Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

74. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 9, 1990, 5:10–11:20 p.m.

Baker-Shevardnadze Ministerial in Moscow, USSR
Third Small Group Meeting: Arms Control

SUBJECTS

• Arms Control: START, CW, Nuclear Testing, CFE, Visits to Radars; Coda: Karelian Bear Dogs

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
  • Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor to President
  • Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State, T
  • Ronald Lehman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
  • Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
  • Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
  • Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
  • Dennis B. Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
  • Margaret DeB. Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State, PA
  • Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
  • Paul Robinson, U.S. Ambassador to the Nuclear Testing Talks
  • Arnold Kanter, Senior Director, NSC Staff
  • Steven Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISP
  • Gen. William Graves, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • James P. Timbie, Special Advisor to Under Secretary Bartholomew
  • Alexander Vershbow, Director, EUR/SOV (notetaker)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Advisor to Chairman Gorbachev
  • Viktor Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Yuriy Dubinin, USSR Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Aleksey Obukhov, Head, USA & Canada Administration, MFA
  • Yuriy Nazarkin, USSR Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
  • Oleg Grinevskiy, USSR Ambassador to the CFE Negotiations
  • Sergey Batsanov, Head of USSR Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament
  • Igor Palenykh, Head of USSR Delegation to the Nuclear Testing Talks
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze
  • Gennadiy Gerasimov, MFA Spokesman
  • Vitaliy Churkin, Special Advisor to Shevardnadze
  • Yevgeniy Gusarev, Deputy Head, USA & Canada Administration (notetaker)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze suggested that the Ministers hear the reports of the working groups to see what had been settled and what was still left to resolve. He asked Marshal Akhromeyev to report on the Nuclear and Space Talks.

START: ALCMs

Marshal Akhromeyev said that, on the basis of instructions issued by Gorbachev and the Secretary to review the ALCM issue, the working group had begun its work immediately after the Kremlin meetings.² He had first met with Under Secretary Bartholomew and subsequently with Ambassador Burt. The essence of the Soviet side’s proposals were as follows. The Soviets were willing to proceed on the basis of the new U.S. proposal, but in such a case they had three wishes to express:

1) The sides could agree that the number of warheads on heavy bombers should be counted as 10 for the U.S. and 8 for the Soviet Union. The maximum possible number of ALCMs for which bombers could be equipped would be 20 for the U.S. and 12, rather than 16, for the Soviet Union. The reason for this change was that the Soviets did not have any heavy bombers which would accommodate more than 12 ALCMs; it would be technically impossible to carry more since all Soviet ALCMs were located inside the fuselage on rotating devices.

2) Because of the disparity in the number of ALCMs to be installed (20 vs. 12), the Soviets suggested that the situation be equalized on the following basis: within the number of strategic delivery vehicles (1600), both sides should determine the number of heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs (at present there was no limit of this kind); this number should be different for each side. For example, if the number of ALCMs on each heavy bomber for the U.S. exceeded the Soviet figure by 40%, then the number of heavy bombers should be 40% higher on the Soviet side. By way of illustration, if the U.S. had 100 heavy bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs, the Soviet Union would be allowed 140 such bombers.

3) For missiles of the SRAM type, the range would be limited to 600 km or less; each missile of this type with a range greater than 600 km would be considered to be a long-range ALCM and counted toward the 6000 warhead ceiling.

If all these proposals were acceptable to the U.S. then we could agree on ALCM limits, Akhromeyev concluded. This was what he had told Ambassador Burt a short time ago.

The Secretary asked whether U.S. proposals on distinguishability and other aspects of the ALCM issue were all part of the Soviet package.

Akhromeyev replied that this was exactly correct. Some of the language might be in need of further elaboration, but in principle the Soviets agreed to these proposals.

The Secretary commented that the Soviets were proposing a ratio. The U.S. could have whatever number of bombers it needed and the Soviets would be allowed to have 40% more. Was this correct?

Ambassador Burt said that, as it had been explained by Marshal Akhromeyev, the Soviets wanted a specific ceiling on both sides, with the Soviet figure 40% above that of the U.S.

