Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/8–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Saigon, August 24, 1954—11 p.m.

721. Repeated information priority Paris 240, Hanoi unnumbered. General Ely returned this morning and I saw him this afternoon.

Ely said he wanted to discuss at length four matters, viz: (A) French policy toward remaining Vietnam; (B) scope of Sainteny’s representation in north; (C) question of American aid to Vietnam; and (D) political situation in Vietnam.

(A) Ely reminded me he had gone to Paris to inform Government that he would not remain on as Commissioner General unless France followed unswervingly policy of complete independence for remaining Vietnam and complete support of its efforts to avoid Communist domination. He had told Mendes-France he could not represent “double game (double jeu)” of playing both with Viet Minh and southern government with idea of eventually backing one that came out on top. Ely said at first Mendes-France seemed disposed to adopt “special policy” vis-à-vis Viet Minh but he dropped that idea and gave Ely unqualified assurance of loyal and single support of remaining Vietnam. Ely then went on to say that, while there was to be no doubt of independence, in parlous political state in Vietnam, France and US would be obliged to give very firm advice to keep country from falling apart. Such advice would not be infringement of its internal sovereignty.

(B) Mendes-France had agreed that it had been mistake to give Sainteny title of Delegate General to North Vietnam, but since title had been published, it was impossible to change it. Ely then let me read instruction to Sainteny which had been drafted in conference between Guy la Chambre, Ely, and Sainteny, and later approved by Mendes-France. Instruction provided that Sainteny until evacuation of Hanoi completed was to be under Commissioner General. Thereafter he would be independent but his function in North Vietnam would be consular and not political or diplomatic. Sainteny was to make clear in public statements that his appointment in no way constituted recognition of Viet Minh regime. His duties were to protect French economic and cultural interests. His first duty would be to take census of all French economic enterprises and determine what assurances they would require from Viet Minh regime to continue in business. His second duty was to restart French educational institutions, including Hanoi Faculty of Medicine. Although his functions would remain consular, he was entitled to approach Central Viet Minh Government to insure protection of French cultural and economic interests. Sainteny would arrive in Saigon end of week and proceed immediately for three days stay in Hanoi and Haiphong, where he would contact representatives of French interests there. He was not to contact Viet Minh authorities, and specifically should have no communication with Ho Chi Minh, during this first visit. He would thereafter return to Saigon for brief stay, where he would prepare his initial report and recommendations. On his return here, Ely said, Sainteny would be instructed to call on me and inform me of his findings and recommendations.

(C) Ely then let me read a French translation of Secretary’s letter of August 19¹ to Mendes-France and then informed me of suggestions he and Minister La Chambre had made to Mendes-France re a reply. Their suggestions were: (1) That proposed letter of President to Ngo Dinh Diem be carefully phrased not to imply personal and permanent approval of Ngo Dinh Diem concerning whose capacity to form solid government both Ely and La Chambre entertained gravest doubts; (2) objection to proposed discontinuance of present practice of funneling budgetary aid through French and suggestion matter be studied in Saigon and effort made to find some “joint arrangements” for passing on such aid; (3) insistence on necessity of continued American budgetary support of French expeditionary force on ground latter was not acting in selfish national interest but was in effect a free world guard; (4) approval suggestion of American participation in training of Vietnamese national army but pointing out that armistice provisions would prevent sending more American personnel than were present in Vietnam at effective date of armistice; suggestion that present personnel now assigned for end-use inspections be rotated out and replaced by training personnel; (5) objection to sending American training mission to Cambodia at present time on ground such action, while not specifically provided against in armistice, would be interpreted by Viet Minh and others as looking toward setting up foreign military base in Cambodia which armistice forbids.

Comment: I told Ely question of whether present American budgetary aid to expeditionary force were to continue would of course have to be decided between Washington and Paris, remarking that as far as I knew there had been no budget submitted as to peace time costs of expeditionary force in Indochina. Question of whether budgetary aid to Vietnam would be direct would also have to be decided at high level, but it might be useful also to have discussions here and idea of joint arrangements to pass on such aid was worth exploring. I remarked that in any case whether it was given direct or passed through French as heretofore we would certainly have to have voice in disposition of foreign exchange which would be created by such support. Our Congress and public opinion would never allow “exchange deals” and inordinate transfers such as Bao Dai and other individuals had practiced.

(D) Ely said he had just completed a long meeting with his principal advisers as to political situation. He and his advisers here were unanimously of opinion that return of Bao Dai to Vietnam at this time would be unmitigated political calamity. Bao Dai was intelligent but lazy and could not be expected to exert selfless leadership and set example which this situation required. His advisers here were also firmly of opinion that much plotted project of installing military regime with Hinh at head would equally be mistake. They not only doubt character and efficiency of such regime but it was certain Hinh would soon be overthrown by another military coup and so on ad infinitum.

There was general agreement, he said, that Ngo Dinh Diem regime was dangerously inefficient and change of some sort for better must be made very quickly. He doubted Diem could reshuffle his Cabinet to come up with something effective but he was keeping his mind open until he had chance to talk with Diem. On other hand, none of his advisers was able to come up with suggestion of desirable successor for Ngo Dinh Diem. Tam should have post of Interior (police) in any new or reshuffled Cabinet, but it was doubtful he could effectively preside a government. Ely also mentioned Huu. Ely asked my ideas.

I replied that, while admitting weaknesses of Diem’s regime, I saw no one that could replace him. It seemed clear to me that any government must be headed by known Nationalist, but there was no other capable Nationalist in sight. It seemed to me that only thing to do would be for French and Americans to “weigh in” with urgent suggestions to Ngo Dinh Diem that he must strengthen his government. In any case, I said he should have completely frank talk with Diem at earliest opportunity and I would appreciate being informed promptly of results of that conversation. I remarked that Diem had made certain progress in sense that he had prevented his wilder eyed followers from staging manifestations against French following armistice. Ely admitted this was true, that some very harmful incidents might otherwise have occurred. I said that Diem had placed Chieu, an efficient man, in charge of all foreign aid and latter seemed to be doing a good job, and he had delegated Chieu sufficient powers to carry out economic reforms. I observed also that after several trials and delays Diem finally had appointed Doi² with full powers to carry through evacuation and resettlement and we hoped this man would achieve results. Ely said, however, that Diem was increasingly “discredited” in France and on his return here he had found he was largely discredited within Vietnam. Diem had taken office at time of defeat of Vietnam and was considered by Vietnamese as “unlucky”. Ely said he wanted to discuss matter further with me but something had to be done quickly to better political situation.

Reverting to Ely’s mention of Huu, I said that latter had obviously discredited himself with his public statements calling for collaboration, if indeed not coalition, with Viet Minh. Ely said he was uninformed as to Huu’s statements and sorry to learn he had made them.

Heath

1. See telegram 610 to Paris, Aug. 18, p. 1957.
2. Ngo Ngoc Doi.