Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

266. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 30-2-57

Washington, October 8, 1957.

NEAR EAST DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US INTERESTS²

The Problem

To analyze probable developments affecting US interests in the area during the next several years.³

Summary

1. The situation in the Near East has changed profoundly within the past few years and the outlook for Western and US interests has deteriorated. While British and French influence in the area has declined, the USSR has entered actively into Near East affairs by supporting the radical element of the Arab nationalist movement. As yet radical Arab nationalists control only Egypt and Syria. However, sympathy and support for their strong anti-Western, revolutionary, and pan-Arab policies come from a substantial majority of the Arabs of the Near East. Within the region, indigenous Arab support for Western interests comes largely from the outnumbered and often weakly-led conservative nationalist elements.

2. The present military regimes in Egypt and Syria, or ones like them, will probably remain in power for the next few years. If they do, the economic and military dependence of both Egypt and Syria on the Bloc is likely to increase. Nasser and the Syrian leaders will probably continue to exert a powerful influence over radical Arab nationalists throughout the area, except in the unlikely event of their emerging clearly as Soviet puppets. The chief weakness of the radical Arab nationalists will lie in domestic economic problems and in the divisive influences of special local interests and personal struggles for power and leadership. Effective unity among this group is unlikely, except on the issues of Israel and anti-colonialism. Nevertheless, even if the present Syrian or Egyptian regimes should fall, the radical Arab nationalist movement will continue as a basic element in the Near East situation.

3. The conservative grouping, composed of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, forms a loose coalition of regimes that look to the US for aid because of their common interest in the existing system and opposition to the forces of revolution represented by the radicals. They do not reject the basic ideas of Arab nationalism, and they are more tolerant than the US of Arab relations with the Bloc. King Saud, even more than the other conservative leaders, is likely to seek to maintain the appearance of loyalty to the principle of Arab solidarity, despite his differences with the radicals.

4. Prospects for broadening or consolidating the position of the conservative forces in the Arab states are poor, although these forces will continue to be an important factor in the area. [10 lines of source text not declassified]

5. A principal obstacle to stability in the area and to a cooperative relationship between the US and local states is the hostility between the Arab states and Israel. Given the Arab arms build-up, Israel’s forceful policy, and the unwillingness of either side to compromise, prospects for a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem are poor.

6. We believe that there will almost certainly be some armed conflict in the area during the next several years. The chances of hostilities arising out of the Arab-Israel situation are better than even. Any armed intervention in Syria would probably spread to involve Arab-Israel fighting. Hostilities might arise out of the collapse of the regime in Jordan, and the chances of such hostilities spreading to an Arab-Israel conflict are better than even. We believe that fighting will occur on the Aden-Yemen border or in the Muscat-Oman area, but that such fighting would probably not spread to other Arab areas. In the event of hostilities, the USSR may employ threats and demonstrations of force, but it is unlikely to risk general war in order to defend all or any part of its present position in the area, although the risk of miscalculation might be considerable.

7. With the objective of strengthening its influence and harassing the West, the Bloc will continue to aim at such primary targets as Western oil concessions and military bases, and Western relations with Israel. It is unlikely that the Bloc will try to establish Communist regimes in the area within the next few years, but will continue to represent itself as the champion of Arab nationalism and to attempt to bring the Arab states one by one within the Soviet sphere of influence. Although radical Arab nationalist governments are unlikely for the next year or so willingly to grant the USSR military bases on their soil, construction of installations, including port facilities, in the area for the operation and maintenance of Soviet-made armaments creates facilities which could be used on short notice by the USSR as physical extensions of its own military power.

8. Pressures on Western oil companies for arrangements more favorable to producing and transit countries will mount. At least as long as conservative governments remain in power in the producing countries, arrangements acceptable to Western interests can probably be worked out. Egypt and Syria will probably seek to keep facilities open for the sake of revenues and to maintain good relations with the oil-producing Arab states. Egypt and Syria are unlikely, except under extreme provocation, to exercise their capability to stop the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.

Discussion

Recent Developments

9. In the past two years the decline of the British and French role in the Arab area has been greatly hastened. Meanwhile, the Soviet Bloc has established itself as a power with direct interests and influence in the Near East through the supply of arms to Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen, through its role in the Suez crisis, and through an intensive political, economic, and cultural campaign. During this period the US has emerged as the recognized representative of Western interests. The Near East has thus become a principal arena of the contest between the US and the USSR.

