Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

160. Telegram From the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

Paris, April 30, 1955—8 p.m.

4746. For Young from Gibson. Following is second message drafted in Nice April 29 after second interview with Nguyen De and Bao Dai,² résumé of which telephoned to Young evening April 29.

1. After receipt Deptel 27 to Nice³ and word received by telephone from Paris that Amb Dillon had called on Faure pursuant to Deptel 3849⁴ (results reported Embtel 4740, Saigon 687⁵), Gibson called on first Nguyen De and then immediately following on Bao Dai.

2. We informed De that Ambassador had seen Faure and reviewed with him important aspects France–U.S. policy Vietnam. We referred to necessity that Bao Dai, as well as French, give full support to legally constituted Govt. Vietnam.

3. We then had general review with De in course of which we made point to him given to us over telephone from Washington. We emphasized that any further steps toward solution Vietnam crisis must be made on initiative Vietnamese nationalists themselves. We emphasized U.S. view that present govt. as legally constituted govt. must be supported as long as it remains such and that urgent problem is to deal with present civil war and not question of form of any new govt.

4. De agreed fully with our remarks pointing out that Bao Dai’s decisions of previous day were in keeping with these principles. He had made clear to Diem in summoning him to Cannes before other Vietnamese and in sending personal plane to fetch him that his status as Prime Minister remained unaltered. Bao Dai regarded present crisis as being in two phases: First, to bring about end of present civil war and second, to deal with question of governmental reform. First would have to be settled now, second could be dealt with later.

5. Thenceforth, and in conversation immediately following with Bao Dai interview concerned with Bao Dai’s observations on how to put end civil war rather than any questions alternate govt. or other aspects Bao Dai “plan”.

6. Bao Dai stated in strong terms he wished U.S. to take immediate steps persuade Diem to come to France to receive Vietnamese leaders with him and discuss means ending present crisis. He stated that correctly or incorrectly Diem has claimed that he has had U.S. support in steps he has taken during last few weeks which have led to present bloodshed. He violated truce and at least his brothers if not he himself claimed that he did so with at least passive U.S. support. It was already being said, Bao Dai claimed, that U.S. had “by its refusal to countenance any action but blind support for Diem allowed present abcess to fester until it had burst in form present civil war and that U.S. had purposely done this in hope Diem would take armed action. This action had resulted in deaths of hundreds of innocent people and waste of national force needed to fight Communism. U.S. inaction could no longer be admitted”.

7. All of this we denied, pointing out again that General Collins and Embassy Saigon have consistently urged restraint on govt. Bao Dai continued, stating that U.S. responsibility in present situation was heavy. He had put off taking action he had wished to take which might have served to avoid present bloodshed at U.S. request. On two successive days U.S. had asked him to refrain from taking decisive action on excuse Washington was studying problem with General Collins there and would have something to say shortly. On April 26 and 27 Bao Dai had agreed to our requests and had not taken action which his judgment indicated was necessary. On April 28 he was forced to take matters into his own hands despite third successive request delivered in Cannes on April 28 after shooting had already started. In his opinion if he had acted last week hundreds of lives would have been saved. If U.S. was really neutral in matter it must take steps to avoid giving opposite impression he added. Moreover, if U.S. did not wish to stand by and watch state of civil war established in Vietnam, which would last until Vietminh won complete control, we must help in bringing an end to that civil war. Way to do this is to influence Diem to lay down arms and come to France to consult with other Vietnamese anti-Communist nationalists. Moment he does, opposite side will lay down their arms, he claimed.

8. Bao Dai alleged that resistance to Diem is so universal in Vietnam that support of Diem was serving discredit U.S. in eyes of Vietnamese people. Diem will undoubtedly succeed in driving sects out of Saigon or at least in suppressing military forces there but they will simply go to provinces where Diem has no control.

