Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

746F.00/12–1650: Telegram

The Consul General at Singapore (Langdon) to the Secretary of State

secret

Singapore, December 16, 1950—noon.

459. MacDonald gave me following résumé of UK diplomatic conference here December 7 through 12.

1. Mission chiefs, colonial governors reported situation and problems respective countries, among them: Burma continuing improvement, Siam rising opposition to Phibun¹ and anxiety over commentments to west but Phibun thinks can ride it out, Indochina very gloomy, Indonesia unsettled but not hopeless with much hinging on New Guinea outcome.² Conference agreed that whole SEA anti-Communist structure shored by Tonkin, that Tonkin rather neck of IC vital and must be held since red forces could advance south on either side of neck but had no answer as to how to help beyond going over same ground MacDonald covered in Paris and urging more effective anti-VM propaganda. Estimated Ho Chi Minh would launch attack within 2 months and whatever was to be done to stop it would have to be done in next few weeks.

2. Conference was asked by FonOff to give opinion on whether (a) any differences existing between Peking and Moscow (b) there is any hope of splitting them (c) anything can be done divide Chinese people from Mao. It toyed with these conundrums and made guesses but had no answers. It recognized full bloodedness of Chinese expansionism and found no basis for supposing rift existed between China and USSR but agreed there was always chance of such rift if west was patient and did not push China into arms of USSR. As to dividing people from Mao, conference agreed there was very little the outside could do and anything it might do would have to be done in the most subtle and cunning way.

3. FonOff asked what effect Chinese invasion of Tibet and Korea and help Ho Chi Minh had on South Asia and FE peoples, whether any revulsion. Conference replied revulsion none except in India but some leaders had become critical of China who had not been so before. This was more than offset by wide view that Chinese solely to blame but also UN and US for provoking her and by fear and admiration of Chinese might and progress especially among overseas Chinese. In fact the more successfully aggressive China was the more support she was getting.

4. FonOff asked what would be reaction if Chinese crossed 38th parallel in Korea, if ignored 13 power resolution,³ if able hold territory below parallel, if forced US out of Korea altogether by (30 characters missing)⁴ not only be bad but progressively bad in that admiration and fear of China would mount in ratio to each. Exceptions were Pakistan who is wholly on our side and to lesser degree India where fraternal spirit for UK growing.

5. Also taken up were rice supply in SEA, Colombo plan and illegal arms traffic. How to get participation in Colombo plan by non-Commonwealth nations was discussed but no answer found beyond waiting for right opportunity. Sub-committee was set up for study problems arms traffic.

Department pass London, sent Department 459; repeated information London 36.

Langdon

1. Field Marshal Phibun Songgram (Pibulsonggram), Prime Minister of Thailand.
2. For documentation on the disposition of Western New Guinea, see pp. 964 ff.
3. On December 14, the General Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by 13 Asian nations calling upon the President of the General Assembly to constitute a committee to determine the basis for a cease-fire in Korea; see editorial note, vol. vii, p. 1542.
4. Notation in the source text.