction of Soviet Bloc influence
in the area.
- b.
- The production and transit of oil through the area of
the Middle East to the satisfaction of Free World
requirements.
- c.
- Denying the Soviet Bloc access to the resources,
markets, and lines of communication of the Middle
East.
- d.
- The development of pro-U.S. governments in all nations
of the area. (Defense)
- 2.
- U.S. Commitments
- a.
-
The United States has formally assumed Free World
leadership in the Near East. How shall we carry out
this endeavor, and to what degree should we commit
our prestige to it? (State)
or
- a.
- In view of the deep involvement of U.S. prestige and
interest in the Near East, what action should the U.S.
take to maintain its prestige and interest against the
formidable challenges they now face in the area? ([less than 1 line of source text not
declassified])
- b.
- Should the U.S. undertake additional commitments with
respect to the Near East in order to meet contingencies,
such as subversion and non-Communist aggression, which
are not provided for under the terms of the Joint
Resolution? (Defense)
- c.
- Should circumstances require it, do we have the
capability in the area for quick and effective action in
such “limited war” contingencies as an outbreak of
Arab-Israel hostilities; an armed attack by a Middle
East nation under the control of international Communism
against another nation in the area; a Communist-inspired
internal uprising against the established government of
a friendly Near East state? (State)
- 3.
- The Baghdad Pact and Arab Unity
- a.
- What is our present view of the Baghdad Pact? NSC 5428 (para. 6-c) stated
that the immediate benefits of a Northern Tier defense
arrangement would be primarily political and
psychological. Do we still view these as the primary
benefits or do we consider the Pact an important
military instrument? (NSC Staff) Should the U.S. attempt to
expand the membership of the Baghdad Pact?
(Defense)
- b.
- What should be our attitude towards “Arab unity”? Are
there other possible regional groupings which we should
promote? Have recent developments altered our thinking
as to the short-term and long-range roles to be played
by indigenous forces in area defense? (State)
- c.
- Should we establish contingency planning in the event
Arab unity should prevail? In such an eventuality, what
Arab leadership would be in the best interests of the
U.S.? (Defense)
- 4.
- U.S. Bases
- a.
- Does our new role in the area require us to seek
peace-time expansion of our military facilities and
bases in the Near East? Should we seek stockpiling
facilities in the area? Do we need to station additional
forces there? Are our transit rights adequate?
(State)
- b.
- What is our future need for our military installations
at Dhahran; and how can they be made more secure?
(State)
- 5.
- Soviet Penetration
- a.
- What degree of Soviet presence in the area can the
United States tolerate? Is it possible to arrive at a
workable modus vivendi with the USSR in the area? (State)
- (1)
- What should be our attitude toward area states
which assume a neutralist policy and position?
([less than 1 line of source
text not declassified])
- (2)
- What should be our attitude toward area states
which (a) accept a close relationship with the
Soviet Bloc, or (b) gradually accept Communist
doctrine and establish the Communist system? ([less than 1 line of source text not
declassified])
- (3)
- What should be our attitude toward the further
extension of Soviet influence and Soviet activity
throughout the Near East area by legal means not
involving the use of force? ([less than 1 line of source text not
declassified])
- (4)
- Can an acceptable mechanism for controlling
arms shipments to the area be devised?
(State)
- b.
- In order to prevent further Soviet influence and
penetration in the Near East, should the U.S. adopt
courses of action vis-à-vis the USSR which involve a more direct
confrontation of Soviet activity and interests in the
area? (Defense)
- c.
- Can we expect to do more than isolate Syria and Egypt?
(State) Is Egyptian and/or Syrian cooperation with the
U.S. essential to future stability and settlement in the
Near East? If such cooperation is essential, what
actions can induce such cooperation? (Defense)
- d.
- Can we take steps to lessen the dependence of certain
states in the area on Soviet Bloc markets for an outlet
for their exports? In view of the importance of cotton
to several of the states, should we review our own
cotton purchase and disposal programs? (State)
- e.
- How can we best assure the leadership of responsible
and constructive elements in the growing trade union
movement in the area? (State)
- 6.
- U.S. Aid Programs
- a.
- How can we reconcile our increased role in the area
with significant public and congressional sentiment
favoring a curtailment of economic and military
assistance programs? (State)
- b.
- Should the U.S. as a government make a greater
coordinated effort with respect to the Near East and
accord it higher priority in policy considerations?
Should U.S. assistance elsewhere in the world be
decreased accordingly to provide the necessary U.S.
resources? (Defense)
- c.
- To what extent should the U.S. engage in regional as
opposed to bilateral aid programs? (NSC Staff)
- d.
- In the light of the limited economic capability of the
majority of Near East countries, should our U.S. grant
military assistance furnished in the future be limited
to providing equipment and training primarily for
internal security purposes, with reliance on U.S.
capabilities for defense against external aggression?
(Defense)
- e.
- In view of the fact that Jordan is not an economically
viable state, are we prepared to provide continuing
economic support for an indefinite period? Is there any
alternative which is compatible with U.S. interests?
(NSC Staff)
- 7.
- Jordan River Development. What
alternatives are possible and what approach should we take on
Jordan River water development? (State)
- 8.
- Arab-Israeli Dispute
- a.
- The Secretary of State’s speech of August 26, 1955
indicated our willingness to take the initiative in
assisting the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute to work
toward a settlement. In view of recent developments,
would it now be in the U.S. interest for this country to
assume the leading role in such an endeavor?
(State)
- b.
- Would U.S. security interests in the Near East be
better advanced by backing one side or the other in the
event the Arab-Israeli dispute remains unsettled: (1) in
the short-term and (2) over the long-run?
(Defense)
- c.
- Can and should the USSR be forced to clarify its pro-Arab
position, e.g., does it include dissolution of Israel?
(NSC Staff)
- d.
- Are there further steps which the United States can
take to prevent the question of the Gulf of Aqaba from
becoming an explosive issue? (State)
- e.
- What is to be our long-run policy with respect to the
Gaza strip and with respect to the continued maintenance
of the UN Emergency Force
in Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh? (NSC Staff)
- f.
- What should be done about the Palestine refugee
problem? What are present prospects of action on the
proposals of the Secretary of State in his speech of
August 26, 1955? What should be the U.S. attitude toward
extension of the mandate of UNRWA beyond 1960 when its present mandate
expires? Should the U.S. increase the percentage of its
support (70%)? Would such an increase contribute
significantly to rehabilitation and resettlement?
(NSC Staff)
- 9.
- Oil (Including the
Suez Canal Problem)
- a.
- Can we strengthen the position of the Suez Canal as a
truly international waterway? What degree of moral and
material support should we give to proposals for
alternatives to the Suez Canal? (State)
- b.
- Are present arrangements for the production and
transit through the area of Near East petroleum
resources adequately responsive to area political trends
and the needs of the consuming countries? (State)
- c.
- Would a revision of recent U.S. policy regarding
voluntary oil import restrictions, which would permit an
increase in U.S. oil imports from the Middle East,
enhance U.S. influence in the area over the long term?
(Defense)
- 10.
- Roles of Other Non-Near Eastern Countries in
the Area
- a.
- What are the future roles of Britain and France in the
area? (State)
- b.
- How can we help to improve relations between the
United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia? (State)
- c.
- Is it to our interest to promote increased roles for
Italy and the German Federal Republic in the area?
(State)
- d.
- Can Greece and India play constructive roles in the
area? (State)
- e.
- Should we seek to strengthen the relations between the
states of North Africa and those of the Near East?
(State)
- f.
- What contributions can the United Nations make to the
stability and economic and political progress of the
area? (State)