Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 333

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (McBride)¹

secret

Geneva, May 2, 1954.

Participants:

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Vice Admiral Davis
  • Asst. Secretary Merchant
  • Asst. Secretary Robertson
  • Mr. McBride
• Australia
  • The Hon. R. G. Casey, Foreign Minister
  • Mr. A. S. Watt, Commissioner in Malaya
  • Mr. T. K. Critchley
  • Mr. J. R. Rowland
• New Zealand
  • The Hon. T. C. Webb, Foreign Minister
  • Mr. A. D. Mcintosh
  • Mr. F. H. Corner

The Secretary opened the meeting stating that he had asked his Australian and New Zealand colleagues to meet with him under the terms of reference of the ANZUS Pact which provide for such consultation when any part of the area is threatened. The Secretary said he felt the situation in Southeast Asia was such that it required consultation as called for in the ANZUS Pact. Furthermore, since all three Ministers were present in Geneva, he thought it would be useful to exchange views again, especially since the present situation requires a broad unified front.² He said he had discussed the situation with the Philippines under the terms of our pact with them and also with the French and the Associated States, and with the United Kingdom because of her interest in Malaya. He said that he had also talked with the Thais, and because of their special concern had held military conversations with them in Washington. Finally, he had talked on the general subject of the Southeast Asian situation with the Ambassadors of India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Japan, Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea. Conversations with the latter group of Ambassadors in Washington had been merely for the purpose of keeping them informed.

The Secretary continued saying that the present situation was due in large part to the lack of any strong French Government, and the French failure to put the situation on a sound basis politically in Indochina earlier. He noted that for the Western powers to appear to be engaged in Southeast Asia in helping France preserve a colonial regime would certainly not win us support from the Asian states. The Secretary said he was, however, fully aware of the problem in France where public opinion insisted that the French effort in Indochina be in support of the French Union, and pointed out it was somewhat difficult to reconcile full independence with the French Union concept. He added the French had made some progress along the lines of the British Commonwealth although their concept was not quite so liberal. He said that the Governments of the Associated States were feeble, and that Bao Dai and the King of Cambodia had hardly demonstrated qualities that would make people enthusiastic about dying for them.

The Secretary continued that some progress on achieving a united front in Southeast Asia had been made, but the situation remained unsatisfactory. He stressed that the peoples of the area were uncertain as to what issues were involved, and that it was difficult to obtain their support until the issues had been made clearer.

The Secretary then passed to the question of United States aid which he said had been enormous, and had stopped short only of acts which we felt could be considered as open belligerency. He said we could not pass to actions of this type without Congressional approval, and that it was undesirable to request such action from Congress when fundamental questions remained unanswered.

The Secretary stated that Bidault was extremely disheartened, felt that he had no remaining assets and was ready for virtual unconditional surrender. He continued that no one had yet devised any compromise that would save the situation. Partition is undesirable because it would be followed by large scale Communist infiltration south of any line that might be drawn, and furthermore the situation was unlike that in Korea because the Communists were all over the country. The solution of the problem of how to keep the south non–Communist in the event of partition had not been answered. If elections were held now the Communists would probably win, and in any event it was difficult to envisage holding elections under present circumstances, and finally, if a coalition government were established, the Communists would probably quickly take it over. Therefore our negotiating position is not encouraging. In conclusion the Secretary asked his colleagues for their thoughts on the problem.

The Foreign Minister of Australia said that his thoughts were largely negative ones, but he doubted very much whether we could hold Indochina, or any of Southeast Asia, by military means without the support of the Asian countries concerned. He noted efforts had been made by the United Kingdom to make sure no damaging resolutions on the subject emerged from the Colombo Conference. Mr. Casey continued that it was absolutely essential to avoid war with Communist China since such a war would be long and terrible and the outcome was uncertain.

Mr. Casey continued recognizing the importance of United States aid to Indochina and said that the French greatly appreciated this aid and had spontaneously mentioned it to him. However, he said this was not in itself a solution. He said he saw some signs that the military situation would not develop so rapidly or so disastrously as we had feared. Dien Bien Phu might not fall, and in any event we tended to overlook the disabilities of the other side, such as the fact that the monsoon season was starting, the Communists had suffered heavy losses at Dien Bien Phu, and they would be exhausted perhaps even if it did fall.

