Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

SEAC Files: Lot 53D255

Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee, Department of State, December 21, 1950, 3:30 p. m.

December 21, 1950, 3:30 p.m.

top secret
SEAC M–9
[Extract]

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. The Committee considered the question raised by Mr. Cleveland whether, in light of Chinese Communist military effectiveness, the U.S. Government was still justified in feeling that small Southeast Asian forces should be built up even though they might be overrun readily by superior forces. The similarities and differences with the problems involved in the granting of U.S. military assistance to Europe were discussed at length, differences of geography and in capacity for establishing regional security arrangements being stressed. The Committee also considered the nature of the NSC decision concerning the Defense of Korea which preceded the Communist attack of June 25,¹ and the absence of a present commitment (unlike in the cases of Europe and Japan) on the part of the U.S. to consider an attack on any free nation in Southeast Asia an attack on all the free countries. The specific purposes to which military assistance in the region addressed itself was then analyzed; and it was generally agreed that these arms were aimed at providing internal security, and creating a deterrent to outside aggression against the countries.

7. The Committee considered the degree of possibility of military cooperation, or even unification, in Southeast Asia. Mr. Rusk pointed out that while the United States was willing to face the possibilities of further military reverses in Southeast Asia, certain unwise “assumptions” had been given wide currency. These were that: (a) if Tonkin falls, Indo-China will fall; and (b) if Indo-China falls, all of Southeast Asia will fall. Mr. Lacy added that the countries of the region, (Thailand and perhaps Viet Nam being the exceptions) simply refused to consider the U.S. views on the necessity of concerted action against current and future aggression. It was very unlikely that the free countries of Asia would see the necessity of their binding together with the United States to defend Indo-China.

8. Mr. Lacy agreed with the objective of greater unity in Southeast Asia raised by Mr. Cleveland and stated that some progress had been made over the past year and a half. Mr. Rusk remarked that, while only a relatively small force could be mustered in the region, the countries of the area were not unaware of the problem of regional cooperation. Moreover, the U.S. was now talking with Indian officials concerning the problem. Prospects, however, of any marked advance in the near future were very limited. Mr. Cleveland stated that, while the chances for economic unification were nil, it was essential that all possible efforts be made for further political cooperation.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. For documentation on United States policy toward Korea prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, see volume vii.