Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

83. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Ross) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, March 8, 1990

SUBJECT

• MIRVed Mobile Initiative in START

Summary

While moving ahead on schedule with the Soviets in START, we’re encountering criticism at home that the Treaty as it now stands is overly modest compared to today’s momentous political changes, out of step with U.S. programs (especially mobiles) given budgetary realities, and lacking in a strategic vision for the future. None of this would put ratification in doubt. But it could make it more contentious, reduce support for some programs, and diminish the value the public attaches to START.

We should consider taking an initiative on unresolved ICBM issues—the centerpiece of which would be a proposal to ban MIRVed mobile ICBMs—that could put a Bush imprint on START, boost its political appeal, gain the support of Nunn and other key Congressmen, and persuade the “strategic community” and other opinion leaders that we have a coherent strategic plan for the future.

• Such an initiative would not delay the signing of START this year, and the ban on MIRVed mobiles could help us on verification.

• Given your upcoming travel, we might want to move before you leave for Namibia.² That could permit us to raise this before the next Ministerial, not necessarily to get a response but to position us both with the Soviets and Nunn on this issue. End Summary.

The Problem: Congressional and Public Concerns

Sam Nunn has taken the lead in arguing that START and our mobile ICBM programs are out of sync. He claims that, given budgetary pressures and reduced threat perceptions, funding for rail MX is dead unless we adopt his preferred package: propose a ban on MIRVed mobiles, fund rail MX temporarily to support the proposal, press for a long-term phase-out of all MIRVed ICBMs, and move ahead with Midgetman (perhaps with deployment initially in silos and later on trucks).

• If Nunn is right about prospects for rail MX funding, then permitting MIRVed mobiles in START could result in the Soviets fielding two mobile ICBMs to our none.

• Apparently, Nunn feels he had an agreement with the Administration that produced his support for the two missiles last year in return for our acceptance of a ban on mobile MIRVs.³ His sense of betrayal could come back to haunt us if we don’t at least raise the mobile MIRV ban with the Soviets.

Currently, security specialists with considerable clout on the Hill and with the media have joined Nunn in arguing that START does not do enough to encourage more stable forces, particularly through de-MIRVing of land-based systems. Added to this “experts’” concern is a growing feeling by the public at large (reflected by editorial writers all over the country) that, considering what is going in the world today, START is overly timid and our program requests represent strategic “business as usual.” The example invariably cited is our desire to deploy two mobile ICBMs.⁴

The Solution: An ICBM Initiative

The following could be the main components of an ICBM package proposal to deal with the problem:

1) Propose a ban on MIRVed mobile ICBMs, with either (a) no ceiling on them other than the existing 1600/4900 limits or (b) a ceiling of 500 on single-warhead mobile ICBMs.

• Having no ceiling on singles would reinforce the de-MIRVing theme, but the JCS and OSD prefer to cap Soviet SS–25s on the grounds that it would facilitate our targeting requirements. This argument, however, is inconsistent with our emphasis on survivability and stability—themes you and Scowcroft have emphasized publicly and themes the President emphasized in his letter on arms control he sent Gorbachev last June.⁵

• Alternatively, a ceiling of 500, while less visionary, would still allow both sides a significant single-warhead mobile ICBM force while meeting OSD and JCS concerns. It may, however, create a problem with the Soviets who may want to increase deployments of SS–25s above the 500 level if they are forced to give up SS–24 rail-mobile deployments.

2) Withdraw our proposed limit of 3300 on all ICBM warheads in favor of a new sublimit on silo-based MIRVed warheads. This sublimit would have several functions. At a minimum, it would prevent the Soviets from moving SS–24s from rails to additional silos (which would be destabilizing) and would single out a particularly destabilizing category of strategic arms for further cuts in START II. Depending on its level, it could also result in further cuts in heavy ICBMs (SS–18s) without requiring the Soviets to lower the 154 ceiling explicitly.

• At 2000, it would accommodate current Soviet plans for 154 SS-18s and close to 50 silo-based SS–24s.

• At 1500–1750, they would have to cut an additional 25–50 of those missiles, but they would have the flexibility to decide what mix of the two types to retain.

3) Agree to the Soviet proposal that we undertake in START I to pursue follow-on START II negotiations, while proposing a commitment that land-based MIRVs will be further reduced or phased out in START II.

• Placed in this context, the ban on mobile MIRVs would be a first step toward a de-MIRVing of land-based missiles in START II.

• It would also put a Bush stamp—strategic stability as the overriding goal—on nuclear arms control.

4) Retain the agreed 154 ceiling on heavy ICBMs, while relaxing our proposed ban on heavy ICBM modernization (ban on flight testing and production) in favor of tight limits on modernization (1–2 flight tests per year, production cutoff by an agreed future date).