The Australian Foreign Minister stressed no military action should be envisaged in any event during the Geneva Conference since this could be most damaging in Asian public opinion. He expressed the view that perhaps the UN should participate in the Southeast Asian problem, but did not have any specific ideas as to how this might be brought about. He mentioned Australia had already agreed to talks looking toward common action in Southeast Asia but warned the forthcoming Australian elections inhibited his Government from taking any positive action at this time. He said it would be quite wrong to commit Australia now since the Government might change in a few weeks.

He continued saying that Australia was inclined to give Geneva a chance to reach a solution during the next few weeks and that we should see if anything came out of it. He mentioned talks were going on behind closed doors, not with the other side however, regarding partition. He said he agreed with the Secretary’s analysis of the disadvantages of partition. He noted furthermore that Bao Dai was opposed to partition and that the other Asian states feared it, though militarily partition at the 18th parallel might be feasible. He added possibly an alliance in the Southeast Asia area was the only answer, but stressed such a grouping should have all possible Asian participation, while we must watch very closely the colonial issue which he knew was important in the United States, and was heavily stressed in the area.

Mr. Casey said he would see Mohammed Ali and Zafrullah Khan in Karachi on Tuesday and would talk to them along these lines as he already had with Eden. He said Ceylon might give us at least moral support, and that even in Burma the situation might not be hopeless, particularly if Ceylon should participate. He mentioned Siam had already joined in, but concluded that it would be undesirable to try to get Indonesia because that would raise the Dutch problem. He concluded if his party won the elections, Australia would take a much more positive position in this field.

The Foreign Minister of New Zealand said his delegation had been going around in circles on this problem without coming up with any answers. He said New Zealand had no enthusiasm for going into the Indochina war since it was the view of his Government the problem derived to a very large extent from French failure to grant independence to the Associated States at the proper time, as a result of which the latter were demanding much more now than they would have been satisfied with a few years ago. He said that much as we dislike Communism we were now in a difficult position because the Communists had been handed an issue on a platter by the French.

He said New Zealand could, in any event, give very little material assistance, but would not give even moral support while the Geneva Conference was in session. He said the reaction to common action outside the framework of the UN would be bad, especially with the Asians. Therefore it would be better to have the Indochina problem introduced initially into the UN. He said common action would, of course, be vetoed by the Soviets in the Security Council but that he thought the General Assembly would approve some sort of collective measures. He said that this might be the quickest way to get action anyway and such an exercise would have to be attempted before New Zealand could consider coming in.

Discussing the various alternatives Mr. Webb said it is true it would be very difficult to hold elections now and perhaps the possibility of holding a line following partition might represent the best prospect. He also noted the military situation was not too bad. Dien Bien Phu appeared to be holding out fairly firmly, and not just because the Communists were refraining from taking it for political reasons. He noted the Communists also had suffered considerably, and we should not underestimate their losses. Mr. Webb said Molotov was not keen apparently for Communist Chinese intervention in Indochina so perhaps there was some prospect for negotiations. In any event he thought negotiations should be attempted before there was any thought of military action. He added he presumed common action in Indochina would require French consent and for reasons of pride and prestige so far France had not asked for any such assistance.

In conclusion he said that New Zealand recognized her responsibilities in the area so she would join in talks looking toward a defensive alliance of the area, but stressed it was essential to keep the South Asian countries at least neutral and if possible to try to get them on our side. He concluded with an appeal for caution.

The Under Secretary then referred to recent NSC consideration of the Indochina problem.³ He agreed with the conclusions of the Foreign Minister of New Zealand that our present problem had been created to a large extent by French mistakes in the past and made the point that we had urged the French to grant independence to the Associated States at a much earlier moment.

Insofar as the military situation is concerned, he said that none of us should have any illusions about Dien Bien Phu. He said the fortress area was already so reduced that the remainder could fall at any time. He mentioned further critical positions had been lost today and the Communists can now probably take it within 24 hours. He said militarily this would not cause a collapse of the French Union effort as the French Union forces had committed much less to this effort than had the enemy. In fact he concluded the Dien Bien Phu operation had already paid dividends from the French viewpoint. However, unfortunately it has become a symbol in France and Bidault is extremely gloomy as to the effect of its fall on the morale of the French people and the National Assembly. The Under Secretary added even after the fall of Dien Bien Phu there would remain in Indochina quite strong, very well equipped, and not badly trained French Union forces.

