396.1 GE/5–154: Telegram
The Ambassador in Australia (Peaslee) to the Department of State
251. Sent USDel Geneva unnumbered. Limit distribution. Following reports interview with Prime Minister Menzies at Canberra Embassy residence Friday evening, April 30, 1800 to 1915 hours Canberra time, at his request, related in approximate chronological sequence of statements for your appraisal.
Principal points are first, Prime Minister statement re Casey’s advocacy of general Korean elections, second consideration which Prime Minister gave to himself leading the Australian delegation at Geneva, and, third Prime Minister opposition to any thought of territorial concessions in SEA.
Prime Minister’s request for interview was first since our conferences April 5–11, reported Embtels 210, 213, 215, 217, 218 and despatch 343 April 13.1 Conference was on eve of Prime Minister’s departure [Page 650] from Canberra for election campaign. I assumed it was for purpose of friendly explanation some Australian current press speculations re UK, Australia, and US lack of complete agreement. After preliminaries he launched into sub SEA crisis. He said government profoundly appreciated importance of Geneva conference to Australia future but that pendency of general election embarrassed it respecting any major moves in international affairs. Said the election foreclosed move which he might otherwise have taken if himself heading the Australian delegation to Geneva, in which case he would have requested “Winston” to go and would have hoped President Eisenhower might have considered it.
He then described several recent conferences with UK High Commissioner in which High Commissioner had complained about Australian press suggesting Australia not following UK, to which Prime Minister said he replied that Australia was not an authoritarian state and did not control its press but pointed he had already made a statement deploring suggestions of any rift between UK and US which he said still did not seem to satisfy High Commissioner.
Re Indochina, Prime Minister then said “of course the people have to be prepared for these things. If US and UK and Australia should invade Indochina now neither the white nor the yellow people would understand us.” He referred to division of opinion in US as well as elsewhere. He said it was obviously important to get other countries associated, mentioning particularly Thailand and Burma.
I told him of UK High Commissioner’s conversations with me April 11, reported despatch 343 April 13, in which High Commissioner had referred to UK thought of making some territorial concessions in Indochina. At this Prime Minister declared emphatically his “personal, unalterable opposition to anything of that kind.” He referred rhetorically to the obvious desirability if it were possible of drawing line between those who really want to be Communists and those who do not, but indicated that this was not feasible geographically.
I then referred to brief Australian press statements which had just appeared suggesting possible Casey–Dulles divergence re Korean elections, saying I knew nothing except press reports and was not disturbed. Prime Minister replied knew nothing but press reports either but that press always gave only half story and that he assumed, interpolating with some emphasis “unless Casey is completely deviating from Cabinet policy,” that what Casey had said was that “of course everybody would be glad to see such general elections if that would bring a solution to the problem” and that Casey had then gone on to point out obstacles and difficulties.
I referred to other press reports that Casey will return shortly to Australia and that there may be further Cabinet discussions and [Page 651] asked whether Casey was needed generally in election campaign. He replied Casey not needed but if does not participate he might lose in his district.
In course of foregoing discussions Prime Minister referred to UK leadership difficulties “Winston’s failing health” and “Eden’s demonstrated incapacity for getting along with his US opposite numbers, including both Acheson and Dulles,” according to the Prime Minister.
There was also discussion of possible future role of Prime Minister personally in international discussions after election if government returned. Prime Minister said his personal acquaintance our President only one short interview.
There are some indications of confusion in Australian press re Casey’s Geneva speech.2 Today’s Sydney Telegraph, for example, sets forth as contrasting parallel columns Reuter dispatch headed “Reuter says the speech was part of a British Commonwealth bid to change tactics at the talks” and the other column headed “Rohan Rivett asks, is Australia’s role simply that of a supporter and echo of Washington?”
Consul General Stebbins, Melbourne, reports recent talk with Cabinet member Kent–Hughes (which parallels similar information are [of?] other Cabinet members) in which Kent–Hughes said Dulles position on Indochina expressed exactly his own point of view, though he felt US had been somewhat late in realizing seriousness of situation.