751G.00/8–2754
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Tyler)
Subject:
- Visit of the French Ambassador with The Acting Secretary of State.
Participants:
- The Acting Secretary of State
- Ambassador Bonnet, French Embassy
- Mr. Pierre Millet, Counselor of the French Embassy
- Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State
- Mr. Tyler, WE
The Ambassador called, at his own request, on the Acting Secretary of State. He said that he had received from his Government some [Page 1992] comments on the letter which the Secretary of State had sent to Mr. Mendes-France, concerning Vietnam.1 In general, the French Government is gratified that the Vietnamese should be considered by the U.S. as an independent government and that the importance of that country should be recognized by the fact that a letter was to be sent by the President of the United States to the Vietnamese Prime Minister. The French Government expressed its hope that the letter would be addressed not so much to Mr. Diem as an individual, but to the Prime Minister, as the head of the Vietnamese Government. The reason for this suggestion was that reports received from Saigon made it clear that Diem is not gaining in authority, and that support for him among the people of Southern Vietnam is decreasing daily. The Ambassador said he believed that reports of a similar nature had been received by the Department of State from US officials in that area. It therefore seemed possible that Diem would not last very long and it would therefore be preferable not to appear to raise his prestige at this time by anything resembling personal support.
The French Government had noted with some surprise that there had been no mention of the French Expeditionary Corps in the text of the letter to Diem. While the French Government understood that matters concerning support of the French Expeditionary Corps were subject to bilateral arrangements and discussions between the U.S. and France, omission of any reference to the F.E.C. in the text of the letter seemed a little surprising. The Ambassador went on to say that the French Government felt that it would be very important that U.S. military aid to the Vietnamese Armed Forces should not be carried out in such a way as to imperil the armistice agreement, or so as to permit misuse of equipment. The French Government wished to suggest that there be constituted in Saigon a tripartite military group, including the Vietnamese, the French, and the U.S., whereby the study and control of the distribution of military aid could be effected.
The Ambassador then turned to the question of the training of Vietnamese troops by the U.S. He said that his Government appreciated and welcomes U.S. participation in this field, and General Ely had reached very good understanding with General O’Daniel as to what was required. The French Government nevertheless wished to emphasize the precaution necessary in order that no pretext be given to the Communists to claim that the armistice agreement had been violated. It would thus be dangerous to try to replace U.S. administrative personnel by military instructors, as this would at once become known.
Turning to Cambodia, he said that in order to prevent possible accusations of breach of the armistice, the French Government felt [Page 1993] that it would be desirable that Cambodian troops should continue to be treated [trained] by the French instructors already there, so far as possible. If there were a sudden influx of U.S. military instructors this would possibly create a difficult situation in view of the functions of the International Advisory Commission.
The Acting Secretary of State told the Ambassador that the French Government’s comments would be taken into consideration and that he thought it would be useful to have the points written down in an Aide-Mémoire.2 He commented that particularly with regard to training, the U.S. had certain definite ideas. Very considerable sums of money and the prestige of the U.S. were involved and we would have to be sure that our aid was applied in a way likely to enable us to achieve our aims. We would therefore have to look very closely at the problems involved.
The Ambassador then turned briefly to the matter of the EDC and said that the chances of ratification were obviously poor. He added that he hoped that even if EDC were defeated, this would not mean that the U.S. would look for a solution of the problem without the participation of France. The Acting Secretary emphasized the gravity of the decision before the French Assembly and said he wondered whether the French Government realized the significance of the decision which was about to be taken. He added that if the EDC were defeated, this would undoubtedly bring about a very fundamental re-assessment of the situation, and of its strategic implications, by the U.S.
- See telegram 610 to Paris, Aug. 18, p. 1957.↩
- Later on Aug. 27, the French Embassy provided the Department of State with an aide-mémoire setting forth the points which had been made by Ambassador Bonnet. (PSA files, lot 54 D 190, “Indochina”) An informal translation of that aide-mémoire was sent to Paris in telegram 737 of Aug. 28, which was also sent to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Vientiane, and London. (751G.00/8–2854)↩