10. These developments in external forces have interacted with changes within the area itself. Nasser has become, especially since the Suez episode, the spokesman and symbol of radical Pan-Arab nationalism. Yet even before the Suez crisis conservative Moslem and Christian leaders had become concerned at Nasser’s tendency to take unilateral actions in self-assumed leadership of the Arab world and at his steady drift toward the Communist Bloc which they felt was a threat to their position. Egyptian subversive activities in other Arab states also encouraged distrust of Nasser. Hence the ruling groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan/and Saudi Arabia welcomed the announcement of the American Doctrine as an opportunity to strengthen their own positions. Thus has emerged a division of the Arab Near East into two loose groupings.

11. Radical Pan-Arab nationalism is the movement of Nasser and the Syrian leaders. They advocate the union of all Arabs in a single state. Among Arab leaders they are both the most dynamic and the most violent in their anti-Westernism, the most interested in a military buildup as a symbol of Arab strength, and at the present time the most activist in their hostility toward Israel. They are revolutionaries who believe in replacing many traditional social and economic institutions with a state socialism of their own devising. The majority of politically conscious Arab Moslems throughout the Near East, particularly the middle class intelligentsia, are sympathetic to this concept of Arab nationalism. Its proponents believe that the West’s only interests in the Near East are Israel, oil, and domination of the area. They also believe the West to be opposed to their concept of Arab unity. During the past two years they have become largely convinced that Soviet Bloc assistance will be helpful to them in overcoming Western obstruction, and that they can safely accept such Bloc support.

12. Conservative Arab nationalism is represented in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq by the ruling dynasties and their supporters. In Lebanon it is represented by the present government and supported by the traditionally dominant Christian element. These forces are wedded to the traditional Arab nationalist concept of Arab solidarity, but they reject the radicals’ concept of a single Arab state. These elements share the general Arab opposition to “imperialist” special privilege and hostility to Israel. However, their supporters are the more conservative and more traditional elements with a vested interest in the status quo in the separate Arab states. They are equally suspicious of the radical nationalists’ new order and of Soviet support of their rivals. Hence they seek assistance from the West, despite differences over Israel. This conservative point of view is largely confined to the upper and professional classes and has little popular support.

Pattern of Arab State Relationships

13. The present lineup of radical and conservative forces has assumed no rigid form; the relative strength of each side and the degree of difference between them will vary. Both radicals and conservatives will remain basically neutralist in outlook and will accept extra-area relationships mainly with the objective of improving their relative position within the area. Both groups will continue to agree on the objective of Arab independence and both will remain violently antagonistic toward Israel and “imperialism.” Despite the differences between them, these common interests will tend to draw them together. Nonetheless, these two groupings reflect the main lines of conflict over local and regional issues. It is likely that they will persist throughout the period of this estimate and that they will be generally on opposite sides of the East-West competition for influence in the area.

14. The Egyptian-Syrian Axis: The radical nationalists are in control in Egypt and Syria. There is a formal alliance between the two countries and a military agreement places forces of both under the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief.⁴ The members of the dominant coalition in Syria have followed Nasser’s example and he probably still has considerable influence over them, though not a controlling one. In fact they have probably already gone further in their relations with the Soviet Bloc than Nasser would have thought desirable. There are no immediate prospects that this grouping of states will become any more close-knit. In its international alignment the Yemen must be classified with this group, largely because of the traditional claims of its dynasty against Aden.

15. Nevertheless, the radical Pan-Arab nationalist group in all the Arab states has acquired strength from Nasser’s gains at the expense of the West. It can point to his success in obtaining arms and economic assistance from the Soviet Bloc while still maintaining his “positive neutralism.” It can claim leadership in Arab opposition to “imperialism” and Israel and can play effectively on the vulnerability of the conservative Arab local nationalists to charges of collaboration with the West. On the other hand, its relations with the Bloc lay it open increasingly to countercharges of too-close collaboration with the USSR and the abandonment of “neutrality.”

16. The Conservative Arab Group: The conservative Arab nationalists are a disparate group. Aside from the mutual defense treaty between Iraq and Jordan, there is no other formal alliance or understanding among them and there are many factors that separate them. Jordan has had reason to fear being swallowed up by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Hashimite Jordan and Iraq in the past have been separated from Saudi Arabia by the traditional dynastic feud, although this dynastic dispute plays a lesser role today. Iraq has been separated from the other states by its membership in the Baghdad Pact. Although all the states of this group cooperate in one way or another with the US and have accepted US aid, only Iraq and Lebanon were willing formally to accept assistance under the American Doctrine. Lebanon, which because of its large Christian population and ties with the West has more reasons than the other states to adhere to the conservative group, makes little contribution to its strength.

