Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

63. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, November 23, 1957, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, November 23, 1957, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Exchange of Views

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Foreign Minister von Brentano
• Ambassador Krekeler
• Ambassador Blankenhorn
• Mr. Weber (Interpreter)
• Ambassador Bruce
• C. Burke Elbrick

Foreign Minister Brentano said that he was anxious to exchange views with the Secretary on matters which will be the subject of discussion and action at the December meeting of NATO. He said that he had talked to Maurice Faure in Paris before Pineau came to the United States and had talked more recently to Foreign Minister Pella in Italy. He was glad to say that there had been a large measure of agreement on basic questions.

The Secretary said that he would like to express some thoughts on NATO’s basic problems. The NATO countries face a threat directed by a single will, the Soviet Communist leadership. Soviet Communism controls one-third of the people of the world. It has a freedom of action which we do not enjoy and which does not respond to any moral control or to public opinion. This creates a most difficult problem for the NATO countries to meet. We cannot pool all of our sovereignties and work as a single unit but must find a way to concert our efforts within the limits inherent in the situation. He referred to U.S. relations with various organizations such as the OAS, SEATO and other bilateral ties involving some forty-two nations in all. We cannot give a veto power to each of the forty-two countries because this would result in immobility. We must find a middle ground.

We cannot, for example, agree not to act without consultation in the North Atlantic Council, for two reasons. We do not wish publicly to give the impression that NATO has primacy over the rest of the world, although this may be true de facto, since it is the most vital alliance and offers us the greatest support. Also, we must sometimes act very quickly and, while we are anxious to see the North Atlantic Council develop into a useful consultative body, we do not wish to have our capacity for action destroyed. We feel that all members of the Council should be prepared to discuss policies in all parts of the world, but the requirement for taking action may sometimes prevent us from consulting beforehand. For example, though some thought was given to rejecting a recent Soviet note on the Middle East which we considered to be insulting to the United States,² it was decided to discuss the matter in the North Atlantic Council. Obviously the appropriate moment for returning the note to the Soviets, if we had wished to do so, would have been lost as a result of long consultation in the Council. This was not an important matter but served only as an illustration.

The Secretary referred to the Tunisian arms question, relating the development of events from September to November 12 when the French agreed to supply arms to Tunis. Unfortunately, the French proposed a condition to the Tunisians which the latter could not accept. Perhaps this was a wise move on the part of Gaillard who apparently felt that his Government would fall. The Secretary said it would have been impossible to bring these matters before the North Atlantic Council.

We have a practical problem of trying to hold together about fifty free nations in the Near East, the Far East and elsewhere. The machinery is only good if it works and does not impede progress. We have made good progress in the North Atlantic Council but it should be borne in mind that it is not always practicable to discuss everything on a multilateral basis. Sometimes matters are better discussed bilaterally, particularly since some of the North Atlantic countries may not be able to make any contributions. We must have the confidence and trust of our allies if we are to exercise the power which we have to give leadership to the organization.

The Secretary said that Khrushchev is a most dangerous and unpredictable individual, unlike Stalin, and he can be opposed only by an ability to act quickly. We are not asking for a blank check from our NATO partners but, he pointed out, if we wait in all cases to consult them before reacting to Soviet maneuvers the opportunity to make a riposte might vanish.

Brentano said he agreed with the Secretary’s analysis. The Eastern bloc is united by force and by fear. Never before was there as powerful or unpredictable a figure as Khrushchev at the helm in Russia controlling both the party and the army. This makes for a psychological malaise in the free world. Now we are approaching a summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council with a very short time to prepare for it. It must be a success; it would be very demoralizing if the public received the impression that nothing had happened at such a meeting.

Brentano said that the United States plays the essential role in NATO and that no one wants to restrict U.S. action. He realized that the United States has gigantic obligations. The problem is how to establish a common policy and how to bind the others in a partnership in the organization. In no case would Germany wish to restrict United States freedom of action. He was thinking in terms of what can be done to make NATO active by coordinating the policies of its members in various areas. He referred here particularly to the 1948 Treaty of Bogota which set up an organ of consultation and which might provide a formula acceptable to the European countries which would oblige them to consult under certain conditions and circumstances. He said that discussion in the North Atlantic Council had not been too profitable and that Blankenhorn’s reports of the Council meetings were very depressing.

The Secretary said that perhaps we can do more than has been done in the past about consultation. He recalled that in the spring of 1956 he had appealed to the Council for action to strengthen the consultative process and the Three Wise Men exercise had resulted. We were disappointed in the outcome of the Wise Men’s report. The recent appearance of the Soviet Sputniks may have the good result of impelling us to do things which could not be done before because we were not sufficiently aroused.

The Secretary said that the United States is not alarmed at recent developments in the Soviet Union. We had known all along that the USSR was developing a scientific military base and we cannot stop Russia from becoming an increasingly important military and scientific power. Perhaps we had made a mistake in not publishing more about our knowledge of this situation which now has taken people by surprise. We must strike back and we have the will and the means to do so. The launching of the Soviet satellites may prove costly to the Soviets in that they have created a condition in which the free world is now willing to move further in the direction of unification.

The meeting was then adjourned to the State Department where the discussion was resumed later.³

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick. This conversation took place at the Secretary’s home. Von Brentano arrived in the United States on November 23 for discussions with Dulles on the forthcoming NATO meeting, and departed on November 24. Bruce’s record of the meetings with von Brentano on November 23 and 24 are ibid., Bruce Files: Lot 64 D 327.
2. For text of the Soviet note of September 3, 1957, which condemned the use of force in the Middle East, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1957, pp. 602–603.
3. See the memorandum of conversation, infra.