Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

161. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, April 30, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Na

1. Collins arrived Thursday, April 21, and left early Friday morning, April 29. He had lunch with the President April 22, saw the Secretary for the first time at a long luncheon meeting April 25. We also met with the Secretary Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. We spent all day Friday, April 22, meeting with Collins with Defense and CIA represented. He reiterated even more vigorously and firmly his view, strongly backed by Sturm, that Diem must be replaced and that a plan of action should go into effect immediately. They both favored Quat. None of the questions or alternate considerations expressed by any of us at that or any subsequent meetings changed Collins’ view. Monday morning, April 25, we had a working meeting with him at which (a) I proposed basic question, do we or do we not support some political change in Saigon, and (b) a specific plan of change. The reports at that time from Saigon showed Diem was steadily slipping. In the face of the adamant view of Collins and Sturm most of us reluctantly accepted the need for a change, but we all insisted that we stay with Diem at least for the first innings. Collins, and particularly Sturm, rejected our proposition in any shape or form. The basic shift in our approach was taken at a long luncheon meeting with the Secretary. Unfortunately neither Bob Hoey nor I were invited to attend. Bill Sebald can fill you in on this. The Secretary took the position we would support Diem until and unless genuinely Vietnamese elements turned up with another acceptable solution. Collins and Sturm later told the working group this was an impossible condition.

2. The rest of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday we spent working up two long and complicated telegrams to Paris and Saigon.² At a full meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Hoover and Allen Dulles late Tuesday afternoon they were approved. Collins fully endorsed these telegrams after he and Sturm had eliminated our proposal to try again to keep Diem as head of a coalition government. These telegrams envisaged a gradual and rather complicated shift of our position in carefully worked out stages. As we suspected at the time, they were immediately overtaken by events. None of us really believe in them but we were faced with Collins’ strong recommendations and the fact that he had been to the White House the first day after his arrival. In any event, this shift has never been carried out. Although the telegrams were sent to Paris and Saigon, we have put out a stop order holding up action on them indefinitely.³

3. Wednesday, April 27, Diem changed the police chiefs and Thursday the Binh Xuyen began military action against the government. Ely and the French have been putting the full blame for this situation on Diem, as they tried to do for the March 29–30 incident. Events have moved very rapidly since then. The national army has seemed to be winning, groups are rallying to Diem, Bao Dai is getting set to fire Diem, and the French have in effect withdrawn their support from Diem. All reports from Saigon indicate there is a revolutionary feeling developing against Bao Dai and the French. Some of this is instigated by the Diem group but some of it may be spontaneous. As of this writing we may be faced with a choice between Diem and Bao Dai. In view of the fighting, we have felt in State it was best to continue support for the government under Diem and see what happens. But as this crisis develops we are being forced to take a more and more unequivocal and strong stand for Diem.

4. Senator Mansfield issued a long statement in support of Diem on April 29.⁴ If Diem is forced out, Mansfield would have us stop all aid to Viet-Nam except of a humanitarian nature. Senators Knowland and Humphrey have also backed Diem. A large number of members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee after hearing Collins have informed the Department through Congresswoman Kelly that they would not favor the State Department withdrawing support from Diem. Collins met with the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, separately with Senator Mansfield and with about a dozen of the House Committee. While he and Sturm felt these legislators would give no trouble, Sturm informing us after seeing Senator Mansfield that there was nothing to it, Bob Hoey and the rest of us here were much less sanguine about legislative feeling. In fact there are going to be real difficulties on the Hill if Diem is forced out by what appears to be French-Bao Dai action.

5. During the past ten days the French have been quiet with us, but working behind the scene. Kidder reports Ely as almost hysterical. Bao Dai has been active, as he has submitted one plan to us and has also taken another action publicly. Both of these are almost identical with plans or ideas which French officials had submitted to us several weeks ago. If there were any notion that Bao Dai acts independently of the French and Ely, that should now be dispelled. However, Prime Minister Faure has indicated to Dillon that he has no stomach for going off independently of the US in Free Viet-Nam. They will follow our lead even though they don’t like the idea, providing the situation is not so bad in Saigon that they have to move out French military and civilian personnel. We have asked for pretty fundamental reassurances on basic French intentions in Viet-Nam, we got them orally for whatever they may be worth.

6. We are in a bewildering, fluid situation. I believe more strongly than ever that we should stick with Diem now. Collins says he is a terrible administrator and it will wreck Free Viet-Nam if we leave him in. That may be true but that is not the issue at present. If Diem can lead the nationalist forces to a conclusive settlement, even to the point of rendering Bao Dai ineffective or annulled, we should continue to support him. The key questions are:

a) Will the Vietnamese National Army as a group stick with Diem?

b) Will the Binh Xuyen be broken up into isolated remnants?

c) Will enough nationalist groups including sect leaders rally to the government even against Bao Dai?

d) Will Bao Dai fire Diem, even if the answers to the above three questions are clearly enough in the affirmative?

What I am afraid of is that the combination of continuing forces coalesced around Diem on the one hand and Bao Dai on the other may not enjoy preponderant strength.

7. There are possibly serious anti-French overtones in the Vietnamese political situation. These also include anti-Bao Dai feelings. We must not take any action which would tar us with the same accusations. General O’Daniel, our three Attachés, and Lansdale informed us on April 30th that “any change in leadership or command at this time could result in chaos”.⁵

8. There are some personal aspects that I would like to take up with you privately.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–3055. Top Secret. Also printed in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 945–947.
2. Printed as Documents 140 and 141.
3. See Document 144.
4. For a report on Mansfield’s statement, see The New York Times, April 30, 1955, “U.S. Reiterates Vietnam Backing”.
5. See Document 156.