751G.00/8–2754: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
761. Repeated information Paris 254, Hanoi unnumbered. My telegrams 758 August 26 and 759 August 27. We are faced with a real dilemma. French and Vietnamese criticisms of inefficiency and political ineptitude of Diem are unfortunately all too valid. I am by no means persuaded that even if Diem buys French idea of taking Tam in as policeman of his government (and latter accepts); that if Diem came to terms with sects as result of French and our pressure on him and our possible influence on sects; or that if he took away direct command of army from General Hinh, he would be able to build a solid, effective regime. Diem still has reputation for honesty and patriotism. However, he seems scarcely capable of influencing people, making friends, or undertaking determined action. He seems to dwell in an ivory tower in company with his belief in “his mission”, leaving urgent political negotiations largely in hands of his brothers; “gets in everybody’s hair”; or entrusts to well meaning, intelligent, but not dynamic people like Tran Van Do. While he retains some prestige among non-political elements, he has largely lost whatever support he [Page 1991] enjoyed among Vietnamese political groups, with exception of certain, but by no means all, Catholic groups. He may have some support in center and possibly in north, but the northerners have no influence at present in remaining Vietnam. He seems not to realize that through his own ineptness, lack of action and positive gift for alienating even those who wish to assist him, number of his supporters has dwindled away.
On other hand, no successor government that we can envisage at this time would have any real appeal to nationalist or anti-Communist sentiment. While another government based on candidates who appear to be at hand, including Tam as Minister of Interior, might build up a strong police authority, it would not be an authority that would be completely effective against Viet Minh infiltration nor able to create any general popular support. I am also far from convinced that in spite of his activity and cleverness, Hinh could build up a popular disciplined national army.
We must hope that, perhaps out of a national assembly, some real leader will develop, but this possibility is somewhat far in the uncertain future and there is no time to be lost.
Practically, we must support Diem vis-à-vis the French and the sects, as an interim measure, but I am far from sanguine that his defects of personality and performance will enable him to make effective use of this opportunity. Meanwhile, we must keep our eyes open for another leader.
In light of above, I recommend that proposed message from President to Diem (Deptel 636)1 be held in abeyance.