Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

62. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to the Secretary of State¹

Bonn, 19 November 1957.

Dear Mr. Dulles: I would like to tell you first how grateful I am that you gave Mr. von Brentano the opportunity for a discussion which I consider very important in view of the NATO Ministerial Meeting on 16 December.² I was also very glad to have had today, with Mr. McCloy, a detailed exchange of opinion on the importance and the subjects of the December Meeting.³ We were largely in agreement on all questions we discussed and which I shall briefly touch upon in the following paragraphs.

You may well imagine that I am much concerned about certain aspects of the present situation. By this I am referring to the occasional disaccord which makes itself felt within the alliance, to the psychological uncertainty resulting from the launching of the Sputnik and to the deficiencies appearing in our military organization. The forthcoming Ministerial Meeting on top level must, if it is to be of any purpose at all, provide the basis for a very substantial reform, the details of which the Council may decide upon at subsequent meetings.

First I feel that a strong reaffirmation of the Atlantic Alliance and its moral and political aims would be urgently required. It might perhaps be desirable, over and above the reaffirmation of the existing alliance, to make some gesture which would demonstrate that any hope of our adversaries for a disintegration of this alliance is [in] vain. This could be done by the Heads of Government, headed by the President of the United States, expressing their unanimous will to make no use of the possibility to be released from their obligations after ten years. It should be made clear to the world that this alliance is not conditioned by any prevailing situation but that in any case it has grown into a genuine and lasting political community. In my opinion we need such an affirmation of the durability of our alliance beyond 1968 because only in this way we can convince our peoples that, indeed, we attach very great importance to common efforts in the field of fundamental and applied research, the result of which can only be obtained within very long periods of time.

For the same reasons it is so important that the forthcoming NATO meeting reaffirms and extends the obligation of member countries to mutual consultation. Unfortunately we had to learn that the decisions of last year based upon the report of the Three Wise Men⁴ have not always been complied with. We must endeavour to change this. Particularly Article 4 of the NATO Treaty⁵ should be so interpreted that a genuine obligation to consult is established in all cases in which political, economic or military actions of a member country might lead to conflicts which would directly or indirectly bring one or all of us into the danger of grave complications. Never before have there been so numerous causes of conflict in the world. They are apt to put the alliance within a few hours before the question of war or peace. Only if we mutually agree in time and before-hand on all existing possibilities, can we preserve unity and prevent the alliance from disintegrating in the face of a question vital to us all.

It must therefore be our aim to bring about to an ever increasing extent a common foreign policy in all questions decisively touching upon the fate of the community and its partners, and this should be a foreign policy which is supported by all member countries and which can be accounted for in their parliaments and before public opinion.

It will be necessary in this connexion to give the Permanent Representatives of the member countries to the NATO Council more powers and more comprehensive instructions. They must always feel themselves empowered, especially during acute crises, to take part in the formulation of proposals and to negotiate thereon. For this purpose they should be in particularly close contacts with their cabinets.

Furthermore we should seek closer military cooperation. In this connexion the consequence should be drawn from the dangers arising from the present world situation and from the advance of technical achievements that no nation is any longer in the position to act alone and that, therefore, any country must fall in line with the others even if this would mean giving up certain sovereign rights.

In this connexion I would name some especially urgent and concrete examples:

1. Coordination of air defence especially on the European continent under central control;

2. A speedy standardization of weapons required by the Alliance, where certain countries would be assigned concrete part-responsibilities in the field of production;

3. Coordination of logistics.

We probably all agree that we must considerably increase the efforts of the Atlantic Community in the field of scientific research and technology by long term planning. I therefore feel that political and military cooperation should be accompanied by joint research. Here, too, a genuine distribution of tasks should be made. In particular it would be the task of the European member countries of the Alliance to form certain centres of activities in some fields of research and thus to contribute to a lessening of the burden on the United States.

However important a reaffirmation and a strengthening of the NATO defence preparedness are, the consultations and results of the Ministerial Meeting at top level should not be of an exclusively military nature, for this would only provide the opportunity to Soviet propaganda to mark us as “war mongers” and to distort and to falsify our aims. Therefore, I feel that it would be of utmost importance that in the declaration at the end of the Ministerial Meeting suggested by Mr. Spaak we should emphasize the great aims of our Alliance which is designed to serve the peaceful coexistence of all peoples. In this declaration we should also address the peoples of the non-committed world who expect from our meeting a convincing interpretation of our relations with them.

I am very glad to see the President and yourself in Paris again in order to consider these and other questions in the customary atmosphere of friendship and mutual trust.

I beg you to convey the President my sincere greetings and wishes.

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials with Dulles/Herter. A notation on the source text indicates that Dulles saw the letter but there is no indication when it was delivered. It was probably delivered by von Brentano on November 23. The source text is a translation from German.
2. Reference is to Dulles’ willingness to see von Brentano on November 23.
3. See telegram 1582, supra.
4. Regarding the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-Operation in NATO, issued December 14, 1956, see footnote 4, Document 47.
5. Article 4 stipulated that the signatory parties would consult together when their territorial integrity, political independence, or security was threatened.