Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

78. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Bush¹

Washington, February 21, 1990

MEETING WITH SENATORS WARNER AND NUNN

DATE: February 22, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 1:30 pm–2:00 pm

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Congressional support for the defense budget, especially the strategic modernization program and its relationship to START.

II. BACKGROUND

This is an informal meeting held at the request of Senators Nunn and Warner to express their concerns about the prospects on the Hill for the strategic modernization program. They will tell you that the “two-missile program” will not survive without a major arms control initiative and that B–2 and SDI are “in trouble.” You will want to draw them out on these subjects as well as on Congressional support for troop levels in Europe and on the defense budget as a whole.

Support for strategic modernization last year was very thin and required the investment of considerable political capital and time by you, Dick Cheney and our arms control negotiators. The political climate this year is far less supportive. We face a major attack on the defense budget, the belief by some that the strategic threat is now appreciably lessened, a growing clamor for payment of the “peace dividend,” and election year politics. Yet with START in the balance, strategic modernization may be even more important.

ICBM Modernization. Your FY 1991 defense budget calls for $2.8 billion for the Peacekeeper ICBM, most of which is for the redeployment of the missile from its silos to rail garrison. It also includes $202 million for continued development of the small mobile ICBM, the Midgetman. The first trains with Peacekeeper would be deployed in 1992 and the first Midgetman in 1997.

The two missiles have survived in Congress as a package. The coalition that has supported both missiles was built largely around political compromises to support one missile in return for support for the other, and was never very strong. That coalition is vanishing and there has not been a majority who support either missile for a year or more.

Now Warner has said that we cannot afford both systems; Nunn has called for a revision to START to ban mobile MIRVs and said that we should delay the treaty if necessary to achieve this; Aspin has said the US can no longer justify systems as needed for bargaining leverage. These are the members who led the fight to support the two missile program last year.

If both programs are cancelled there is a real possibility that the START treaty would not be ratified since the Soviets already have two deployed mobile systems and we will have none. This problem will be compounded if the B–2 program is sharply curtailed and we are not able to take full advantage of the bomber counting rule in START.

Nunn will push for a change to our START position to explicitly ban mobile MIRVs. While I am attracted to this idea, I am concerned that anything we do now will delay the conclusion of START and potentially give the Soviets an opening to charge that we are intentionally delaying the treaty. I will have some specific ideas to discuss with you soon. At this point, however, I note that there are no quick or simple ways to change START to rebuild support on the Hill for our ICBM modernization program.

B–2. Your budget proposal calls for $5.5 billion and the authorization to produce five additional aircraft. Last fall Congress reduced the plan from five aircraft to two and added a number of testing and reporting requirements. This year support for the aircraft is weakening further, and the aircraft cost makes this an easy target (although about half of the total program cost already has been spent).

The full program is for a buy of 132 aircraft and that is what is presented in your budget. Dick Cheney has ordered a full review of the program by March, after which he will make his recommendations. Best guess now is that he will call for a total buy of 75–85 aircraft instead of the 132 now planned.

Nunn and Warner should be generally supportive of the program but will be concerned about the costs—both monetary and political. Both have supported the technology but will not support the full 132 aircraft buy. Nunn argues, I think correctly, that we have not done a good job defining the mission for this aircraft. We do need the B–2 if we are to enter the next century with a penetrating bomber. Numbers much below 75 do not make much sense to me from either a financial or operational point of view.

Congressional support of the B–2 will be important, however, for ratification of START. As you recall, bombers that do not carry ALCMs only count as one warhead against the 6000 weapon limit of the treaty. Without being able to take advantage of this treaty feature, the JCS will have real difficulty supporting the treaty.

Trident/D–5. The Trident submarine program is in good shape on the Hill. This next year’s budget funds the production of the 18th boat along with long-lead items for the 19th and 20th. We anticipate that START will permit this many boats. Next year, however, we will need to decide if we want to begin funding the 21st submarine.

SDI. The FY 1991 budget calls for $4.8 billion for SDI. This level of funding is required to support large-scale space-based experiments necessary to making the decision on SDI deployment during your first term. Budget support has been eroding—last year’s initial request was for $5.6 billion, later revised in your budget to $4.9 billion and eventually funded at $3.9 billion. As with other programs, the changes in the political environment are increasing calls to cut back or cancel this program.

In the past both Nunn and Warner supported the program and Nunn feels he carried the Administration’s water during last fall’s Congressional budget action. Some on the Hill question the Administration’s support of SDI because we acquiesced to last year’s cut in the program. We anticipate a substantial cut again this year unless you go to the mat for it. Nunn and Warner will want to know whether you are prepared to make an all out push including a veto threat if necessary.

Nunn would likely be content with a program that focused on long-term R&D, bypassing the near-term deployment option. Warner may believe we are spending too much on near-term technologies. Nevertheless, as you were told at Livermore,² Brilliant Pebbles accounts for only about three percent of the SDI budget, despite its high profile. The overall balance is about 50–50 near term and long term.

Troop Levels in Europe. Soviet agreement to your 195,000 manpower initiative in Central Europe should have strengthened Congressional support for maintaining this level, but there will be calls to reduce further as the Soviets inevitably pull out and German unification proceeds. While you will want to hear Nunn and Warner’s views on how Congress will treat our military presence in Europe, you should emphasize that their support is essential and that we cannot now go lower without severe damage to the Alliance, the future of Germany, and our relations with our strongest allies.

Other Defense Budget Issues. You may want to discuss briefly the overall level of the defense budget of $295 billion. The interest in the “peace dividend” seems limited at present to the press and those in Congress who want to shift even more funds into social programs, but there is widespread consensus that the budget will be cut, perhaps substantially. You can point out that the real peace dividends are in both peace itself and the potential for democratically elected governments in Eastern Europe. Nunn knows that there has been a reduction in defense spending every year since 1985—to take a bigger cut now may force hard-to-reverse steps before we fully understand the new strategic environment. Nunn and Warner can give insight on how to handle Congressional calls for substantial additional cuts.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.³

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Informal discussions.⁴

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, USSR Chronological Files, START Files, OA/ID 91122–001, Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe—Strategic Arms Control (October 1989–April 1990). Secret. Copied to Quayle and Sununu. A stamped notation indicates Bush saw the memorandum.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Bush received a briefing on Brilliant Pebbles at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories on February 7. No minutes were found.
3. Not attached.
4. An unknown hand wrote “memo to President only” at the bottom of the memorandum beside a printed list of attachments: Tab A, “Points to be made,” and Tab B, “Participants List.” Neither was attached.