The Under Secretary recapitulated the original plan of General Navarre and repeated that it was a sound plan which had offered a good chance of success if it were well carried out. If carried out, it would have provided a position of strength in the area, and would have resulted in effective armies of the Associated States. He noted that it provided for the establishment of 54 light battalions over each of two years. The Under Secretary added the United States contribution to this effort had been 1¼ billion dollars during the present fiscal year alone, and even this figure did not include certain additional emergency requests. The Navarre plan had kept up to schedule until three months ago and the principal disappointment had been in the quality of training. The Under Secretary stated the United States had offered to assist in this training but for reasons of sensitivity and pride the French had refused our offer though there was some possibility they would accept if we were to repeat the proposal now. He added we had been successful in the past in training forces under similar circumstances in Greece and Korea.

The Under Secretary said it had never been intended U.S. ground forces, Australian or New Zealand ground forces either for that matter, should be committed to Indochina, but pointed out that unless some new element were introduced the situation would remain very discouraging. He said if hostilities were to terminate unsatisfactorily the long border of Laos would be virtually indefensible while Thailand would urgently need assistance. He said unless strong action were taken the Communists would reach the Malayan frontier, where it would be too late to defend Malaya even if British troops were rushed to the frontier, especially in view of the Communist infiltration which has already taken place in the area. The Kra Isthmus would then be indefensible without an outside action.

Admiral Davis added most of his military information confirmed Dien Bien Phu was on its last legs, and could fall even without any large–scale Communist assault. He said after its fall the French Union forces would still have the strength to carry on militarily but it was a question whether they had the will. The Under Secretary stated the Viet Minh had put 20–25% of their assets into Dien Bien Phu, while the French Union had committed only 5–6% of its assets, and that the Communists had already lost more men than the French Union has committed in the Dien Bien Phu garrison. However, the effect in France, especially after so many years of warfare, would be greatly felt, and the officers and noncommissioned officers were French, so the effect of casualties had been felt all over the country.

The Under Secretary stated the West could not afford to commit its ground troops on the mainland of Asia, since the creation of our forces was simply too expensive to permit such a commitment. He noted the Chinese Communists had accepted an Armistice in Korea not in any sense because of losses they had suffered but because they concluded we were about to bomb their only industrial plant in Manchuria. Therefore he thought it was very desirable for us to state now that we were consulting together since it might prove a deterrent to the Communists, while if we do nothing a very grave threat will present itself in the future. Finally, he said that we do after all still have the capacity of retaliatory bombing, if the decision were taken in that sense. Admiral Davis noted from his viewpoint he also believed consultations were desirable and could certainly do no harm to anyone as no commitments were involved.

The Secretary turned to the statements made by the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers with reference to the desirability of “giving Geneva a run” before taking any action. He said we agreed we could not take any military action while the Conference was in progress, but felt strongly it would be a disaster for us just to sit around. He asserted only Communist self–restraint would prevent the fall of all of Indochina now. He said neither he nor the French could see a deterrent at the present time. Accordingly, Bidault was correct when he said he had no cards to play. Furthermore Bidault’s mandate, if any, is to liquidate the Indochina war, and to guarantee that no more Frenchmen are killed in Indochina after the end of the Geneva Conference. That is what the French Government and the National Assembly want, the Secretary concluded. Furthermore, he added, Bao Dai and the King of Cambodia are both playboys and have no leadership whatever to offer. They are certainly not going in any way effectively to deter the Communists.

The Secretary continued saying the choice facing the Communists was merely whether to grab Indochina all in one bite, or in little pieces and digest it as they went along. The only reason they might not take it all now is for fear of scaring the other side too much. At the present time there was not even the appearance of any alternative to eventual Communist domination of all of Indochina.

Therefore the Secretary declared he was trying to bring together a group of anti–Communist nations with interests in the area, as the knowledge such a group was consulting might cause the Communists to moderate their demands. If no action is taken until after Geneva and a disaster occurs, it will be too late. Therefore the Secretary said he would like to see military talks going on in Washington, where we have considerable information on the situation, as soon as possible.