The Secretary said the U.S. could agree that the Soviets would be allowed 40% more ALCM-equipped bombers than the U.S., but he was unwilling to lock the U.S. into a specific number today. That would constrain our flexibility down the road, particularly when there was no constraint on modernization of Soviet air defenses. The Secretary suggested that to meet the Soviet requirements, we could agree to a sliding ratio: the Soviets would be allowed 40% more ALCM-equipped bombers than the U.S., but the U.S. would not be locked into any particular figure.

Akhromeyev said that he had expressed the Soviet point of view. Apparently the 40% figure could be a floating limit. For example, if on the day the treaty were signed the number were 140, this could later be altered but the ratio maintained.

The Secretary said that this was his idea: that the numbers could be adjusted. Akhromeyev agreed. The number could be adjusted but the ratio would be retained.

The Secretary said that if we had an understanding on this basis, he would like to have a brief conversation with his colleagues. He added that the range element of the Soviet proposal was not something we could live with. As he had mentioned before, we saw our ALCM proposal as a package involving counting rule, distinguishability and range. We had adopted the Soviet approach on distinguishability and seemed to be on the way to resolving the counting rule. On range, however, the Soviets did not appear willing to move in the U.S. direction. We had moved from 1500 to 1000 km, and it was not fair to ask us to go all the way to 600 km.

Under Secretary Wolfowitz asked by way of clarification how the Soviet proposal would deal with future heavy bombers capable of carrying more than 10 ALCMs. Under Secretary Bartholomew said he would sharpen this question further. The U.S. had proposed that all future heavy bombers count as having 10 ALCMs. He thought that the sliding 40% rule should not apply to future heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs, since they would be counted equally for the U.S. and USSR.

Akhromeyev replied that the Soviets agreed that all future heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs would be counted at 10 with no further limits. All future bombers should be equipped with 10 ALCMs. Future heavy bombers that had not yet been built should be equipped and counted at 10.

Burt said that the 40% advantage, then, would have to apply only to existing types of bombers.

Akhromeyev said this was correct, provided that future bombers were equipped and counted at 10. The 40% advantage would only apply to those that existed today.

The Secretary suggested moving on to the next issue. The U.S. would give consideration to the sliding rule, and he asked again if the Soviets would reconsider their position on range.

Akhromeyev responded that the Soviet side had moved toward the U.S. on counting rule. It was clear that the U.S. would get a great advantage from the agreed approach in terms of the number of ALCMs. Therefore the U.S. must accommodate the Soviet side on the range for SRAM missiles. The U.S. had an advantage of thousands in cruise missiles, and so it needed to accommodate the Soviet side in other respects.

The Secretary said he didn’t want to debate this point. He agreed that the Soviets had moved in our direction on the counting rule, but we had also gone from 1500 to 1000 km on the range question. He suggested moving on to chemical weapons or SLCMs to see if any progress had been made there.

START: SLCMs

Bartholomew said that in the morning’s discussion with Gorbachev, the Soviet leader had said that the Soviets’ main problem with the U.S. proposal on SLCMs was the absence of a range cut-off. We thought it was only fair, given the vulnerability of our coastlines to Soviet short-range SLCMs, to include nuclear SLCMs of any range in our reciprocal declarations. This was what our draft declaration³ did. The question he would like to pose, however, was whether, in the event the U.S. moved on this point—i.e. if the U.S. established a range cut-off—the Soviet side would be prepared to accept the other elements of the U.S. proposal as set forth in our draft declaration.

To put the question more specifically, Bartholomew asked whether the Soviets, with U.S. agreement to a range cut-off, would agree that we would exchange declarations of the sides’ nuclear SLCMs plans for three years ahead and update these declarations annually over the life of the treaty. Under this approach declarations would not be subject to verification measures, although as Secretary Baker had said we would be prepared to have Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin hold informal exchanges on the problems of verification for SLCMs. In sum, the question was: were the Soviets prepared to agree to these points regarding the nature of the declaration if, for the U.S. part, we were prepared to accept an amendment to our declaration which would refer to nuclear-armed SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km? (Note: Shortly after making this proposal, the U.S. corrected its proposal to be an offer of a range cut-off of 300 km).