17. The principal bond among these states is their common fear of the threat they see to their position in the policies and methods of the radical Pan-Arab nationalists. To guard themselves against this threat, they are ready to accept Western support. Their desire for good relations with the West is also based on the fact that this group includes the principal oil producing states, which need to maintain good relations with the Western states which provide their principal markets.

Prospects for Change in Relationships Among the States

18. The factors which created the Egyptian-Syrian alliance are likely to persist and this alliance, accordingly, is likely to continue in some form. However, its cohesiveness is likely to be affected by the geographical separation of the two countries, by incipient policy differences between them and by internal economic and political instability.

19. Stability in Egypt:⁵ Although the Egyptian regime will face increasing domestic problems and growing opposition, no opposition group appears to be likely to develop the capability to take over. If Nasser were eliminated, a coalition of his principal lieutenants would probably continue with most of his policies, but would almost certainly be a less potent influence in the Arab world.

20. Stability in Syria:⁶ The open assumption of power in Syria by a radical pro-Soviet coalition in August 1957 was a blow to the hopes and a challenge to the position of conservatives throughout the area. However, Syria’s conservative Arab neighbors are unlikely to take action. The regimes in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon are torn between feeling that something must be done and awareness of the dangers involved in an attempt. Singly or in combination, they lack the capability of effective intervention. Moreover, they, like Saudi Arabia, are restrained by unwillingness further to rupture Arab unity. In some form or other, the dominant coalition will probably remain in power. Whatever its form, it will almost certainly retain its orientation toward the Soviet Bloc.

21. Turkey is keenly aware of the dangers involved in a pro-Soviet government in Syria and is anxious that some positive action be taken to overthrow the Syrian coalition. However, Soviet warnings, realization that to be politically successful intervention in Syria must appear to be Arab, and awareness that Iraq would be unlikely to commit itself, make it unlikely that Turkey will act without prior assurance of US support. Turkey’s concern will not abate, however, and the possibility of precipitate action by Turkey cannot be ruled out.

22. If a conservative government were established in Syria through outside intervention, it might prove able to maintain itself initially with the help of outside forces. Its ability to retain control for any length of time, however, would probably diminish if it appeared to have gained power through the intervention of non-Arab states.

23. Stability of Conservative Grouping: The radical nationalist group will continue its efforts to undermine the conservative regimes and to break up the tenuous unity of the conservative group of countries. In Jordan, the Palestinian majority opposes King Hussein’s pro-Western stand, and Egypt and Syria may succeed in promoting the return to power of a radical nationalist government such as that dismissed by Hussein last April. However, they will probably try to avoid the break up of Jordan, as this would almost certainly precipitate a general Arab scramble for territory, in which Israel would feel compelled to participate and which would greatly increase the chance of great power involvement.

[Numbered paragraph 24 (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

25. Saud is likely to insist on seeing his policy of friendship with the US generously rewarded and is not likely to be reasonable or easy to deal with on questions of military or economic assistance. He will compare his receipts from the US with what Nasser, Syria, and the Yemen get from the Soviets. King Saud, however, is genuinely suspicious of the Communist Bloc and is unlikely seriously to consider close relations with it. Nevertheless, he will continue to make gestures of cooperation with the radical Arab nationalist group from time to time, primarily to preserve a facade of Arab unity, but also to win concessions from the US.

26. Iraq is likely to remain a stable force in the conservative nationalist group and to continue its membership in the Baghdad Pact, at least as long as the present ruling group remains in power. In the absence of US encouragement and support, Iraq is unlikely to take the initiative in exercising leadership in the conservative grouping. There are forces of opposition to the conservative regime in Iraq which will probably grow during the next few years, but they are unlikely to take control.

27. In Lebanon the traditionally dominant Christian element and its supporters are apprehensive of an Arab world dominated by Moslem Pan-Arab nationalists and will support the conservative proponents of local nationalism in the area. In the event of a breakup in the grouping of conservative states, the conservative elements now in control in Lebanon will seek a more direct relationship with the West.

28. The situation is temporarily quiescent in the Persian Gulf and on the southern rim of the Arabian Peninsula, except for continuing disturbances on the Aden–Yemen border. However, the area remains a fertile ground for Arab and Soviet efforts to harass the British, and further armed conflict is likely. The British still consider this area vital to their interests and will use force if necessary to maintain their position, although they will be considerably hampered by the pressure of US and world opinion. In Bahrein and Kuwait there is an even chance of serious opposition to the British-supported conservative governments from urban elements.