The Secretary went on to say Eden had agreed to these talks two weeks ago when the Secretary was in London but he was not quite clear whether this agreement still stood.⁴ However, he thought the British might come along if no intervention were involved. He said he agreed, of course, war with Communist China would be a dreadful thing, and assured the others that the United States had no intention of getting into any provocative posture with Communist China. If the Peking Government openly intervenes, then another situation would be created and we must, of course, be ready to fight at some point to preserve our fundamental values. However, the Secretary stressed that we did not intend to give the Communist Chinese any justification to attack Indochina openly.

If we take no action whatever while the Geneva Conference is in progress the French, who have no will to fight, and the Associated States who have no capacity to fight, will not continue resisting and will enter into a lonely and hopeless negotiation. The Secretary agreed that the French situation was deplorable and that there was virtually no Government at the present time. For this reason above all it was urgent to have discussions among ourselves now so that we could at least make up our own minds. For example, he said, if agreement was reached on a line in Vietnam, what would we do to hold that line? At least we should examine that question among ourselves.

The Secretary added that as Mr. Casey had said the time factor was perhaps not quite so bad as it might be, and we do have the asset that the French have their troops in Indochina, and cannot evacuate them in less than several months anyway during which time the native population might turn against them. He pointed out that, since the French would in any event want to guarantee the safety of their expeditionary corps, this was a factor which might prove to be an asset on our side. He agreed that we should draw no cheer from the fact that Dien Bien Phu has not fallen as yet, as the situation there is desperate.

The Secretary added the French had made no formal request of any kind for additional United States participation except two informal requests for an air strike at Dien Bien Phu. The first had been made following General Ely’s visit to Washington,⁵ when Pleven and Bidault asked Ambassador Dillon if we could take such action, indicating they thought it might be decisive. We informed the French Government then the President considered this would be an act of war which could be taken only with Congressional consent, which he did not believe he could request at that time for various reasons, including the fact that the political situation did not appear sound to us in the Associated States nor did it to the other Asian states either. Furthermore if the states of the area did not take as grave a view of the situation as we did it would not be possible to convince the United States people of the necessity of such action.

In any event these requests were very informal, the Secretary stressed, and were not accompanied by any French suggestion for a broader United States–French relationship along lines that should be established before the creation of a wartime alliance. The French have never offered us a partnership in Indochina, and we have had nothing to do with campaign plans, training policy, etc. The Secretary added on April 22 Bidault had shown him a telegram from General Navarre stating a United States air strike was the only way to save Dien Bien Phu. The Secretary reiterated this was a very informal way to request such a momentous action. Accordingly he had informed Bidault at that time there was not sufficient time for Congress to act, and furthermore this request should be made in a somewhat broader framework, providing for a partnership etc.⁶ The Secretary concluded that these are the only French requests that we have turned down except for perhaps a few minor delays in sending equipment etc. and these requests were turned down because they appeared to us to cross the line of belligerency. He said we had gone to great effort to meet other requests, and had even obtained civilian pilots for example to conduct operations which the French wanted and which we did not believe our Air Force should carry out.

Mr. Webb questioned whether the mere fact that we were discussing a common policy for the area would in fact be a deterrent and whether we would inform the Communists at Geneva that we were holding talks in Washington. He added that, of course, a point would be reached beyond which we could not go. The Secretary mentioned that at the present time no agreement existed among ourselves on what we would not tolerate from the Communists, and that accordingly at the present time they could presumably assume we would not draw the line anywhere.

The Under Secretary added it was a question of what assets we could salvage from the Indochina situation and what will emerge from the present critical problem, what is left and how we could save it. As an example, the Thais had offered to double their army. The Under Secretary did not think they could reach the 125,000 total which they had proposed, but believed an effective force of 90,000 could be built up with adequate training. Perhaps something could be done in Laos and Cambodia, he added, as well as supplying military equipment to Burma through the British mission. Finally perhaps southern Vietnam could be held and an effective force trained there, while there might also be other enclaves in Vietnam open to us. The Under Secretary pointed out until we had talked these things over among ourselves it was quite unclear where we stood. Admiral Davis added the point discussions of this type would require a long time and accordingly should get underway, noting what we were looking for now were military appreciations and not commitments.

Mr. Casey said that the Five Power Staff Agency had probably already done much of this work. The Secretary stressed again the need for some new element and made the point that the holding even of military staff talks might stiffen the French a little, and make them slightly less willing to accept surrender. The effects of French capitulation in Indochina furthermore were not limited to Asia the Secretary pointed out. The sudden descent of France into the role of a fourth–rate power would have a profound effect in North Africa, on NATO and on EDC.