The Secretary said he would like to summarize this proposal more succinctly. If the U.S. were to meet Soviet objections as raised by Mr. Gorbachev by including a range cut-off, could the Soviets accept the proposal we put on the table yesterday⁴ regarding a declaratory approach to SLCMs?

Shevardnadze asked Nazarkin to respond. Ambassador Nazarkin said that, in addition to the problem of a range cut-off, there was also a number of other problems with the U.S. approach to SLCMs. First was the very nature of the obligations that would be assumed by the sides. The Soviet Union could not accept declarations which would not be mandatory.

The Secretary asked what he meant. Nazarkin explained that the U.S. approach was not binding. The Secretary asked whether the concern was that it was not subject to verification or that it was not a binding limit within the treaty.

Nazarkin replied that the Soviets believed the declarations to be exchanged did not need to be legally binding, but they had to be politically binding. This would entail a requirement that some means be provided to assure the other side that the other’s declaration was being complied with. The Soviets had expressed this idea in their own unofficial draft declaration.⁵

Burt said that, while the two sides’ declarations differed, they both used similar language regarding “levels will not exceed.” Therefore, there was no difference in terms of how binding they were. The only difference was that the Soviet declaration called for verification measures.

Nazarkin said another difference was that the U.S. draft only involved a declaration for three years, whereas the Soviet side would require that a side’s plans be declared for the duration of the treaty. This would establish a definite limit that the sides could not overstep.

Bartholomew asked whether the Soviets had in mind a single number for the coming 15 years to be declared at the time of entry into force of the treaty. Nazarkin said this was, indeed, the Soviet idea.

The Secretary remarked that even under the Soviet formula, the U.S. could list the figure two million and it would be all right.

Shevardnadze commented that we were establishing ceilings for other types of missiles and placing specific figures; therefore he wondered why we could not do the same for SLCMs.

The Secretary explained that the question we were debating was whether we should try to handle SLCMs in the START Treaty. The U.S. had said no, they should be limited outside the treaty. We would not agree to limit SLCMs for 15 years, but we would be prepared to undertake an obligation to update our declaration each year for the duration of the treaty to set forth our SLCM plans for the coming three years. Our position had always been that SLCMs should not be included in the treaty. Under the Soviet approach the U.S. could put an outrageously high figure and not reach it. Another obvious problem was that the Soviets wanted to get into verification, whereas we did not think this was feasible. It was simply impossible to verify SLCMs.

Shevardnadze said he believed there was a fundamental difference between the sides and perhaps we should not pursue this further, but rather focus on other issues such as ALCMs. We could put SLCMs off until the next ministerial. It seemed that the problems were basic and we would not reach an understanding no matter how long we discussed it.

Nazarkin said he wanted to add one point. In the Washington summit joint statement of 1987 there was an obligation to establish a ceiling on SLCMs. The Soviet draft was based on this understanding, whereas the U.S. draft ignored the Washington understanding and provided for the possibility of changing the limits in the future. Such an approach did not allow for the possibility for reaching an agreement.

Burt said the Washington summit agreement also spoke of verification measures. As we had made clear, there were fundamental problems in this regard. Frankly, if the U.S. agreed to limit these missiles within the treaty or in a legally binding agreement outside the treaty, there would be severe problems in getting such a deal ratified because of the verification problems. This was why we had proposed a different approach.

Under the U.S. concept, Burt continued, both sides would declare their plans for SLCM production. In our political system, this would have a binding impact. This was the only way to proceed given the verification problems. While we could not agree to the Soviet statement, it did contain some interesting elements. For example, it spoke of enhancing confidence. This, Burt thought was a better way to proceed. We should think of our declarations as confidence-building measures rather than as legally binding, verifiable limits.

Shevardnadze said he did not think we would work this out. Talking of different categories—confidence-building measures and limits on the number and qualitative characteristics of armaments—was a very serious matter. The Soviets thought that their draft declaration would be suitable, and in the U.S. as well as the Soviet interest.