Other Factors in the Situation

Communism

29. In the Near East, as elsewhere, local Communist parties have in recent years followed the strategy of attempting to cooperate, rather than compete, with the more popular nationalist groups. In Syria the local party, though legally proscribed, has attained a certain recognition. Its leader exercises some influence upon the ruling clique, which includes at least one Communist sympathizer, General Bizri. A major source of Communist strength in Syria is the 15–20,000-strong paramilitary Futuwwa youth movement which has received training in the use of small arms and street fighting techniques under Major Burhan Qasab Hasan, who is almost certainly a Communist. In the other Arab states, Communist parties are illegal and their governments have continued to harass local Communists. In Jordan, the party is a small but significant part of the opposition and potentially dangerous.

30. We have no evidence of any change in the attitude of Arab governments toward local Communist parties. Nevertheless, in those countries where local attitudes toward the Bloc continue to become more favorable, it is reasonable to assume that the intelligentsia will show increased interest in the Communist system, that there will be some softening of government action against local Communists, and that the domestic Communist parties will expand both their overt organizations and their covert penetration of nationalist groups. Communists are likely to play an active role in the development of Arab labor organizations, and with Egyptian and Syrian support may become an increasingly dangerous source of unrest and agitation in key industrial and commercial areas such as Basra, Kirkuk, Aden, and the Persian Gulf oil centers. They will also continue to win support among Palestine refugees.

Military⁷

31. As a result of the general arms buildup throughout the area, the military capabilities of the individual countries are likely to improve. The rate of improvement in the Arab armed forces, however, will continue to be slow and suffer from serious deficiencies in leadership, logistics, and technology. Israel’s manpower limitations will make further strengthening of its forces largely dependent on qualitative improvements. Should Soviet arms deliveries and training assistance continue at roughly the present level—as we believe likely—and should Western assistance remain limited, the military power of Egypt and Syria will constitute a growing pressure on their neighbors and a threat to Israel. Syrian forces will continue to be incapable of defending their country against an invasion by Turkish or, for the near future, Israeli forces.

32. Israeli military strength constitutes a strong deterrent to attack by its Arab enemies. For at least the next year or so, Israel unaided will probably retain the capability to defend itself successfully against the combined ground forces of all Arab states. Furthermore, it now has and will retain the capability to launch severe air strikes against most important Egyptian and Syrian targets. Israel will probably continue for the same period to be capable of defeating the armed forces of Syria and Jordan, and occupying the Sinai Peninsula. However, it will remain vulnerable to surprise air attack by Egypt and Syria, and in less than a year its shipping will be vulnerable to Egyptian submarine attack.

33. At least for the next year or so it is unlikely that Egypt or Syria will grant the USSR the right to establish military bases on their soil, or that the USSR will seek such bases. In fact, the objectives of the Bloc’s military assistance program are primarily political. However, the construction of installations, including port facilities, in Syria and Egypt for the operation and maintenance of Soviet-made armaments creates facilities which could be used on short notice by the USSR as physical extensions of its own military power.

Economic Prospects

34. Since World War II the interest in economic development and in increased military strength has made new demands on limited economic resources of Near East states. Revenues from petroleum can be utilized in some states, but all will continue to try to get foreign assistance for their economic development and military programs. In consequence, the Western-oriented states importune their friends, particularly the US, for aid, and Bloc offers of assistance have found receptive audiences in other countries.

35. Given available resources and local government policies, prospects for general economic progress during the period of this estimate are not promising except in Iraq. The mass of the people in most Arab states is unlikely to achieve much, if any, improvement in their standard of living and many will lose ground. Jordan, without a viable economy and burdened by a large refugee population, will be heavily dependent on outside assistance. Lebanon may hold the line economically, though its revenues are somewhat dependent on access to the hinterland through Syria. Israel will press forward with its own ambitious development plans, but they will remain heavily dependent on a flow of funds from abroad. Plans for a marked increase in immigration, however, threaten Israel’s net economic gain.

36. The outlook is most promising in Iraq, which has underway a well coordinated development plan amply financed by oil revenues. These revenues, however, are primarily dependent upon the flow of oil through pipelines to the Mediterranean coast across Syria. Barring prolonged disruption of the pipelines, the plan’s impact will almost certainly be increasingly felt, and the general economic improvement may contribute to greater political stability.

