Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

76. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

1385.

Geneva, February 13, 1990, 1758Z

SUBJECT

• Official-Informal

Following are Dave Smith’s notes from the February 8 meeting of the Moscow arms control small group, including back and forth on attempts to put defense and space language into the ministerial joint statement²). We will reflect some conclusions of the ministerial discussion in our plenary statement on Thursday.³ Kuznetsov told us today he would present the long-awaited protocol to the ABM treaty on Thursday. It will be interesting to see how the Soviets handle the agreed statements in light of the Moscow conversations. Regards, Bill.

Secretary Baker

— noted 5 Dec US treaty

— it responds to what we did at Wyoming

— both sides agree the December visit was of value

— building on that, we could agree on certain PMS; he used TPS with our new paragraph:

“In order to expedite our negotiations on D&S, the US is developing an initiative for early implementation by both sides of certain PMS, which would later be integrated into a D&S treaty and its predictability protocol.”

— informally used V & S analogy

— negotiators may present an initiative later in Geneva

— on P/P, the US has good proposals to clarify; don’t need to go further

— US will not accept limits more restrictiv than ABMT

— we cannot accept that the exercise of our rights under the ABMT would justify withdrawal from START

— supreme interest withdrawal clause is sufficient

— Soviets should drop draft agreed statements—they are a “major impediment to START”

Shevardnadze

— in Malta we agreed our experts should shed light on this subject

— it is the “problem of problems”

— but not intractable

— Wyoming was a way out of sterile conceptual debates

— USSR will sign START without agreement, but

— sides must observe ABMT as signed in 72

— thus the Krasnoyarsk and ABM impediments were removed

— but the US position hasn’t changed

— US draft D&S Treaty is still for a cooperative transition, an “approach which has no promise”

— we need one common understanding on P/P

— it’s not a precondition, but still important

— the Soviets do not understand us opposition to agreed statements

— on the Krasnoyarsk issue, newspapers and the supreme Soviet have been critical of the Soviets at Wyoming for giving too much

Baker

— this sounds like relinkage

— if you have supreme national interest withdrawal provision, why do you need more protection?

— you referred to your political problems; insistence on this creates a political problem for us which will constrain us from moving toward greater stability and greater predictability

Shevardnadze

— the Washington accord must remain in effect

— therefore, need P/P agreement

— ABMT as signed in 72 must not be changed

— in these circumstances we can go ahead with START

Baker

— if START issues are resolved, and each side is observing the ABMT, can we sign it?

Shevardnadze

— “yes, we can”

Baker

— without P/P and so forth?

Shevardnadze

— we must continue discussing P/P

Baker

— there is no condition on agreed statements on supreme interest withdrawal, or common/joint understandings on right of withdrawal upon future determination of a violation?

Shevardnadze

— “basically, that is correct”

Burt

— this is new; you seem to be saying we don’t need agreed statements

Baker

— this is how I understood Wyoming

— (to Shevardnadze) I asked you if this was delinkage; you said yes

— you just said it again

— we cannot move forward if you insist

— you just said you don’t need statements because you have the supreme interests withdrawal clause

Shevardnadze

— we must also have compliance (with ABMT)

Baker

— there is no linkage between agreed statements and START?

Shevardnadze

— yes, but P/P negotiations continue in parallel with START (implementation)

— perhaps in the future we could have some other agreement on other components; can’t say how ABM negotiations will go in the future

Karpov

— need agreement on P/P

— compliance is sine qua non (for START)

— should record now the common statements

— if these are not agreed by the time of START, we want the US to understand we will act under Art. XVI

— in these circumstances we can go ahead with START

Baker

— “we want the Soviets to understand”

— “a requirement for common understandings is not something we will do”

— “you make whatever determination you want; you can withdraw because the sun doesn’t come up; but if you are asking us to agree with you that violation of the ABMT sometime down the line gives you a right to withdraw, we cannot do that. You can put forth whatever position you want. We retain our right to interpret that treaty as we believe it should be interpreted. This doesn’t affect you. You have the right to withdraw, so failure to agree on P/P is not a problem. A common understanding is unacceptable. Don’t make that a requirement if you want START—if you care. I understand it is a preference; not a precondition to signing and implementation.”