The Secretary said there were two major problems with the Soviet proposal. First, it would require us to agree to verification measures that we did not believe were feasible. Second, it offered no flexibility regarding our production of SLCMs for the next 15 years. The rest of the Soviet declaration, the Secretary added, did not seem particularly objectionable. Perhaps we could take another look, but the last sentence of the Soviet draft was a hill we could not climb.

Burt said there were, as the Secretary had said, many things on which we could not agree. But there were constructive ideas in the Soviet draft. We hoped we could meld these into a common approach.

The Secretary suggested that the working group get back to work. Shevardnadze said he had no objection to this. The Secretary said we should try to at least narrow our differences in this area. It would be a good way for Burt and Nazarkin to spend the evening. Shevardnadze agreed. He suggested moving to another subject. The ALCMists could leave and we could turn to the chemists.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

START: Telemetry Encryption

Shevardnadze asked whether they could return to START and the question of telemetry encryption.

Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov said he would like to report on the status of the discussions. A lot of provisions had been agreed or were in the process of being agreed. There would be a need for some technical elaboration and development of legal language to complete the discussions. The U.S. had made a proposal on one point, namely, encapsulation of information, that would require further study by the Soviets. The Soviets agreed that encapsulation should be allowed primarily on warheads in the plasma-forming segment of flight. There seemed to be a common understanding, but additional efforts would be needed to establish technical language. Overall, Karpov said, the trend of the discussions was toward convergence of the sides’ positions.

Bartholomew said he thought the sides were down to two basic issues that had been covered by Karpov. He would emphasize that these exchanges would have real political consequences for ratification. Our technical people needed to be instructed accordingly so that Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin could close out the issue in Geneva.

The Secretary asked whether the sides might not be able to resolve the remaining technical questions in the next 24 hours.

Karpov replied that he feared this was not the case. There was a serious question of how to ensure confidence that encapsulation would not affect measurements along the entire flight path of a missile. For example, the Soviets had suggested using a special cassette with special seals, one for the U.S. and one for the USSR, so that the accuracy of the information could be verified by both sides. In this way the U.S. would get all the information. This would guarantee against circumvention of the limit on encryption.

Other questions also needed technical elaboration, Karpov continued, such as the broadcast of information, directed beams, low-power transmission to satellites, what kind of waves, the angles of transmission, etc.

The Secretary asked Ambassador Burt, who had just rejoined the group, to give his comments.

Burt said that he agreed the remaining issues were complicated, but he thought there were really only two major issues. One was the kind of exemptions that would be allowed for encapsulating information. The U.S. had allowed for the right to do this on one older missile, the Minuteman II. The Soviets had agreed and this was welcome. The exemption problem was different on the Soviet side since it referred to test programs for new warheads. The U.S. was prepared to work around this by allowing a limited number of encapsulations.

The second remaining problem was more complex, Burt continued. This concerned how much information we could exchange and how much assistance we would give the other side in assessing the data. The U.S. was prepared to provide the stream of data and even the frequency modulation on which data had been transmitted. We also were prepared to give the frame of the digital stream. The Soviet side, however, wanted more: the algorithm with which to translate the data stream into engineering values. This would require further discussion that evening or in the morning. Nevertheless, if we could resolve these two issues, all others could be put to bed. Burt would add that we had in principle solved all the issues. The only outstanding questions were technical ones. In our joint statement we could say that we had agreed on the framework of an agreement regarding data denial.

Karpov said he could agree with what Burt had said, but wanted to note that the sides were using different principles of transmitting telemetric information. The Soviets transmitted absolute measurements of absolute factors. The United States, on the other hand, only transmitted data concerning changes in baseline information that was not known to anyone. Therefore to find a common denominator was not so simple. Additional efforts were required.

Shevardnadze said that if the basic issues had been resolved and only technical questions remained, the experts should work that night in the hopes of finding a solution. The Secretary agreed, urging the experts to continue that night. Shevardnadze said the experts should get no sleep until they resolve the issue. Burt said that he would agree to negotiate all night if Karpov agreed to participate. (Subsequently agreed Elements of Common Ground on Non-denial of Telemetry are attached.)⁶

START: Non-Deployed Missiles

Shevardnadze asked whether there were any questions on non-deployed missiles. He understood there had been full agreement.