37. Of the countries accepting Bloc economic aid, Syria stands to gain the most. The credits recently promised by the USSR may enable Syria to satisfy its development needs for some time. Although details have not been settled, it appears that the USSR will undertake several of the projects envisaged in the Syrian government’s $180 million six-year development scheme. However, increasing rapprochement with the USSR and the socialist orientation of the government may discourage private investment, in which case additional outside assistance— from the Bloc or elsewhere—would be required. It is likely that the Bloc will extend further financial assistance with the primary objective of increasing Syrian economic and political dependence. Increased economic dependence on the Bloc, however, may arouse apprehension among Arab nationalists and result in some pressure on the Syrian government to modify its policy.

38. The Bloc has assumed a major role in certain areas of Egyptian economic life. About 10 percent of Egypt’s annual cotton exports will be required for the next five years to pay for the arms received prior to 1957; Egypt is indebted to the Bloc for $17 million worth of construction projects now underway. By mid-1957 the Soviet Bloc had become the principal purchaser of Egyptian cotton (55 percent) and the chief supplier of wheat (65 percent) and of petroleum (50 percent). This situation, however, is partly the consequence of reduced Western and Indian cotton purchases and the termination of PL 480 wheat sales.

39. In accord with its stated policy of neutrality, Egypt will probably continue to seek to balance economic relations between the Bloc and the West. The country’s complex economic problems, sharpened by population pressure and limited natural resources, will lead it to seek additional amounts of foreign assistance. In the absence of Western aid and investment, and substantial Free World cotton purchases, Egypt is likely to make greater demands on the Bloc which, whether Nasser intends it or not, are likely to increase his dependence upon the Bloc. Even if assistance becomes available on a sizable scale, we believe that it will not reverse the downward trend in the Egyptian standard of living.

Petroleum

40. The non-Communist world looks increasingly for its petroleum requirements to the vast reserves of the Middle East.⁸ This is particularly true of Western Europe, which now consumes almost three million barrels of oil per day, of which 72 percent comes from the Middle East. In 1965 Western Europe is expected to consume more than six million barrels per day, of which about 75 percent will come from the Middle East.

41. The existing pattern of oil production and transportation in the Middle East is being subjected to pressure both from nationalistic movements and governments within the area, which are seeking increased revenue and more control over oil operations, and from the probable entry of new foreign companies, chiefly Japanese, Italian, and West German, which would almost certainly be prepared to offer more favorable terms to the host countries. As a result, a revision of the present 50–50 division of production profits and an increase in charges for pipeline transit facilities appear probable within the next few years. However, at least as long as the conservative nationalist governments continue to control the major oil-producing areas, expropriation and prohibitive royalty fees and other excessive financial demands are unlikely.

42. The future of various plans for new pipelines⁹ and the likelihood of expansion of the Suez Canal’s capacity for oil shipments remain uncertain. Under these circumstances, the present pattern of movement of Middle East oil to the Free World west of Suez—35 percent via pipeline and 65 percent via the Suez Canal—appears likely to remain basically unchanged during the next five years. An increasing number of new super-tankers capable of using the Cape of Good Hope route will be put in service during the next few years.¹⁰ These will probably not affect the pattern of oil movement toward Western Europe under normal conditions. In the event of closure of the Suez Canal and/or the pipelines, however, full mobilization of tanker capacity and diversion of Western Hemisphere oil might make it possible for Western Europe to meet its minimum requirements.

43. Egypt and Syria are unlikely, except under extreme provocation, to exercise their capability to stop the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf area to the Mediterranean. Syria and Egypt will wish to conserve revenues from the pipelines and the Suez Canal, and will hesitate to provoke the West and the oil producing Arab states on a matter so critical. The USSR will probably maintain as an objective the denial of Near East oil resources to the West. However, under ordinary conditions, the Bloc would probably be inhibited from seeking to acquire major oil concessions by its position as a surplus producer of oil and its lack of excess refining, storage, transportation, and market facilities. At the same time, the Bloc might attempt to market small amounts of Middle East oil as a token breach of the Western monopoly.

Suez Canal

44. Egypt regards its control of the Canal as a matter of national prestige. It will seek to operate and develop the Canal in an efficient manner, particularly in view of the fact that it will have to seek outside financial assistance for necessary development of the Canal. Egypt is unlikely to interfere with traffic, other than Israeli, except under crisis conditions. Nasser will remain adamant on the question of the transit of the Canal by Israeli flag vessels or by vessels carrying strategic materials to Israel.

The Arab-Israel Problem

45. Opposition to Israel continues to be the principal point of agreement among all factions of Arabs and acute tension between the Arab states and Israel will continue throughout the period of this estimate. The likelihood of armed clashes is heightened by Israel’s dynamism, as evidenced in its border area development activities, and by the Arab attitude of intransigent hostility. While there is no indication that either side plans an attack in the near future, Israel’s fear that Syrian and Egyptian absorption of Soviet arms will deprive it of military superiority could lead to another preventive war within the next year or so. The French will probably continue their support of Israel.

