Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.11/8—2454

Memorandum by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, August 24, 1954.

Subject:

• Report on Ngo Dinh Diem

There is attached a report dated 23 August 1954 … on Diem and his Government. Although this report is being disseminated through our regular channels, I am forwarding this copy to you because of its pertinence to present policy discussions on Indochina.

C. P. Cabell

[Enclosure]

Central Intelligence Agency Report

secret

[Saigon, August 23, 1954.]

Political Conditions in Vietnam

The following . . . . report represents a round-up of information available to representatives of the Departments of Defense, and State and CIA.

1. Ngo Dinh Diem has assumed governmental responsibility under conditions of greater disadvantage than most of his compatriots would be able to bear. Diem has demonstrated great courage and implacable stubbornness, which he acquired during the period when his character was being molded. He is an uncompromising moralist, nationalist and rebel. In the past, Diem has cooperated with Bao Dai, the French, the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh, various cliques, sects and political parties and has broken with all these elements by his own volition and judgement despite the capacity of each and all of them to do him material damage. The basis of his divergence with all these factions has been his uncompromising stand on complete independence for Vietnam. Diem’s present reputation is based on these past actions which are indicative of his self righteousness and single mindedness and which cannot be interpreted as signs of vacillation or lack of character. Diem and Ho Chi Minh are ascetics and zealots, qualities which separate them from the corrupt courtiers of the French and Bao Dai. Without such qualities, there would not be much hope for a future leader in South Vietnam.

2. Diem’s present government is composed of a handful of relatives and friends who are individuals Diem believes he can trust. Most of these individuals have good reputations as nationalists and none are disreputable or even suspected of dishonesty. There are few who are competent administrators but it should be remembered that the results of the Geneva Conference and partition have put a premium on nationalist leaders and not on administrators. In addition, many of the best Vietnamese technical experts are tied up in Paris for the duration of current negotiations regarding the transfer of powers. Any realistic assessment of the Diem government must take into account those areas which are within his sphere of action and those which are not. Diem does not have control over finances, the military, customs, immigration, diplomatic representation, the judiciary and police matters or the security forces. These would fall within the rights of an independent state and Vietnam is not independent despite the fact that she has been recognized by the U.S. The transfer of powers from the French to the Vietnamese government, which is now in the discussion stage, offers the French a multitude of opportunities to play off Vietnamese leaders and sects against the Vietnamese government in an effort to obtain the most concessions from the Vietnamese government. Added to these difficulties, the Vietnamese government is frequently embarrassed by French actions to save face.

3. The local nationalist criticism of Diem is based on his failure to acquire immediate and complete independence from France. The continued presence of General Nguyen Van Hinh and the promised return of Bao Dai symbolize this failure. The French criticism of Diem is believed to stem solely from Diem’s failure to concede favored positions administratively and politically to the Confessional Groups in South Vietnam. U.S. criticism of Diem is based on his failure to demonstrate that his government has an administrative capacity which has not been an attribute of previous governments.

4. The basic nature of the problem facing the Vietnamese government regarding its position with the French is amply demonstrated by two statements Mendes-France made after Geneva. Mendes-France said that he had instructed Geneva that he would probably turn over to Diem control in those fields previously reserved for the French. He also said that Geneva was the best possible solution to the Indochina problem as it guaranteed continued French responsibility in Asia.

5. The present spate of rumors that the Diem government is “floundering” and about to resign or be removed is partly caused by the natural psychological letdown. Such stories appear frequently in the French press. The visits of Cheysson, Raphael-Leygues, Guy La Chambre and Buu Hoi present excellent opportunities for all those who desire to unseat Diem or for the French who claim that certain groups desire to see Diem ousted. There is no information substantiating these rumors. Nguyen Van Tam, Tran Van Huu and Hinh are reported to be intriguing with French stimulation, but have few followers and probably cannot agree among themselves. No other groups or individuals are known to be positively opposing Diem at this time.

6. The French position is also amply clear although their policy is supposedly not yet defined. The French do not and will not trust any Vietnamese government which is not headed by individuals under French influence or control. Diem does not meet these requirements. The French undoubtedly fear that Diem is too strong to bow to their wishes and that his government is too weak to protect their citizens or their interests.

7. Diem’s chances for remaining in power depend on the whims of Bao Dai and the demands of French policy. Bao Dai can be bought or pressured by the French. The French probably have decided to take a strong stand in South Vietnam and will defend economic and cultural interests as well as trade with the Viet Minh. In order to do this, the French must be able to control or influence the government. Since Bao Dai has the power to make or break the Vietnamese government, the question arises, how much pressure will the French bring to bear on Bao Dai?

8. Diem does have political know-how and is attempting to make bargains on his own terms rather than by bribery with groups and party leaders. Diem has plans to remove or negate the opposition and therefore it appears that the delay in carrying out these plans is a calculated risk he is taking. There has been no evidence of friction within Diem’s cabinet or that there are pro-Viet Minh personalities in it. Diem is aware of inadequacies of some members of his cabinet and the removal of the Minister of Information who showed himself incompetent was an example of this awareness.

9. The French are believed to be actively undermining Diem despite their denials. Present French efforts are confined to maneuvers intended to demonstrate that Diem is incompetent and lacks popular support. However, the role of arbiter of the popularity of any Vietnamese government is hardly a believable one for the French. Similarly, sincere cooperation by the French with any nationalist Vietnamese government is hardly to be expected at this late hour. The most recent example of French insincerity is their promise to evacuate all Vietnamese desiring to leave North Vietnam prior to the Viet Minh take over. The French did not and do not have the capacity to perform this task. This fumbling and incapacity on the part of the French has not been an inspiration or an example to the Vietnamese government, which has far less means but is now subject to severe criticism for its failure to run the evacuation like the Normandy landings in reverse.

10. Local French security precautions, which are extremely obvious and heavy handed, the visits of Raphael-Leygues, Cheysson, Guy La Chambre and Buu Hoi, promises of the return of Bao Dai and the spate of articles criticizing Diem in the French press have all contributed to current rumors that Diem will resign or be ousted. However, Diem will not resign and no candidate to replace him is in sight. While Tam is believed to be the French choice, he would receive far less support than Diem in Vietnamese circles. Some confessional leaders and Tam’s son, General Hinh, would probably support him which would alienate the majority of the politically conscious population of South and Central Vietnam.

11. The attitude of some of the nationalists and confessional leaders toward Diem depend on his progress toward independence and pacification of South and Central Vietnam. Some leaders are probably withholding their support awaiting to be paid off. Bao Dai, Pham Cong Tac and Colonel Trinh Minh The have openly declared their support for Diem. The idea of a coalition government between the Confessional Groups and Diem is superficially attractive but it is probably not workable under present conditions with so many pressures working from various sides.

1. The following handwritten notation by Deputy Assistant Secretary Drumright appears on the source text: “A very interesting paper which is revealing in the light of what has been taking place in Saigon during the past month.”