9. In Bao Dai’s opinion Diem has now become a psychopath who wishes to martyrize himself even at price of thousands of lives and national treasury. He enjoys thought that his life is in danger and would welcome martyrdom which is indeed what he will get, said Bao Dai, for feeling is so intense against him that someone is bound to assassinate him in near future if he persists in trying to establish his rule by force “with the support of no one but his own family and the U.S.”, Bao Dai said.

10. Bao Dai spoke of Diem’s role as a Catholic, stating that latter regarded his task as leading a holy war. Instead of doing that, he had turned Vietnamese against Catholicism. Bao Dai said his wife’s own family had been Catholic for generations and now reported it was unsafe to go outside Saigon if you were known to be a Catholic because of the enmity against Diem.

11. We referred to Diem’s refusal to obey Bao Dai’s summons. Bao Dai stated that it did not surprise him. He had expected it and, in a sense, welcomed it as it might serve to clear the air and prove to people that Diem is not acting as servant of the state as he claimed but rather as a self-seeking War Lord who wished to eradicate all opposition and hold total power within his own hands and that of his family. Bao Dai would stake his influence with people and Vietnamese nationalists against Diem’s.

12. We asked what Bao Dai intended to do if Diem continues to disobey his orders. Bao Dai stated he would take legal steps to have him declared a rebel and would then proceed to unite the country against him until he was removed from position he was usurping. We asked Bao Dai if he intended to do this in person and if so, would it mean a prompt return to Saigon. He answered that it meant that he might return to Saigon in the near future to lead the fight but that would be dependent on the allegiance of the National Army. Moreover he would take no such step without consulting Vietnamese leaders, whom he had summoned to France next week in advance.

13. We asked what effect Diem’s refusal to obey his orders would have on arrival in France of other Vietnamese personalities. Bao Dai said he hoped that they would all come as it was now more essential than ever that they be consulted in order that country could now achieve the unity Diem had failed to achieve. We asked for a list of those invited and it was supplied (being cabled separately⁶). It is noted that contrary to Bao Dai’s first statement April 28 sects have now been invited and all former Prime Ministers except Tam are included, Quat and Do as well. Bishop Le Huu Tu has been invited but it is not certain he can come. The list includes Buddhists, Catholics, army reps, trade unionists, peasants, etc. Bao Dai said it was his intention to make representation broad as possible.

14. Bao Dai stated that he had decided on Hinh as special emissary to sects. We pointed out that this decision would come as great shock to American public opinion who looked upon Hinh as rebel against Government. He had had to be removed from Saigon for that reason. It would be interpreted as a sign that Bao Dai was sending Hinh as means upsetting National Army’s loyalty to Government. Bao Dai said these were interpretations he could not help and that circumstances no longer permitted him to be influenced by them. Fact was, he said, that Hinh enjoyed most support in Vietnam military circles of any Vietnamese general. He had been removed from Vietnam by Bao Dai at our request in order give Diem free hand in establishing his authority over the army and in reestablishing law and order and a government of natl union. Bao Dai removal of him was best example of extent of effort to give Diem every chance. Diem had consistently failed. Now it was Bao Dai’s purpose to end present bloodshed by removing Diem from scene and thus preventing National Army from taking further armed action. At same time, he must make certain that sects would desist from similar armed action. He had already taken steps to accomplish former by decree. Only way he could assure latter was by force his own authority backed up by that of man who had greatest influence. Man was Hinh. Hinh will carry Bao Dai’s orders for integration of sect forces into National Army and Bao Dai guarantees sects will obey him and message Hinh carries if Diem is removed from scene.