Burt said that the only question remaining was the precise numbers each side would be permitted to have. We could agree on these numbers in Geneva. (Text of Elements of Common Ground attached.)⁷

Shevardnadze asked whether the Secretary wanted to talk about ALCMs. Akhromeyev noted that the Secretary had said the U.S. delegation wanted to caucus first. The Soviet side would need to do this as well. The Secretary asked whether we should turn to SLCMs.

START: SLCMs (continued)

Burt said that he could speak for Ambassador Nazarkin, who was not present. The sides had had a good discussion of SLCMs, but had not returned with a common text. Nazarkin wanted to consult with Karpov to see if it were worthwhile to have a larger meeting with Karpov present. The sides had spoken of the idea of exchanging information. They still had a problem with the duration of the proposed declarations. The Soviet Union wanted the limits to apply for the whole period, whereas we were not prepared to go that far. Therefore the discussions would benefit from one more working meeting.

The Secretary agreed and proposed a break. Shevardnadze agreed. He noted that the Ministers still had to address bilateral, transnational and human rights questions. As for the Soviet experts on these topics, he said, “Let them wait.” He was not sorry for his group, although as guests perhaps the U.S. experts should be given some sympathy.

(The proceedings recessed at 7:15 p.m. During the next two hours, the delegations caucused and a series of working group meetings and one-on-ones between the Ministers were held on ALCM and SLCM questions. The proceedings resumed at 9:26 p.m.)

START: ALCMs (continued)

The Secretary said it was fair to say that the sides had been able to resolve many, if not most of the ALCM issues. The only unresolved issue was that of range. He asked Kanter to run through the areas of agreements so that we could be sure we had a mutual understanding.

NSC Senior Staff Director Kanter then read the additional elements of common ground.

— For the United States:

○ Attribute 10 warheads to each B–52 equipped for ALCMs, 10 warheads to each B–1 equipped for ALCMs, and 10 warheads to future heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs.

○ Each B–52, B–1 and future heavy bomber may be equipped for no more than 20 ALCMs.

— For the Soviet Union:

○ Attribute 8 warheads to each TU–95 equipped for ALCMs, 8 warheads to each TU–160 equipped for ALCMs, and 10 warheads to future heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs.

○ Each TU–95 and TU–160 may be equipped for no more than 12 ALCMs; future Soviet heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 20 ALCMs.

— The total number of TU–95s equipped for ALCMs and TU–160s equipped for ALCMs may be up to 40% more than the total number of U.S. heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs.

Kanter concluded by saying that all other elements of the package previously discussed would remain unchanged. (Final agreed text of Elements of Common Ground on ALCMs is attached.)⁸

The Secretary asked whether Kanter meant all other elements of the U.S. proposal had been agreed. Kanter replied that this was correct, with the exception of the range threshold.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to consult with his delegation.

(The meeting recessed at 9:30 and resumed at 9:35.)

Shevardnadze returned, remarking that negotiating was a difficult business. He believed that all these questions could be enumerated. On seven points, the sides had taken an agreed position and on one, range, they still had to resolve their differences. He believed we could say that the entire package had been agreed with the exception of range. He asked, however, that the U.S. not cite publicly the figures that had been agreed. The reason was that it would be difficult for the Soviet side to explain these new figures, given the fact that they gave the U.S. side a certain edge. Problems would arise right away from the fact that the U.S. was getting 1100 warheads above the 6000 limit. Therefore, he would like the sides to state publicly nothing more than that all questions had been agreed except for range and that work will go on.

The Secretary said this was fine; we would not use the numbers publicly, although he could not guarantee against leaks. Nevertheless, the U.S. would not brief and would try to keep the specific figures from becoming public.

START: SLCMs (continued)

Shevardnadze asked whether there were any new details on telemetry encryption. His experts said no, and then he asked whether we could turn to SLCMs.

The Secretary suggested further engagement on SLCMs among Karpov, Burt and Bartholomew. This could determine whether we had anything further to talk about. He believed that if we were able to close out the SLCM issue, we would surprise a lot of people. This would be a big step toward a START agreement. He knew others were skeptical but he believed we were making progress.