46. A resumption of the Israeli policy of “active defense”¹¹ would revive Arab clamor for action against Israel but probably would not result in any Arab military operation against Israel until Egyptian and Syrian military leaders estimated that their forces had acquired sufficient superiority to inflict serious damage on the Israeli armed forces or territory. Despite Egypt’s and Syria’s ability to launch surprise attacks they will lack the overall capability to offer Israel a serious military challenge for at least another year.

47. Both the Arab states and Israel have persisted in their uncompromising attitude on the settlement of individual issues between them, the most important of which concerns the Arab refugees. Arab political leaders continue to regard the refugee question as a valuable asset in a final settlement of the Palestine issue, while bitterness against the West has made the refugees themselves an easy prey for Syro-Egyptian and Communist influences and anti-Western propaganda. Moreover, popular sentiment in most Arab states tends to deter Arab governments from any readiness to compromise on the refugee question.

48. For its part, the government of Israel has shown little disposition to negotiate the question on a basis acceptable to the Arabs. The UN refugee program (UNRWA) is scheduled to end in I960 and there does not appear to be much prospect for its continuation beyond that date. The host governments may be unwilling or unable to assume this burden of support. There is a possibility that the approaching end of UNRWA support may make some of the refugees more receptive to the idea of resettlement. However, it is almost certain that there will be strong pressures from Arab governments and from most of the refugees for continuation of outside aid in some form. The net result is likely to be a general increase in Arab bitterness and resentment against the West.

The Soviet-American Contest for Position and Influence

The Soviet Campaign

49. The Bloc will continue to pursue an active policy in the Near East designed to vitiate the Western strategic position in the area, including its base structure, and to attain a position to deny the area’s oil resources to the West.

50. Arab attitudes toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc are a source of considerable advantage to the Bloc in the Near East. The Soviets have succeeded in representing their hostility to Western “imperialism” as equal to that of the Arabs. They also enjoy the advantage of being able to exploit the Israeli issue for their purposes. Most politically conscious Arabs are indifferent to world affairs except as they affect their own area. The conflict between the Communist Bloc and the West is regarded as a battle of giants which concerns the Arab world only insofar as it intrudes in Arab affairs or offers opportunities to the Arabs to advance their own interests. Even among politically sophisticated Arabs very few comprehend the issues between the Soviet Union and the US, and they fail to share the West’s apprehension of Soviet ambitions in the area. Their fears of Western “imperialism” are not the result of a judgment of the relative merits of the Communist and Western position, but the result of past experience, present friction, and future aspirations.

51. The Soviet Bloc appears to be carrying out a flexible and opportunistic policy of limited risk in the Near East. It has managed its campaign in such a way as to leave the initiative with the Arab leaders. The Bloc has responded quickly to Egyptian, Syrian, and Yemeni requests and has been careful to avoid the appearance of attaching strings to its assistance. The Bloc has also shown itself willing to extend aid to other Arab governments without political conditions, in the hope of eventually weaning them away from the West.

52. Another characteristic of the Soviet campaign has been the care with which the Soviets have avoided affronting the Arabs on the points on which they are particularly sensitive. They have carefully catered to the Arab slogans of “independence” and “neutrality” and have been mindful of Arab prestige. Of great importance is the fact that the Soviets have conducted their campaign in the Arab states on a government-to-government basis. The local Arab Communist parties have probably not been involved. It is also likely that the Bloc advisers have been instructed not to engage in blatant advocacy of Communist doctrine. Soviet propaganda aimed at the Arabs has had the objectives of convincing them of the Bloc’s support of “peace” and of the goals of Arab nationalism and unity, of representing the Bloc as being on the Arab side against Israel, of painting the West as the enemy of Arab nationalism, and of fostering the feeling of common interest between the Arabs and the Bloc in resisting their common enemy, the Western “warmongers.”

53. The Bloc will probably seek further to develop its position in the Near East along the lines laid down in the past two years. It will establish economic and political influence wherever it can, but will probably not seek during the next few years to install Communist regimes in states of the area. The USSR will continue to pose as the friend and protector of the independent Arab states and will seek to establish itself as a power with recognized interests in the Near East area. It will seek to exploit the Arab-Israeli situation. For example, it might stimulate and support an Arab attempt to force a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem along the lines of the 1947 UN Partition Plan and subsequent resolutions on Palestine. The Soviets will probably continue to supply arms to Arab states on terms similar to those prevailing during the past two years. They would probably also be willing to increase the number of their military and technical advisers but would remain careful not to offend Arab sensibilities.

