Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

61. Telegram From the Ambassador in Germany (Bruce) to the Department of State¹

Bonn, November 19, 1957—8 p.m.

1582. For Secretary from John J. McCloy.² Had lunch with Chancellor, before which I had an hour’s conversation alone with him. Bruce, though invited, felt Chancellor might talk more informally and freely if he were not present and so excused himself. Chancellor referred first to the great importance of the coming meeting,³ out of which new inspiration must come—if not, this would be the end of NATO, to use his words. He felt it essential that steps be taken to integrate NATO better. The vertical organization was complicated and the appearance of a unified force was given, but the reality was a number of separate national forces. It was nonsense that there was not a United European air force, French, German, Dutch, Belgian, operating under NATO. The whole thing should be organized as EDC was planned air and ground combined and integrated force. As presently organized, it would all collapse before a Russian attack.

Next he talked of the great need for political consultation in NATO. He was critical of US policy, which on several occasions had brought NATO close to the risk of war without consultation with those whose interests and strength were allied with ours—witness Suez, the Jordan air lift, Tunisia, etc. He referred also to the turning down of financial help to Turkey which he claimed the USSR was now providing for industrial development. There should be political consultation in NATO with the American representative of course taking the lead. He complained that there was no long range knowledge or authority reposing in the American representative to deal with serious developments. Adenauer seemed to think the President should bring forth proposals in this field at the forthcoming meeting.

Next, he strongly stressed the air of doubt surrounding US participation and interest in NATO as a result of the military-scientific advances of the USSR. He brought up Khrushchev’s attempts to split the Western alliance and then proposed that the period of the treaty now prescribed for twenty years i.e. approximately 10 years from now, be extended at the forthcoming meeting so that the opportunity for denunciation under Article 13 be postponed till 1978.⁴ This he thought would breathe new life into the treaty, discourage attempts of the Russians to break it apart, and generally be about the best answer possible to growing doubts and skepticism as to the vigor of NATO. He would urge that the President propose this. He would support it and he thought France would. He had talked about this with Maurice Faure of France, who he said was in favor of it. By doing this, the whole problem of NATO would be removed from discussion both in international and national politics.

. . . . . . .

He liked the idea of the President’s reiteration of adherence to NATO, the setting up of scientific institutes and some comforting comments on fundamental US economic stability.

Bruce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/11–1957. Confidential.
2. McCloy was Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank and had served as High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952.
3. Adenauer referred to the NATO Heads of Government meeting scheduled for Paris, December 16–18.
4. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty noted that after the accord had been in force for 20 years, any party might cease to be a member 1 year after notice had been given to the United States, which would inform other members.