PPS files,
lot 65 D 101, “Chronological file”
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United
States Delegation (Bowie) to the
Secretary of State
top secret
Geneva, May 2, 1954.
Regardless of how things develop in Indochina, one of our primary
objectives is to protect and preserve as much of the area as feasible.
In particular, it is highly desirable to prevent any debacle in Vietnam
from spreading to Cambodia and Laos. One device for this purpose might
be the designation by the UN of a peace
observation commission for Cambodia and Laos which might serve to block
Vietminh invasion of those two states. Moreover, if Asians such as
India, Pakistan, or Burma could be named for such a commission, this
would tend to engage them, at least to this extent, in shoring up the
area.
[Page 652]
This approach would be especially useful if the French decide to give up
some or all of Vietnam. But it would not seem to be prejudicial even if
the defense of Vietnam can be kept going.
To take this step would presumably require action by Cambodia and Laos
with the approval of the French. The events of the past few weeks may
have changed the attitude of the French on such a proposal. It is hard
to see how they can properly object under present conditions.
[Attachment]
1
Actions To Prepare For Implementation Of
Alternative U.S. Policies in Indochina
Problem
Consideration is herewith given to those actions which the U.S.:
- (a)
- should take to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia
before resolving the question of whether it would, if
necessary, be prepared to commit its forces to prevent
Indochina from succumbing to communism;
- (b)
- should not take, until this question has been resolved, at
least tentatively or conditionally, and whose nature will
depend on that resolution.
Discussion
The present position is obscure, since it is not known what course
the French will adopt after the probable fall of Dien Bien Phu. It
is unknown to what extent the French will desire and be able to
continue resistance in Indochina and whether hostilities may not be
terminated by a cease fire and the eventual partition of Indochina
at the Geneva Conference.
The French have asked for immediate and direct U.S. air intervention
to save Dien Bien Phu. This has been rejected by the U.S. on grounds
that constitutional procedure prevents the U.S. from entering into a
state of belligerency in the present case without congressional
approval. The French were further informed that the Administration
would not be able to seek such authorization until plans had been
developed for Indochina’s defense by united action.
The Secretary in his background press conference at Geneva April
252 stated that the U.S. is assisting the
French in Indochina by all feasible means short of belligerent
action. The Secretary seemed to have intended to imply that the U.S.
would continue with such
[Page 653]
assistance by special measures, such as the airlift from France,
over and beyond the aid agreement concluded last September.
The proposal that the U.S., U.K.,
Australia, New Zealand and Thailand hold secret military talks to
devise measures to bolster Thailand’s defense if French resistance
should collapse in Indochina has been shelved for the reason that it
would produce an adverse reaction on the French if it became
known.3 It is
now proposed instead that the present Five Power Military Staff
Planning Organization (U.S., U.K.,
France, Australia and New Zealand) meet in Bangkok, with Thai
representation, to engage in planning which will include measures
for a defense of Indochina also.
Nehru has indicated that he
will oppose the U.S. proposal for united action for Asian defense
and he has suggested instead that the countries participating in the
Ceylon meeting opening April 28 put forward a plan for a cease fire
in Indochina as a preliminary to a solution for the independence of
all of Indochina and which would be guaranteed against outside
interference.4
Nehru apparently envisaged
prohibiting intervention by the U.S. and Red China but seemed not to
have excluded further French action, on the presumption that the
French had committed themselves to Indochina’s independence.
Initial Measures Required
Lacking the certainty that the French will maintain their stand in
Indochina, the measures suggested in paragraph (a) of the problem statement should initially be of an
immediate and contingent nature designed to do the utmost to ensure
that the French will keep up their resistance. They should take the
following form:
- (1)
- The U.S. should insist with the French that the grant of
sovereignty to the Associated States involves a commitment
to defend the integrity of these States.
- (2)
- Extraordinary aid short of belligerency should be
continued and the British should be urged to
participate.
- (3)
- As a first step towards implementing the concept of united
action, an effort should be made to obtain commitments from
as many free world states in the area as feasible that they
support independence for the Associated States and the
maintenance of that independence against threats from any
outside quarter.
- (4)
- Voluntary contributions should be requested from the
interested countries in support of the extraordinary
assistance which the U.S. is furnishing the French short of
belligerent action.
- (5)
- To match any increase in effective assistance supplied by
the above means, the French should be urged to send
conscript levies to Indochina.
- (6)
- Common negotiating position vis–à–vis the communists
should be developed which would envisage an ultimate
solution safeguarding the southern frontier of Red China by
the possible establishment of a neutral zone to be placed
under the control of a UN
peace observation committee. This would cut off further
intervention by Red China and at the same time would assure
world opinion that united action was aimed to protect
Indochina and not to overthrow the Peking Regime.
- (7)
- United action support should be given to Thailand for the
building up of its defenses as a precautionary
measure.