54. The USSR will probably state its reassurances to the Arab states strongly, but in terms which permit the widest possible freedom of action. These reassurances, however, will probably not go as far as support for Arab annihilation of Israel. In extreme circumstances the USSR would almost certainly adopt a highly belligerent posture, possibly including military gestures against countries threatening friendly Arab states. However, we do not believe that it would deliberately risk World War III to protect all or any part of its newly acquired position in the Near East, although the risk of miscalculation might be considerable.

The Western Position

55. In the contest between the West and the USSR for influence in the Near East, Western European powers will probably leave the initiative to the US. However, Britain, France, and other Western states will be critical of US policy if it does not act effectively to protect Western interests, particularly in petroleum, when threatened. This might lead to a growth in Western Europe of sentiment in favor of a settlement recognizing Bloc interest in the Near East in return for a guarantee of the Western European economic position.

56. The US position with the governments of the conservative Arab states has significantly improved during the past year, but not among the Arab public. Most Arabs failed to understand Western indignation at Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and at his taking Soviet arms. The UK-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt confirmed in Arab minds the charges that the extremists had been making against the “Western imperialists.” The role of the US in the passage of the Cease Fire Resolution in the UN was widely appreciated, but Soviet threats against the UK made an equal or greater impression on the Arab public. Moreover, when the Egyptians made further demands for assistance the Soviet Bloc appeared to comply while the US held back. The US stand on Suez was misinterpreted among the Arabs as an indication that the US intended to back the Pan-Arab program against the UK and France, and many became confused and disillusioned when this turned out not to be the case.

57. The Baghdad Pact and the American doctrine have had some appeal in the Near East, but are probably believed by almost all Arabs to indicate American preoccupation with Communism to the exclusion of what they consider to be the more pressing problems of the area. The conservative nationalist leaders probably share this view to some extent, but they and a large proportion of the upper class conservatives in their countries feel that they are dependent upon the US for the maintenance of both their internal and regional positions. They look to the US for material and diplomatic assistance in sufficient quantity to sustain them. They believe that the US has the capability of meeting their needs, but they are concerned whether the US will maintain its interest in their welfare long and consistently enough to enable them to survive.

Continuing Prospects

58. The radical Pan-Arab nationalist movement in something like its present form will probably continue to be the most significant indigenous regional force in the Near East. The states of this group will continue to proclaim their adherence to the doctrine of “positive neutralism,” and will persist in attempts to use the USSR as a counter to real or imagined Western pressure. The radical Pan-Arabs, however, are unlikely to make significant progress toward their announced goal of Arab unity. Even an effective Egyptian-Syrian union is unlikely, and differences and disputes are likely to occur between the Syrian and the Egyptian leaders. The Yemen, although useful from the Egyptian and Syrian point of view as a means of causing trouble for the UK and possibly for Saudi Arabia, is unlikely to become a meaningful part of an organization of Arab states.

59. The forces of conservative Arab nationalism are likely to continue to be generally identified with the West. In some areas they will probably show instability and suffer reverses, but will remain an important factor in the Near East situation. Iraq and Lebanon are likely to stand relatively firm, but Saudi Arabia will continue to waver from side to side. The monarchy in Jordan is unlikely to survive without financial and political support from sources friendly to the West. Even with such assistance its chances of survival are only somewhat better than even.

60. We believe that there will almost certainly be some armed conflict in the area during the next several years. The chances of hostilities arising out of the Arab-Israel situation are better than even. Any armed intervention in Syria would probably spread to involve Arab-Israel fighting. Hostilities might arise out of the collapse of the regime in Jordan, and the chances of such hostilities spreading to an Arab-Israel conflict are better than even. We believe that fighting will occur on the Aden-Yemen borders or in the Muscat-Oman area, but that such fighting would probably not spread to other Arab areas.

61. We believe that Israel will continue to receive outside financial and diplomatic support and will persist as a dynamic force within the area. It will almost certainly move ahead with its immigration plans and its energetic development programs. Moreover, it will stand on its refusal to repatriate Arab refugees in any substantial numbers or give up presently held territory in exchange for a settlement with the Arabs. Israel will seek to keep its armed forces qualitatively superior to those of its Arab opponents. It will continue to pursue an active and determined policy and is unlikely to shrink from the use of force where it considers such action necessary.

