790.00/12–2150
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton)
Subject: Conditions in the Far East
| Participants: | Sir Esler Dening, British Foreign Office |
| Mr. Richard Whittington, Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy | |
| Edwin F. Stanton |
Sir Esler Dening of the British Foreign Office, who has been visiting Bangkok briefly, called to see me and we had a general talk about conditions in the Far East.
Sir Esler said he had made repeated efforts to get to Peiping but no replies whatever had been received from the Chinese Communist Government. He said Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, had felt it would be worth while to send some one from the Foreign Office to Peiping who could speak directly to Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, and make clear to him the British Government’s views and policies with respect to China and other Far Eastern problems. However, he said these efforts had been thwarted at Peiping but that the British position had been explained to General Wu, the Chinese representative sent to the United Nations, by Mr. Younger1 and Sir Gladwyn Jebb.2 We had some discussion regarding Soviet influence upon the Chinese Communist Government. Dening expressed the view that although in international affairs it was evident that the Soviets were able to impose their will upon Mao Tse-tung and his Government, nevertheless the pattern of events in China itself was, in his opinion, strictly Chinese. This view seemed to be a comforting one to Sir Esler. I said what ever the pattern of internal events in China, it seemed clear that for the present and probably for some time to come, Mao would be doing the Kremlin’s bidding and the latter had [Page 185] apparently been very successful in convincing Mao that the Soviet Government was China’s only friend.
Speaking of Indian Ambassador Pannikar’s3 efforts to convince the Chinese Communists of Nehru’s great friendship for Communist China, Sir Esler said their information indicated that Chinese Communist leaders paid little attention to Pannikar’s views and were not interested in Nehru’s efforts to woo them. Dening said that the Chinese Communist propaganda line had for so many years branded India as a “running dog” of Imperialist Britain that the Chinese were not convinced of India’s new position in the world and the genuineness of overtures being made to them by Nehru. Dening added that the Soviets had been very successful in persuading Chinese Communist leaders that India, at the instigation of Great Britain, had designs on Tibet, and that in consequence the Chinese Communists rationalized the present invasion of Tibet as a move to forestall the Indians.
With respect to Indochina I found Sir Esler quite optimistic, evidently basing his views on reports received from Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in Singapore. As regards the military situation in Indochina he said the French would most certainly hold their own unless the Chinese intervened. I pointed out that although the French were holding the Hanoi–Haiphong area, Saigon, and a goodly portion of Cochin China, that the rest of Indochina and more specifically the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia were quite inadequately protected. I said that in Laos all information being received indicated growing strength of Vietminh and dissident Laos forces, and that this development was coupled with increasing rumors and reports of the overthrow in the near future of the present Laos Government and establishment of a Communist dominated Government in that State. I said that this development would constitute a direct threat to Thailand where there are more Laos than in the present Kingdom of Laos. I asked Sir Esler whether he thought intervention by the Chinese in Indochina was likely. He replied he did not think so. We had some further general discussion about conditions in Indochina, during which Dening said that the recent concessions made by the French Government to Bao Dai’s Government and the Governments of Laos and Cambodia should have a good effect but might be “too late”. With regard to the appointment of General de Tassigny,4 Sir Esler remarked that the appointment of a military man to the post of High Commissioner scarcely seemed to be a happy one.
I asked Dening what he judged the Kremlin’s strategy to be and whether he thought it was their intention to precipitate a third world war. He said he thought the strategy was to achieve their aims and [Page 186] objectives in so far as possible through the use of satellites who, as so successfully demonstrated in the case of China, might be induced to fight in Russia’s behalf and to seize objectives which the Soviets desire. He said these tactics were proving very successful and he thought that from the Kremlin’s point of view there was no need to precipitate a world war. He said Stalin was aware of the fact that industrial production was the key to victory in modern warfare and that Stalin realized, in spite of the superhuman efforts made to build up the war industry of the USSR, they were still far behind the combined production output of the United States and the United Kingdom.
- Kenneth G. Younger, Minister of State; Member of the British Delegation to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, 1950.↩
- Permanent British Representative at the United Nations.↩
- K. M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador In the People’s Republic of China.↩
- Général d’Armée Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was appointed High Commissioner and Commander in Chief in Indochina on December 7.↩