751G.00/8–2654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
751. Repeated information Paris 248. Raphael-Leygues had cocktail party yesterday afternoon at 5:30 p.m. When I arrived purposely late at about 6:30 p.m. I found that so-called “cocktail party” was instead full dress meeting of chief plotters among confessional groups and air of conspiracy was thick. Group included such personnages as Cao Dai Pope, General Soai of the Hoa Hao, political counselor of Binh Xuyen, [name deleted], Ung An of the Imperial Cabinet and the ubiquitous Tran Van An. Also present was General Hinh who, although he must have known that I was coming, appeared somewhat embarrassed, as he should have been, to be found in such company.
Only outsiders present were two Embassy officers and myself, Daridan and Dannaud. In conversation with Embassy First Secretary, [name deleted] who is described as member of “secret steering committee” of conspiratorial group, came directly to point enquiring “is it all right to go ahead and change the government?” [Name deleted] conversation brought forth usual picture of ineptness, incompetence and nepotism of Diem government, fear that free Vietnam would be lost to Communists within six months unless strong clear nationalist leadership provided and indication confessional groups had reached large measure of accord on immediate future policy.
… gave following clear indications: (1) Confessional groups are progressing swiftly in their plans and may well be closer to day of action than had been anticipated; (2) Diem, with his gift for alienating people even those who would wish to aid him, had spurned approaches from confessional groups and previously reported negotiations with sects by Diem and Tran Van Do had not been negotiations at all as Diem’s representatives had been obscure and inept and no practical political concessions or accommodations had been proffered; (3) sects would still not refuse cooperate with Diem even at this late hour if practical political arrangement could be reached with him and his government broadened to include representation of sects. [Name deleted] was frankly skeptical Diem capable of working with such coalition but stated explicitly confessional groups willing to try if their interests recognized and protected and their voices listened to in “reasonable” measure; (4) [name deleted] agreed any Prime [Page 1985] Minister who hoped give leadership and stable government free Vietnam must be nationalist, honest, and preferably have some personal political support. He said such man exists and when chided that this was line taken by all opponents of Diem but that names were never produced, replied that for reasons of secrecy name could not be disclosed but that such a man, although not Cochin Chinese, does in fact exist with all these qualities and will be produced at proper time.
Cocktail party, although theatrical in its atmosphere and obvious manner in which it was staged, did serve to show remarkable degree of harmony among leaders of confessional groups. It is clear that moment when they will be prepared to act is not far off, perhaps within few days, and could possibly be triggered by untoward or sudden movement by Diem, such as hasty effort to dismiss Hinh without prior planning and securing understanding or at least benevolent neutrality of French. Perhaps most significant clue produced was comment by [name deleted] that sects had not completely abandoned willingness negotiate with Diem on reasonable terms provided Diem’s brothers were removed from scene, government was broadened, interests of confessional groups appropriately protected and firm anti-Communist program launched.
Raphael-Leygues, who with Buu Hoi was understood to have come to Vietnam in order give objective picture of political situation to Mendes-France, seems to be spending most of his time busily consorting with if not abetting confessional group conspirators.