751G.00/8–2654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
758. Repeated information Paris 252 Hanoi unnumbered. I spoke with Bordaz, Second Deputy French ComGen about political problems in Vietnam this morning and this afternoon Diem called me in to speak of his problems.
Bordaz came to see me to urge that we form a joint group to discuss coordinating French and American plans for economic assistance to Vietnam and also for joint study of problem of direct American military budgetary support for Vietnam. I agreed that both matters might usefully be discussed here but that latter question would have to be solved in talks between Washington and Paris.
Bordaz then took up question of internal political problem. He said Ely would send for me this evening to discuss this problem which perplexed and preoccupied him. If I had any preliminary ideas, it might be useful for him to convey them to Ely in advance of our talk.
[Page 1986]Bordaz took line that Diem was not up to task of forming solid government with firm support in remaining Vietnam. Tam would probably be best man to take over in this disintegrating situation but French realized that Tam was too widely considered as pro-French to preside [over] a supposedly Nationalist Government. Tam was good policeman and should serve as Minister of Interior in any successor government. French were rather inclined to favor Huu. Bordaz asserted that Huu’s flirtations with Viet Minh and his unfortunate declarations apparently favoring modus vivendi with Viet Minh, if not Coalition Government, were not to be taken seriously. He asked my ideas.
I said that, while Tam had real ability and probably better than anyone else could organize police work against Viet Minh infiltration, fact of his being French citizen and pro-French would make his government easy target for Viet Minh propaganda and he would not gain support of Nationalists. Nevertheless, if Diem clearly demonstrated incapacity to organize a solid, supported governmental structure, it might be necessary to have recourse to Tam. As for Huu, he was open to same objections as Tam. In addition, he was poor administrator and would never appreciate extent of communist menace which was main problem of remaining Vietnam. For more than two years Huu had failed to see that Communist China presented any particular menace.
I thoroughly realized shortcomings of Diem but I saw no other possibility at present time than to give him another chance. I said I thought General Ely and I, separately, should insist that Diem should come up immediately with revised cabinet of effective ministers drawn mainly from south and that we should urge on him to come to terms with sects and resign himself to political facts which required formation of Coalition Government including them. If Diem took these measures then our influence should be exerted on sects to play along with him. If he failed to take such measures, he could hardly expect support against his opposition.
Diem sent for me early this afternoon. I told him frankly his government was in extremely parlous situation and as a friend urged him to come to terms with sects without further delay. He would have to offer more concessions than he had previously done. He would not get their support by merely offering them a substantial but minority representation in a provisional national assembly which had not even been formed. I further told him that certain of his followers had done his government great disservice in indulging in public irrational criticism of French. I could well understand patriotic Vietnamese still harboring rancour against French for their former colonial domination of Vietnam, but statements and actions of these supporters had [Page 1987] given impression in France and abroad that his regime was more incensed against French than they were against communists. Fact of matter was that until Vietnamese Army could be reorganized, which could not be accomplished overnight, into something solid, Vietnam required presence of French expeditionary force to prevent a military vacuum into which Viet Minh would very quickly move. Vietnam also needed French economic aid. Therefore, it was up to his government to convince Ely that they respected legitimate French cultural and economic rights in this country and were prepared to work loyally with French.
Diem then brought up question of General Hinh. He said he was not far from agreement with Cao Daists and with at least one branch of Hoa Hao. Colonel Ngo of latter sect was personally devoted to Diem. One thing that prevented real agreement was that as long as Hinh remained in direct command of Vietnamese National Army Diem could never come to any final agreement with sects. Sects were not in favor of General Hinh and distrusted him but were quite willing to work with him to preserve their present privileges as long as Hinh retained practically independent command of National Army. If he were removed from that direct command, sects would come to terms.
I then said he would have to be prepared both to document Hinh’s insubordination and its consequence very clearly to General Ely and way would have to be found to save Hinh’s face while still removing him from direct control of troops. Hinh was fellow French officer of General Ely’s and it would be very difficult for latter to take action against him. As regards suggestion that Hinh be urged to visit States at this time, my government saw certain objections thereto under present circumstances. If by agreement with General Ely Diem could reorganize Vietnamese Armed Forces and boost Hinh upwards and aside to be chairman of Joint Chiefs, perhaps giving him another star, this might be a solution. I suggested Diem should have very frank talk with Ely without further delay. Diem said his brother Luyen, who was present at interview, was seeing Ely this afternoon on this matter. I said it was indispensable for Diem to talk personally with Ely, but finally agreed that Luyen might present these ideas to Ely and give latter chance to consider them before final discussions with Diem.
I said further to Diem it would be necessary for him to get more Southern representation in his reshuffled Cabinet. Diem gave stock reply that eight of ministerial portfolios in present Cabinet were held by Cochin Chinese. I said that in my opinion that was not enough since practically all that was left of Vietnam, except thinly populated center, was Cochin China.