Bartholomew

— “do we understand that a common understanding is a Soviet preference, not a precondition to sign and implement START?”

Shevardnadze

— “yes—done”

— did you have a problem after Wyoming with people telling you there was nothing new (in the Soviet position on delinkage)?

Baker

— I believed it all along

— I asked you; you said yes

Shevardnadze

— wg should have more discussion on this issue

— this language may lay the foundation for the stability secret talks

Baker

(no response)

— on Krasnoyarsk, I thought we had an understanding on elimination down to the ground

— US SCC Reps say it appears otherwise

— US is foregoing destruction of the foundation

— you reassured me last night

— a Soviet visit to Thule and Fylingdales is ok with the US, UK and Denmark

— we must work closely with UK and Denmark

— you said you would get back to us on the US request to visit Pechora and Baranovichi

Shevardnadze

— I reaffirm what I said yesterday

— my Wyoming commitment will be “put into effect fully and entirely”

— I don’t know what happened in Geneva

— you accepting our visit to T & F will be important for confidence-building

— we will contact U K, as you will too

— on P & B we don’t know yet; but in principle we’re in favor of openness

— 4 points

— Wyoming statement remains

— T & F is a visit to “corresponding radars”

— we’ll get back to you on P & B

— Krasnoyarsk will be eliminated to the ground

Baker

— to the ground?

Karpov

— SCC people are not evil-doers; they are legal people

— we must stick to procedures for LPARs

— Malmstrom was destroyed this way

Baker

— OK your SCC people are like our people who want the Krasnoyarsk foundation destroyed too

Karpov

— have to stick to LPAR procedures agreed by SCC in 1974?

Shevardnadze

— (testily to Karpov) everything from Wyoming stands

Baker

— OK, so Krasnoyarsk will be taken to the ground because the foreign minister said so

End notes on discussion

Joint Statement Preparation

U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement Language

The Soviet side expressed its preference for a formal agreement that either side could withdraw from the START in case of a violation of the ABM treaty, but said this is not a precondition for signing and implementing the START. The U.S. side welcomed the Soviet statement. To advance the discussion of ways to ensure predictability in the development of the US-Soviet strategic relationship, the Secretary of State said the United States would make a further proposal on predictability measures during the current round of the defense and space talks in Geneva.

Soviet Counter-Proposal

Strike first sentence in the US proposal and insert instead:

On ABM and space matters, the Soviet side reiterated the approach put forward in September 1989. In accordance with that approach, there shall be no pre-conditions for signing and observing the START Treaty, other than observance of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972.

Then, if the US insisted on keeping its sentence on predictability measures:

The Soviet side stressed that such measures should make both sides confident that their ABM-related activities are conducted in compliance with the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet proposal was unacceptable to the US side, including Secretary Baker himself. Smith, ASD Hadley, and AMB. Nazarkin worked on alternatives for several hours during the evening of Friday, Feb. 9. It was clear Nazarkin was trying to backfill the Soviet position to say things Shevardnadze did not say and to put a different spin on what he did say.

This is Smith’s attempt to write down the direction in which the draft was headed based on Nazarkin’s comments:

The Soviet side reiterated its approach put forward in September 1989. It stressed that the supreme national interest withdrawal clause in the draft START Treaty implies the right of one side to withdraw from START in the event the other violates, or withdraws from, the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side believes such an understanding should be recorded by agreement on the two relevant draft joint statements it has proposed in Geneva. The Soviet side confirmed that reaching such an agreement is not a pre-condition to signing and implementing START. According to the Soviet approach, the only pre-condition for START is observance of the ABM treaty as signed in 1972.

The US side welcomed Soviet confirmation that neither a defense and space agreement or treaty nor agreement to any joint statements is a precondition for signing and implementing START. The US side emphasized that it retains the right to interpret treaties as it believes correct and that the exercise of its legal rights under the ABM treaty cannot justify the other side’s withdrawal from START.

Any language on predictability measures would have followed these paragraphs.

At this point, Smith and Hadley decided this draft looked more like a rubric of what was disagreed than a report of what the Ministers said. We decided we would be better with no joint statement. Smith proposed this to Nazarkin who readily agreed. Bartholomew and Karpov approved the decision.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900139–0650. Secret; Priority.
2. See Document 77.
3. February 15.