751G.00/8–2754: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
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759. Repeated information Paris 253, Hanoi unnumbered. Plot to get Ngo Dinh Diem and his government out of office is practically completed and operations for its execution would probably have started if I had not stated very firmly to General Ely and his Deputy Bordaz [Page 1989] yesterday evening that Diem must be given another chance to come to terms with sects and set up a capable government.
It would be more correct to say there are two plots against Diem’s government. There is the plot of sects with the more than tacit connivance of General Hinh. Sects are determined it will not be Hinh that heads this new government. Cao Daists say they have some unknown in mind (see Embassy’s telegram 752, August 26)1 but it is likely there is no firm agreement between sects as to who would head new regime. General Tran Van Soai has asked to see General Ely this morning in name of all sects, presumably to demand his “benevolent neutrality” in move against Diem. Modus operandi of sects would be to stir up “popular demonstrations” calling for retirement of Diem government. Following these demonstrations, sects would ask Diem to resign. If latter refused, Bao Dai, who has already been informed or rather approached by Binh Xuyen, would be asked to terminate Diem government.
French, however, have somewhat separate plan. It is that new government should have Nguyen Van Tam as Minister of Interior and Tran Van Huu as President of Council. Ely very frankly, to say the least, exposed this plan to me last night. Real choice of French to head new government would be Tam, except for fact he is unanimously considered as Francophile throughout Vietnam and, while an excellent policeman, lacks intellectual breadth to function as Prime Minister. Ely said to me rather cynically that they would favor Tam in spite of these disadvantages were it not for unfavorable reaction his choice would provoke in US—and other countries. Therefore, French choice was Huu. In view of Huu’s antipathy toward Tam and anti-French stand of latter during latter part of his Prime Ministership and afterwards, this combination, Ely argued, would indicate to country and world that it was government of national union. I said I did not see how Huu could satisfy nationalist anti-Communist sentiment in Vietnam and abroad as long as his public declarations in favor of working with Viet Minh remained uncorrected. I pointed out that Hoa Haos, Cao Daists, and Binh Xuyen had all made public declarations against Huu’s candidacy. I added that Huu as administrator had been very deficient. For example, his information service was least effective and least persuasive of all the bad information services that characterized preceding and succeeding Vietnamese Governments. He had refused to publish budget. While I did not believe he had ever personally appropriated government funds to his own purse, he had made a great deal of money as his “cut” of gambling concession and had displayed very tepid interest in attempts to repress graft in his administration.
Ely finally said he would be willing to give Diem another chance but only on condition that Diem would take Tam into his Cabinet [Page 1990] as Minister of Interior. I said I doubted that without pressure either Diem would agree to name Tam or Tam would agree to accept secondary role in a Diem cabinet. I further said if Tam came into Cabinet and his son Hinh also remained in command army, it would be a very difficult and bitter pill for Diem to swallow, since Hinh for months had been agitating for formation of a military regime, with himself as its head, and latterly had been at least in conversational contact with sects looking toward ouster of Diem government. Ely said that as regards further French support of Diem, latter’s acceptance of Tam was sine qua non. Perhaps Hinh could be “limoge” (put on side lines). That would not be too difficult since Hinh was junior French officer although enjoying temporary high rank in Vietnamese National Army.
Ely went on to say that in agreeing to permit Diem to have another chance he would be going against his instructions from Paris since “France” was determined that Diem government was entirely inefficient, and “unlucky” as well, must go. Ely said, as he had said before, that it was all same to him whether Vietnamese Government was anti-French or pro-French. His criterion was government must be efficient and he had that afternoon told Luyen, Diem’s brother, that it had been most incapable government Vietnam had ever had.
- Telegram 752 from Saigon, Aug. 26, containing information on the position of the Cao Dai sect, is not printed. (751G.00/8–2754)↩