751G.00/9–354: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
884. Repeated information Paris 294. I accompanied Senator Mansfield1 on calls yesterday on Prime Minister Diem, Foreign Minister Do, and Acting Commissariat General Bordaz.
[Page 2002]I was rather perplexed by fact Diem played down the dangerous political difficulties in which he finds himself. Diem said rightly that his government could not exercise strong control and effective program until it had control of army but then went on to argue that although Hinh had unquestionably plotted with sects, he was sure Hinh would realize that sects were dangerous partners and would return to an attitude of loyalty to government. I find it very difficult to credit that Diem really believes in possibility of Hinh’s reasoned repentance and return to loyalty. It is my opinion that Diem glossed over his difficulties in order that Senator should not have too dark a picture of situation here.
Diem went on to point out that sects had divergent interests and also a fund of patriotism which combined would eventually make them come to terms with government. I find this hard to credit. When I asked President how negotiations with Cao Dais were coming on he was rather evasive and said it would be impossible for sects to come immediately to terms with him since they were still bound by their former plot.
Foreign Minister Do was much less optimistic and expressed entire disbelief that Hinh would ever rally voluntarily to government. It was Do’s theory that Hinh’s ambition to become military dictator had hardened rather than reverse. Do said his information was that prior to departure of Tran Van An and Thuan for France to consult with Bao Dai, the three sects and Hinh had signed joint memorandum to Bao Dai, contents of which were unknown to him but presumably called for dismissal of Diem. On other hand, Do had successfully insisted that Diem send Luyen immediately to persuade Bao Dai to remain neutral and he thought Luyen would succeed, as Luyen had a “certain influence” over Bao Dai. Luyen was able to get on same plane as emissaries of plotters.
Both Diem and Do thought possibility of immediate coup d’état had been averted largely due to my “warnings” to Hinh, Tran Van An, and General Le Van Vien. Do said he was convinced that was decisive factor.
In conversation with Bordaz, Mansfield asked him what would be objections to US extending military budgetary aid direct to Vietnam. Bordaz surprisingly replied that there was no objection provided it was done in coordination with French. This is not attitude of La Chambre or of General Ely, although latter has never expressed himself definitely on subject.
In spite of Diem’s belief that danger of coup d’état has temporarily been averted, he received report today that some unnamed French General was secretly encouraging Hinh to take over government by force. To be on safe side, therefore, Diem is instructing Hinh to [Page 2003] accompany him on his three-day visit to various refugee camps beginning tomorrow. It remains to be seen whether Hinh actually accompanies him.
- See footnote 2, p. 1997.↩