751G.00/9–554: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
897. Repeated information Paris 298, Manila 133. Manila for USDel. Ely urgently requested me to see him in Dalat yesterday. He returns to Saigon in 48 hours for ceremony turning over Norodom Palace.
Ely said he had come to my view Diem must be given another chance but only on condition latter broadens his government to include representation of sects and replace inefficient members by capable people. He said this was counter to views of Paris which were that Diem should be gotten out as quickly as possible and, he indicated, contrary to views of some of his advisers one of whom, he indicated, was General Salan. However, Diem could lose no time in forming his new government. Ely agreed pressure must be brought on sects to lower their demands and said he would wire Paris to persuade Bao Dai not to intervene in this situation but to maintain his support of Diem.
[Page 2005]Ely took credit for having prevented a coup d’état of the sects with General Hinh in overthrowing government last week. He also said he had sent “orders” to Bay Vien not to leave with Tran Van An and Thuan to see Bao Dai and told Bay Vien he should cooperate with Diem government. Bay Vien had sent back word he was willing to do so but wished to have Ministry of Interior for his price. I remarked that was hardly possible. Ely was very insistent Diem should take Tam in as Minister of Interior to which I replied that I was convinced that was one concession Diem would refuse to make; in fact he had told me he would resign rather than accept Tam. Ely said that was very regrettable because Tam was willing to enter Diem’s cabinet if latter gave him Interior Ministry and would give him title of vice-president.
At this point Ely suggested General Salan join us. He asked Salan to give his view of the situation and Salan started in by saying unfortunately Diem could not preside effectively over government of union with sects. Diem, in his view, had lost what small popularity he had had by his inaction. He had irritated leading figures in sects and his personality and his physique were so unimpressive that he thought he would be unable to rally masses or their leaders. Ely interrupted at this time to tell him he thoroughly agreed with me that Diem must be given a chance and sects must be told they must cooperate with Diem government. Salan looked unhappy but vouched no further objection.
Both Generals Ely and Salan agreed that military dictatorship or coup d’état by Vietnamese national army would be catastrophe. Both agreed Hinh had not the solid qualities necessary to run a military government and they both said he was not man to develop Vietnamese national army. Only difficulty was there was no one better in sight at the moment. Salan’s idea of getting Hinh away from army and his party was to make him Minister of Defense and put General Vy in as Chief of Staff of Armed Forces. Salan’s opinion of Vy was somewhat higher than Ely’s although Salan said Vy was not Hinh’s equal in intelligence.
I raised question of availability of Colonel The of Cao Daists. Salan said The was person of force and character and real power among Cao Daists. Only objection was French security had absolute proof that it was The who instigated bomb throwing which resulted in death of General Chanson and Governor of South Vietnam in 1951 and that The was also responsible for explosion of the bicycle bombs in Theater Square in Saigon in 1952. Ely suggested there was no proof that The had set out to assassinate Chanson and Governor but that he merely wished to create a panic bomb explosion in that incident.