62. Sino-Soviet influence will expand in the Near East, but the Bloc will experience growing problems as it becomes involved in the area. The Arab nations which become its clients are likely to make demands for aid and assistance which will exceed Bloc allotments. Bloc support of Syria and Egypt probably will continue to antagonize these states’ rivals both within the area and on its periphery.

63. Prospects for improved internal political stability in the Arab states are not good. All governments, whether conservative or Pan-Arab nationalist, will be obliged to continue to rule by repression of the opposition if they are to remain in power. In the conservative states, the radical Pan-Arabs will attempt to wrest power from the existing regimes. In Syria and Egypt the regimes are likely to retain their authoritarian military character and will retain the capability to put down opposition by force.

Outlook for Western Interests

64. The chances of a US understanding with Egypt and Syria are limited by prevailing attitudes of their leaders. Both governments are convinced at the moment that the US is determined to overthrow them. Both are prey to obsessive suspicions of the Western powers, and these suspicions are assiduously cultivated by the Soviets.

65. In the situation likely to prevail the conservative Arab governments are likely to become progressively more dependent upon the US. In this event, economic progress in these states will be regarded in the area as an index of the value of association with the US.

66. Throughout the area the rise in the level of public expectation of improvement in economic standards and welfare will impose difficulties upon governments. The radical nationalist governments of Egypt and Syria are committed to ambitious social and economic reforms. However, problems of implementation and lack of resources make it unlikely that they can fulfill their expectations, even with Soviet assistance, and they will probably experience political difficulties as a consequence. The conservative governments of the oil-producing states have financial resources with which to effect reforms which would probably broaden the base of popular support and thus ultimately strengthen their position and that of the conservative grouping. Prospects for successful prosecution of large-scale development programs are good, however, only in Iraq.

67. Pressures on Western oil companies for arrangements more favorable to producing and transit countries will mount. At least as long as conservative governments remain in power in the producing countries, arrangements acceptable to Western interests can probably be worked out. Egypt and Syria will probably seek to keep facilities open for the sake of revenues and to maintain good relations with the oil-producing Arab states. However, Egypt and Syria will be more difficult to deal with, and the possibility of closure of transit facilities will remain.

68. British military arrangements and political influence with Iraq are likely to continue, but the UK’s position in the Persian Gulf area is likely to be weakened. The Baghdad Pact will continue to draw the fire of the Pan-Arab nationalists and the Soviets. The extent of US participation and US support—as well as US assistance to member nations, whether through the Pact or otherwise—will have an important effect upon the effectiveness of the Pact and the morale of its member states.

1. Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and The Joint Staff.” It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on October 8.

   Two tables, entitled “Importance of Middle East Oil in the Supply of Free World Petroleum Requirements” and “Production and Disposition of Middle East Oil, 1956, 1960, 1965,” are not printed. The source text indicates they were taken from “Studies of the Petroleum Sub-Committee of the Economic Intelligence Committee.”

2. Supersedes NIE 36–54, “Probable Developments in the Arab States,” 7 September 1954, and NIE 30–4–55, “The Outlook for US Interests in the Middle East,” 8 November 1955. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The area covered by this estimate includes the Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—the Arab sheikdoms and principalities of the Arabian Peninsula, and Israel. Excluded from primary consideration are Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya, and the Sudan. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Saudi Arabia and Jordan are members of this alliance, but have ceased to be active. The Yemen is also a member, but plays a minor role. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. See NIE 36.1–57, “The Outlook for Egypt and the Nasser Regime,” scheduled for completion in October 1957. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see vol. XVII, pp. 790–791.]
6. See SNIE 36.7–57, “Developments in the Syrian Situation,” 3 September 1957. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see vol. XIII, pp. 674–680.]
7. See Annex: Military Strengths of Near Eastern States. [Footnote in the source text. The Annex is not printed.]
8. Proven reserves in the Near East are conservatively estimated at 144 billion barrels or 70 percent of the non-Communist world total. Other estimates run as high as 223 billion barrels. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. See Map. [Footnote in the source text. The map is not printed.]
10. By the mid-1960’s, roughly 80 super-tankers (65,000 deadweight tons and over) are expected to be in use. Normally, no more than 15 to 20 of these tankers would be expected to be carrying Middle East oil and using the Cape of Good Hope route to North America (East coast) and Western Europe by 1965. These would have an aggregate carrying capacity of about 100,000 b/d. If Canal tolls are raised substantially, more of these super-tankers would be employed in the Cape route. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. A policy by which the Israelis use “retaliatory” raids into Arab territory to intimidate Arab governments and reduce border-crossings and infiltration. [Footnote in the source text.]