15. At this stage of interview, Bao Dai became so excited that at times he could barely talk. He said that no man had ever enjoyed powers which Diem had had from very beginning. Bao Dai had transferred all his powers to him. He was fully backed by both France and U.S. He was given large sums of money and his military forces were clothed, fed and equipped by foreigners. He was constantly helped by foreigners to do things he was incapable of doing himself. General Collins and Ely and Bao Dai had all been in his service. Even Chief of Staff of the Vietnam army was removed from scene because Diem didn’t like him. Now things had gone too far and consideration had to be taken of what was best for Vietnamese people and not what was best for Diem and his family. Vietnam was supposedly an independent country; she must therefore make her own decisions. Bao Dai was Chief of State, and intended to carry out his responsibilities as such.

16. We asked what brother Luyen was still doing in Cannes and whether he was serving as intermediary between Bao Dai and Diem. At this point Bao Dai really exploded and stated that brother Luyen had come to Cannes not for any patriotic purpose as “Diem undoubtedly had told Americans in Saigon,” but rather on secret mission from Diem to attempt to buy Bao Dai. Some days ago before any action had been taken to summon Diem to France or otherwise Bao Dai said Luyen arrived uninvited in Cannes, Bao Dai kept him waiting and when he finally received him, Luyen offered Bao Dai the sum of three hundred million francs if he would agree not to take any action which would affect status of Diem or prevent him from establishing his authority by force. Bao Dai commented with indignation that, of course he had refused and “thrown Luyen out of the house” but he was still “grovelling” around. He stated that Luyen had made various allegations of his close relations with “Americans” in Saigon.

17. At end of interview Bao Dai asked if we could give him any further word on Washington’s reaction to plan submitted week ago. We explained once more that General Collins was leaving Washington that day for Saigon which was sufficient evidence of Washington’s recognition of emergency nature of situation there. It was obvious that no decisions would now be reached until General Collins had arrived in Saigon and could confer there with Embassy and Ely. In meanwhile we informed Bao Dai that his observations would be passed to Dept in their entirety.

18. Bao Dai said he would send De back to Paris Monday in order to remain in touch with us and to receive any observations Washington cared to make to him. At same time he would instruct De to keep US au courant.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–3055. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to Saigon. Printed also in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 948–954.
2. In the first message, telegram 4743 from Paris, April 30, Gibson reported on his first interview with Bao Dai on April 28 in which he had failed to persuade the Vietnamese monarch not to take action against Diem until the Department finished its deliberations on Vietnam and Collins returned to Saigon. Bao Dai was adamant that he must remove from Diem emergency powers making him commander in chief of the army. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–3055)
3. In this telegram to the American Consulate at Nice, April 28, the Department instructed Gibson to emphasize to Bao Dai that the United States desired that he take no action against Diem until Collins returned to Saigon to review the situation with Ely. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–2855)
4. Document 149.
5. See footnote 2, Document 154.

6. Transmitted in telegram 4745 from Paris, April 30, which reads as follows:

   “List of personalities called Cannes for consultation by Bao Dai as released to press by Bao Dai’s Cabinet and published in Nice-Matin this morning follows: Cao Dai Pope Pham Cong Tac, Pres of Supreme Praesidium United Sect Front; Gen Tran Van Soai, C-in-C Hoa Hao troops; Gen Bai Vien, Binh Xuyen Chief; Mgr Le Huu Tu, a representative high Buddhist clergy; former PriMins including Tran Van Huu, Gen Nguyen Van Xuan, Prince Buu Loc; Tran Van Do and Ho Thong Minh, former Ministers Diem Govt; Ho Van Nut of Tinh-Thanh political group; Nguyen Ton Hoan and Dr Phan Huy Quat of Dai Viet Party; Dr Phan Van Ngoi of Vietnamese Socialist Party; Tran Van Ly, former Governor Central Annam (a Catholic); Dr Nguyen Xuan Chu, Pres Provisional National Council; Tran Van Tuyen of Quoc Dan Dang Party; and former Cabinet Ministers Nguyen Dac Khe, Nguyen Van Tri, and Nguyen Quoc Dinh; Syndicalist representatives including Nguyen Nhon Ung and a representative of Christian Un On; and two peasant representatives.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–3055)