• It would be overloading the circuits to ask the Soviets explicitly to lower the 154 ceiling on SS–18s, the backbone of their strategic force posture and the missile program most heavily favored by their military. If we decide to seek further cuts in START I, we should do so implicitly via the new sublimit on silo-based MIRVs.

Likely Benefits of the Initiative

• Politically: Soviet acceptance of the package (including its emphasis on de-MIRVing and its commitment to bold, stability-enhancing START II goals) would increase the appeal of START to expert and layman alike, counteracting the perception that the Treaty lacks a coherent strategic rationale and is already OBE in today’s world.

• Congressional Support: Agreement on the package would guarantee strong support by Nunn and others for the eventual START Treaty. Indeed, even if the Soviets rejected the MIRVed mobile ban, our willingness to make the proposal and to consult with him in advance could make an ally out of Nunn on START and improve the prospects for funding rail MX.

• Strategically: Given the decreasing likelihood of funding for rail MX, this ICBM initiative, if accepted by the Soviets, could avoid a near-term, 2–0 asymmetry between us and the Soviets in mobile systems, while retaining our most capable missile (MX) in silos (a satisfactory solution for the Air Force) and keeping alive our future Midgetman option.

• Midgetman Prospects: Indeed, a MIRVed mobile ban could have the effect of increasing the priority/funding levels of Midgetman, thus enhancing the chances for eventual deployment of the mobile system best suited to playing a stabilizing role in a world of increasingly lower force levels.

Likely Soviet Reactions

Overall, the initiative would be unlikely to rock the boat with the Soviets. Indeed, they might well be quite receptive.

First, they would clearly welcome several elements of the package: dropping the 3300 limit, agreeing to START II, leaving the 154 ceiling in place, and relaxing constraints on heavy ICBM modernization.

Second, the Soviets would be likely to interpret our initiative as an effort to remove key remaining obstacles and to complete the Treaty on schedule.

Third, senior Soviet civilian and military officials, while noting their sunken investment in SS–24 rail mobility, have carefully avoided ruling out the possibility of a MIRVed mobile ban. Given the limited size of their MIRVed mobile program (we project about 45 rail SS–24s), its high operating costs, the success and large scale of their single-warhead SS–25 program, and the fact that we would be giving up rail MX, there is a reasonable chance the Soviets would accept a ban, especially if embedded in a package they considered worthwhile.

Fourth, in discussions with Rick Burt in Geneva, the Soviets have talked informally but favorably about the possibility of eliminating all silo-based MIRVs in START II. de-MIRVing is clearly consistent with the strategic approach of the new thinkers. Indeed, the positioning of Alexei Arbatov—a radical new thinker—alongside Nazarkin in the discussions about START II is probably a signal of where the new thinkers, including quite likely both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, want to go.

Even if the Soviets rejected the MIRVed mobile ban and we decided to withdraw the idea, we would be able to get back on track without undue difficu11y. If you could get internal agreement on this approach quickly, you could think about floating the package privately (perhaps as a non-paper) to Shevardnadze in Namibia. You could suggest this is just an idea, one Shevardnadze need not react to immediately. If Shevardnadze finds merit in it, he could let you know at the upcoming Ministerial. Shevardnadze might take this as another sign that we are forward leaning and prepared to pursue ambitious initiatives down the road.

Putting the Solution into Play: A Game Plan

Given time constraints and travel plans, the following steps are suggested for pursuing the initiative:

• Outline the approach to Cheney/Scowcroft in your Friday afternoon meeting with them,⁶ and seek their support and Presidential approval by early next week. Suggested talking points are attached.⁷ (Especially given the Ottawa problem, Colin Powell needs to be brought in early on.)

• Consult with Nunn, Warner, and other key Congressional figures before departing for Africa, outlining our ICBM package and seeking their commitment not only to press for rail MX funding temporarily (in support of the proposal) but also to press for it in the event the Soviets reject a MIRVed mobile ban.⁸

• Present the package to Shevardnadze when you see him in Windhoek, urging him to provide a Soviet response well in advance of his arrival in Washington. This would allow us to make any necessary adjustments and consult Congressmen before the Ministerial, perhaps to come to closure there.

1. Source: Department of States, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs. Secret. Copied to Bartholomew. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “This is the out-of the system paper from Dennis for your 3:00 pm meeting re: START. Paper from Reg B. is attached.” An unknown hand wrote beside this notation: “3/9/90.” The paper from Bartholomew was not attached.
2. Baker departed for Windhoek on March 19 to attend Namibian independence ceremonies and meet with Shevardnadze. He flew to Cape Town on March 22 and Kinshasa on March 23, before returning to Washington on March 24.
3. Baker underlined “in return for our acceptance of a ban on mobile MIRVs” and drew a short vertical line in the left-hand margin beside this section.
4. Baker drew two short vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this sentence and the final clause of the preceding sentence.
5. Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
6. March 9. No minutes were found.
7. Attached but not printed.
8. Baker drew two vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this section.