751G.00/8–3154: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
847. Subject: US military support program for Indochina (Paris 760, 814, 868, 873, 899 Saigon 668, 745).2
Basic problem in determining future course action this subject as Department sees it is to determine what military manpower goals should be sought in Indochina and how US financial support can best be used attain such goals and achieve highest quality forces. Our approach this vital subject to French and Associated States authorities depends on views highest US military authorities. Accordingly Department has recommended JCS undertake study forces we would like see Indochina remainder this calendar year and next including judgment what French forces should remain. Study should take account intentions and capabilities other governments concerned to extent we can estimate them. It would begin with fact French expeditionary forces of 240,000 consist some 60,000 Indochinese and remainder Frenchmen, Africans and Legionnaires; although indigenous national armies exceeded 300,000 at time cease fire French now allege large part these forces have disappeared.
Since this military study likely require some weeks and since we cannot afford dissipate what strength now remains Indochina we propose for time being continue present modified aid procedures until we can enter into full negotiation with other governments regarding force concept to pursue Indochina and future direction US aid program.
Regarding force concept may be possible for example that forces Indochina could be built around remainder national armies together with Indochinese presently within Expeditionary Corps and total such indigenous forces including support forces and nationalized militia might amount to considerably less than national forces contemplated this year under $550 million (19.5 billion piaster) program. This in turn could mean future Indochinese national forces might be financed for something on order $300 million year of which [Page 2004] Saigon 668 makes clear US would provide almost all. Determination command relationships between indigenous and remaining French forces would be most important factor in deciding organization such indigenous forces.
If at same time French expeditionary forces are reduced may prove possible reduce French financial requirement from $900 million contemplated this year to amount approximating French contribution this year from their own fiscal resources aside from US support we providing under $400 million program.
If possible in fact cut down US burden along lines outlined above and at same time maintain sufficient forces within Indochina to preserve internal order and stability this would also be in line with what will very likely be competing demands on funds available coming twelve months to meet requirements elsewhere in Asia.
Would like your comment on approach to this problem outlined above and whatever additional information available to help formulate US position this subject.3
Foregoing of course not for discussion with representatives other governments.
- Drafted by Beigel of WE. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 906. Repeated for information to Manila as Tosec 28. A typed notation on the source text indicates that this telegram was based on a paper approved by the OCB Special Working Group on Indochina.↩
- For telegram 873 from Paris, Aug. 30, see p. 1997, For telegram 668 from Saigon, Aug. 22, see p. 1966. The other telegrams under reference are not printed.↩
- In telegram 992 from Saigon, Sept. 6, the Embassy concurred in the basic approach outlined in the first paragraph of this telegram, agreed that a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was necessary, and provided certain detailed information bearing on the problem. (751G.00/9–654)↩