Akhromeyev said, “God help us,” if this were true. The Secretary asked in jest whether we were dealing with the right people.

Shevardnadze asked whether anything had been agreed in principle. Nazarkin said the sides were close to agreement on telemetry encryption, but the Soviets needed the U.S. reaction to a new Soviet formulation. A document had been agreed on non-deployed missiles.⁹ SLCMs were still being worked on, and no results had yet emerged.

Burt said he was more optimistic on SLCMs. Bartholomew said that the sides were exploring some ideas with Mr. Karpov that might have practical possibilities. Bartholomew added that some of these ideas would need to be checked in Washington.

The Secretary suggested that the experts keep discussing this approach on the understanding that the U.S. proposals were not being submitted formally; we needed to check a few points in Washington. Notwithstanding this qualification, if the Soviets could give us a reaction we could save some time.

The Secretary asked whether the Ministers should receive quick reports on human rights, bilateral and transnational issues. He had run out of arms control topics to discuss.

Visits to Radars

Shevardnadze said he had one more arms control question to raise. The previous day the U.S. had said it would be prepared to receive Soviet representatives, scientists, etc. to visit U.S. radar stations in Greenland and the UK. He had noted that the British question was tied up with the UK government. Therefore the Soviets suggested the following option. First, they reaffirmed what they had said regarding Krasnoyarsk. Everything he had said in Wyoming still stood. The Soviets were talking about destroying the radar. Second, regarding visits to radars, he suggested beginning with visits to two, Pechora and Thule. As for the second pair of radars, since this was tied up with the British government, we could look at the question later.

The Secretary said this was all right if the Soviets wanted to approach the subject in this way. As he had said before, the U.S. was willing to have the Soviets visit Fylingdales as well; he had simply stressed the need to coordinate such a visit closely with the British government. If the Soviet side decided to visit Fylingdales, we would want to visit the Soviet radar at Baranovichi. If the Soviets were not prepared to give their consent to a visit to Baranovichi at this time, however, we could return to the question later.

Bartholomew explained that the U.S. was required to consult with the UK and Denmark and had done so. Both governments had given their full agreement to visits. The Secretary’s point the previous day had been that, when the time for the visits was selected, there was a need to coordinate with the British and Danish governments. But both of those governments, he repeated, had given their consent.

Shevardnadze suggested that we announce that we had a favorable view on mutual visits to radar sites with the time and modalities to be worked out later.

The Secretary commented that we would not want to imply a general process of visiting radars. The Soviets in Wyoming had only expressed interest in seeing Thule and Fylingdales. He had thought that this was reasonable and the U.S. had now made all necessary arrangements with the UK and Danish governments. As he now understood it, both the UK and Denmark were ready to receive Soviet visitors and we could make clear that four radars were involved.

Shevardnadze suggested registering agreement on a visit to one radar on each side. We could look at the second pair of radars later on.

The Secretary said that this concluded everything on arms control except for SLCMs. We still had to see what the working group had produced.

Shevardnadze commented that, despite the difficulties we had experienced the previous day and our disappointment with the initial results, we had now made considerable headway on arms control.

Kanter commented that our disappointment had been temporary. The Secretary said he agreed, although he was disappointed we had not completely closed out ALCMs. The CW agreement would be well received publicly. We now had put non-deployed missiles behind us, telemetry encryption had been resolved in principle, most of the ALCM issue had been resolved, and we might even make progress on SLCMs, God forbid.

The Secretary said he wanted Shevardnadze to know, given all the discussion about telemetry, that the U.S. referred to the church across the street from the new American Embassy as “Our Lady of Telemetry.”

Shevardnadze joked that this explained why we had been blessed with success.

The Secretary said another name for that building was the “Church of the Immaculate Reception.”

(The discussion concluded at 9:54 p.m., at which time the working group chairmen on human rights, bilateral, economic and transnational issues were asked to come and report to Ministers, (see separate memcon)¹⁰. The discussions of arms control resumed at 10:50 p.m., focusing on SLCMs.)