The Secretary told the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers it looked now as though we would start the Indochina phase here with nine powers—the four Berlin powers, the Associated States, Communist China and Viet Minh. As of the present time no tripartite position existed, and there had not even been exchanges of views. The Secretary said the French doubtless had some ideas but they had not communicated them to him, while the British had not talked to him either, and it was very questionable whether the French would accept any British play anyway. The Secretary concluded he had tried to sound out Molotov on his plans but had found out only that he was planning to sit back apparently and make our side put forth proposals.

Mr. Casey inquired whether we could not make useful propaganda of the fact the French had finally given independence to Vietnam. The Secretary stated this had not really happened yet and, while an announcement had been made, the treaties had not actually been signed. He said he understood the political treaty was now ready but the Vietnamese did not want to sign it until they had seen the draft of the economic agreement which contained certain privileges for France. Mr. Webb concluded the Vietnamese did not trust the French and accordingly we could not make much use of this. The Secretary added there was one ambiguity in the treaty and that was as to whether the Associated States could withdraw from the French Union.

Mr. Critchley of the Australian Delegation noted that the work which had been done to date by the Five Power Staff Agency was based on the assumption of an open aggression by the Chinese Communists, and accordingly its conclusions would not be useful in the present context. Therefore he said a new estimate was needed by the five powers as to what was likely to happen and what countermeasures we would take.

The Under Secretary said there was even disagreement between the appreciations of our own and the British Joint Chiefs, so it was imperative to have broader talks and evolve a common policy. He said we must decide where we would hold the line, and must prevent erosion of our position. He repeated that if for example Communist troops ever reached the Malayan frontier it would then be too late to defend that area.

The Under Secretary stressed the importance of also giving full weight to political considerations. Mr. Webb indicated his agreement that political considerations, especially colonialism as an issue, were most important. The Under Secretary agreed noting we must have a full answer on this problem when we went to Congress to ask for additional aid for Indochina.

The Secretary concluded that the Communists had invented a type of warfare for which we had no ready antidote. They exploited any injustice in the world, and fed military power into minor dissident movements until they had become an explosive force. The problem was, that when you opposed these movements, unless you were very careful, you appeared to be supporting injustice.

Mr. Casey noted Mr. Eden’s difficulties in coming along very far while the Geneva Conference was in progress, and indicated his view that perhaps working within the formula of the Five Power Staff Agency would be best from the British viewpoint. He said Australia would be glad to take part in talks on a multilateral basis, but, of course, could make no commitments until some weeks after the elections on May 29. He said Australia very much hoped that the UK would participate.

Mr. Webb asserted the New Zealand position was much the same as the Australian and agreed with the United States conclusion that we must develop a position to which we would stick. Accordingly he was willing to participate in talks on the same basis as Australia, with the general aim of stopping Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Mr. Casey added again that we should make every effort to get the Asian states on our side.

In closing the meeting the Secretary stated he thought Mr. Casey’s talks in Karachi would be useful, and noted he had already talked with the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington on this subject. The Secretary made the point that East Pakistan was nearer to the danger than even India, and accordingly Pakistan might recognize the danger. The Secretary stated that since Australia and New Zealand agreed to the general idea of talks, we should explore the question with the other members of the five (UK and France) and see if they are willing also to join in talks. He asked the Australian and New Zealand delegates if they had any objections to Thailand participating in view of her obvious concern, and no objection was made.

The Secretary concluded the meeting reading the attached communiqué to which the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers agreed.

[Attachment]

Communiqué

“The Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, and the Secretary of State of the United States met in Geneva on May 2, as the Council of ANZUS to discuss the situation in South East Asia in accordance with Article Three of the Treaty.”

1. Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 73, May 3. (396.1 GE/5–354)
2. For documentation on the “United Action” concept, see volumes xii and xiii.
3. Reference to the 194th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 29. For a summary of the discussion at that meeting, see telegram Tedul 20, p. 615.
4. Apr. 13; see the extract of telegram 4523, Apr. 13, p. 514.
5. For documentation on General Ely’s visit to Washington, Mar. 20–25, see volume xiii.
6. For a summary of the Dulles–Bidault discussion on Apr. 22, see telegram Dulte 2, Apr. 22, in volume xiii.