Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289
The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)1
Dear Anthony: I am taking back to Washington for discussion with the President the Memorandum on South–East Asian Defence, which you gave me on April 30.2 I think there is much in it with which we would go along. However, it does not seem to me that the eighth paragraph proposing immediate and secret joint examination between the US and the UK is in itself adequate.
Your paragraph 7 says that you do not think that a French collapse in Indochina could come about as rapidly or as completely as we appear to envisage. I hope you are right. I think, however, that our pessimistic view will almost surely prove correct if France is left at this moment with virtually no alternative to a lonely, hopeless negotiation, which will amount to unconditional surrender. I think it imperative that we inject some new element into the situation, and I believe that the least we should do would be to invite the French into at least certain phases of our talks and let this be known.
We have just had a meeting of the ANZUS Council at which Australia and New Zealand indicated a willingness to proceed with military discussions with your Government and mine and France, and with the desirability of Thailand being brought in.3 This last is in accordance with the concluding paragraph of your Memorandum.
If we do nothing in the way of planning a common defense until every last detail of nature and purpose, membership and commitments is agreed upon between our two Governments acting secretly, then I fear circumstances will move against us so rapidly that what we do agree upon will have been rendered obsolete by events. Could not your Government reconsider its position as expressed in your Memorandum at least to the extent of enabling us to help provide Bidault with some element of hope, which might enable him to gather the political strength to hold off from the surrender which otherwise seems inevitable.
Faithfully yours,