Bartholomew reported to the Ministers that he, Burt, Karpov and Nazarkin had developed an understanding that was being submitted ad referendum to the Ministers. There were two basic points on which we had reached a meeting of the minds.

— First, the U.S. had proposed to extend the period of the declarations of SLCM plans from three years to five years.

— Second, the Soviets had proposed that, in the declarations, each side provide information on the types of surface ships and submarines that were capable of deploying SLCMs. We had agreed that such information would be exchanged on a confidential basis.

These changes would be reflected in the draft joint statement, Bartholomew explained. The declarations would be issued each year to cover the coming five years for as long as the START agreement remained in effect.

Bartholomew said that there was still a difference on three other points.

— First, the U.S. declaration would concern only nuclear armed SLCMs. The Soviet side did not specify and appeared to cover both nuclear and conventional.

— Second, the U.S. proposed that the number given in the declaration be the number of missiles in a side’s inventory, that is the actual number of missiles stockpiled or deployed on ships. The Soviet side wanted the number to apply only to those deployed on surface ships and submarines.

— Third, there was a difference regarding range. The U.S. originally had proposed that the declaration apply to nuclear SLCMs of all ranges, whereas the Soviet side had only covered those above 600 km. The U.S. side now had proposed a Yankee solution: a range threshold of 300 km. Karpov, however, had said his instructions did not permit the Soviets to agree to that.

Shevardnadze noted that he always had said that Karpov was a difficult negotiating partner.

Karpov said he would only add that Bartholomew had presented the results of their discussions in clear and precise terms.

The Soviets continued to propose a more radical solution, namely, to allow no more that 600 nuclear and 400 conventional SLCMs. The U.S., however, had not accepted this and the Soviets were prepared to agree to the U.S.-proposed solution that would not be legally binding. If the Ministers thought that the results of these discussions should be elaborated further, the experts would do so.

Shevardnadze, looking at the Soviet side’s working text of the draft declaration, said it appeared to have more brackets than letters. After reviewing the text, he remarked that this was a complex issue that perhaps should be reviewed in greater depth at the next ministerial. In our joint statement, we might just indicate we had discussed the issue in a serious way with the participation of experts. He did not think we could settle the issue by early morning.

The Secretary said we should ask our negotiators in Geneva to work in the interim to see if they could resolve these differences. The point was that we had made good progress. If we could conclude an agreement up to this point, we could refer the remaining details to our Geneva negotiators.

Shevardnadze agreed that we should give this to our delegations. The draft declaration contained interesting things, to be sure.

The Secretary said that the U.S. could accept the Soviet position on counting deployed SLCMs rather than the total inventory. This would leave two unresolved questions: range and whether we count only nuclear SLCMs, or nuclear and conventional SLCMs. We would have to leave these points to our negotiators in Geneva and perhaps conclude an agreement before the next ministerial.

Shevardnadze said that he did not rule this out. We should give the agreement to our negotiators as a basis for further bargaining. Perhaps we would be able to solve it by the next ministerial.

Burt said it would be useful if we could say in our joint statement that we had made more progress on this issue than had been previously possible.

Shevardnadze said he thought we could say that. This was progress and it was an appropriate basis on which the Geneva negotiators could work.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze whether he would object to his saying at his press conference that we had made significant progress on SLCMs through a declaratory approach.

Shevardnadze said this was fine.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his time and effort.

[Omitted here is a discussion of Karelian Bear Dogs.]

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Lot 93D187, Secretary James A. Baker III’s Classified Papers, January 1989–August 1992, JAB Papers Feb 1990. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Osobnyak Guest House at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Seitz, Timbie, and Ross. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989-1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts. Minutes of the working group meetings noted in this memorandum were not found.
2. See Document 73.
3. See footnote 3, Document 72.
4. See footnote 3, Document 72.
5. Not found.
6. Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Elements of Common Ground on Non-Denial of Telemetry Data.”
7. Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Elements of Common Ground on Non-Deployed Missiles.”
8. Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Additional Elements of Common Ground on ALCMs.”
9. Not found.
10. Not found. See Document 75.