6. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Ross) to Secretary of State
Baker1
Washington, February 8,
1989
SUBJECT
- Arms Control Memos from PM and Paul
Nitze
The striking aspect of these memos is the degree of consensus found in them.
Clearly, there are solid opportunities for department-wide agreement; some
of the positions on which the department appears to agree, however, are
likely to be fought by other elements of the national security community-
though there is definite room for compromise.
The points of agreement include:
- •
- ICBM
Survivability: Both Nitze and PM make the case for mobile missiles.2 Nitze remains skeptical
about rail-garrison MX because of
the warning time it requires. Moreover, in order to improve
survivability, he argues we may want to reconsider the 1600 launcher
limit provisionally agreed to in START.3
- •
- Verification: The verification regime will
have to be reviewed and possibly modified as we near an agreement
and delineate positions on mobile missiles and SLCMs.4
- •
- SLCMs:
Each argues that the Soviets will demand some sort of agreement on
SLCMs before agreeing to
START.5
- •
- Defense & Space: They argue that our
D&S approach has become
wrong-headed. We are trying to get the Soviets to agree to an
interpretation of the ABM Treaty
which may be a moot issue- given the present structure and
objectives of SDI. Nitze and PM feel these negotiations should focus
on specific space-based tests or physical
parameters instead of the more general issue of “narrow” versus
“broad.” This area is one where DOD
opposition is likely to be greatest.6
[Page 23]
Attachment
Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Political and Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Baker7
Washington, February 1,
1989
SUBJECT
In the near future you will be participating in the Administration’s
planned review of arms control negotiations. There are good arguments
against delay: Chemical Weapons talks begin February 7, Conventional
Force Reduction negotiations and the CSCE talks on Confidence and Security Building Measures
begin March 9, and pressure will doubtless build to renew Nuclear
Testing, START and Defense &
Space at an early date.
This memorandum lays out general thoughts on how the review should be
structured—the directions we should try to take and the pitfalls to
avoid. In general, we conclude that U.S. goals in START, Chemical Weapons and Nuclear
Testing negotiations remain valid—though we face especially tough
decisions on strategic force structure. On the other hand, our Defense
and Space position needs a thorough revamping: there will likely be no
outcome in START without agreement
with the Soviets on treatment of ballistic missile defenses. We should
carefully review our position on conventional reductions to ensure it
continues to meet the challenge of Eastern unilateral reduction
initiatives.
Some cautions to bear in mind: First, we have greater latitude to change
directions in bilateral negotiations (START, Defense and Space, Nuclear Testing) than
multilateral (Conventional Force Reductions, Confidence and Security
Building Measures, and Chemical Weapons) where our approach tends to be
arduously brokered with Allies. Second, our priorities in the Review
will not be shared by all agencies. Finally, close consultations on the
Hill during the Review will be crucial to success.
[Page 24]
Tab 1
Paper Prepared in the Department of State8
START
Our first task is to decide how to ensure the survivability of our
land-based ICBM force. Without
consensus on this, there is danger of a START impasse in the Administration and on the Hill.
Once this decision is reached, how we should move on key START issues will become clearer. For
example, we will certainly require provision in START for mobile missiles (our present
position bans mobiles), but the specific measures we introduce will
depend on and be designed to support the ICBM program we choose (while taking account of ongoing
Soviet mobile programs). Properly done, the START reductions in the Soviet strategic force should ease
substantially the task of deploying a survivable and affordable ICBM force.
Other problems will remain, especially SLCMs. Our position has been to avoid SLCM limitations in START; the Soviets say this is a Treaty
buster. They have pushed verification proposals we have rejected
(because they could be readily circumvented, would inhibit Navy
operations and would compromise our strict policy to neither confirm nor
deny the presence of nuclear weapons).
In sum, priority issues for the review should be:
- —
- How the U.S. ICBM program
should be structured.
- —
- How mobile ICBMs should be
dealt with, and how such systems should be verified.
- —
- What our position should be on the remaining issues such as
SLCMs.
Conclusion: Our basic approach to START is sound and will stand up to review. In particular,
backing away from support for 50% reductions in fast flyers is both
unwise and unnecessary—provided we come to grips with the survivability
issue. As to SLCMs, we are convinced
they will have to be limited if we are to reach a START agreement, unless we decide we do
not need nuclear
SLCMs, and agree with the Soviets to
ban them. Accordingly, a key element of the review must be to consider
verification options. While SLCMs may
be
[Page 25]
an end-game issue, the
development of consensus on a U.S. position will be contentious and
should start now.
Paul Nitze will be providing you in a separate memo his thoughts on
START, including options for the
ICBM force, and Defense and Space
issues.
Tab 2
Paper Prepared in the Department of State9
Defense and Space
Our current D&S position is designed
to retain the ABM Treaty until
strategic defenses prove feasible, to allow U.S. testing meanwhile under
the “broad” interpretation, and to lay the groundwork for Treaty
termination and ABM deployment after a
“non-withdrawal” period of 8–10 years. It also proposes mutual agreement
to end ABM treaty restrictions on
testing and deployment of sensors (“sensors go free”); and we have
declared unilaterally our right to do limited testing in space of
certain ABM weapons during the
nonwithdrawal period.
This approach is questionable on several grounds. It has caused deadlock
with Congress, gridlock in the negotiation and has little Allied or
other support. Moreover, we are arguably protecting testing options we
do not intend to exercise (but the Soviets might): SDIO plans no
space-based weapons testing—or other activity requiring the “broad”
interpretation—until at least 1996.
Thus, the review needs to consider:
- —
- What SDI program makes sense
technically and would be supported by the Congress.
- —
- What objectives to pursue in future negotiations with the
Soviets on Defense and Space.
Conclusion: The broad/narrow issue has, on balance, been a hindrance to
SDI. We need to re-focus our
efforts on practical steps to 1) achieve consensus with the Hill, 2)
keep SDI on track, and 3) achieve some
common ground with the Soviets (who have shown some interest in
loosening ABM Treaty restrictions on
sensors and testing). The answer may lie in agreement with the Soviets
on what specific space-based ABM tests the two sides can conduct
without reference to broad
[Page 26]
or
narrow (a notion considered and rejected a year ago). In addition, we
need to devote special attention to building consensus with the Hill on
SDI, and look again at whether
mutual freedom to deploy after 1996 is in our interest.
Attachment
Information Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Nitze to Secretary of
State Baker10
Washington, February 1,
1989
SUBJECT
- Comprehensive Review of Strategic Forces/Arms Control
This memo lays out my views on the Administration’s approach to that
portion of its comprehensive review of defense programs and arms control
policies that deals with strategic forces. It also highlights the key
issues that need to be addressed in that review.
Approach
Before we can make prudent decisions on arms control positions, we should
have settled on the sort of force posture we seek, given budgetary and
political constraints and the overriding goal of protecting U.S. and
allied security. Accordingly, the review should address first the future
U.S. force structure and the modernization programs necessary to attain
it, and then formulate arms control positions that are consistent with
our modernization plans.
This approach cannot, of course, be purely sequential. Our estimate of
our ability to reduce the threat through negotiation of acceptable arms
control measures will affect our judgment of force structure
requirements. Furthermore, we cannot delay resumption of the
negotiations indefinitely, and thus we will likely have to proceed in
the talks prior to being wholly confident that our modernization plans
will reach fruition. (If necessary, we can reserve our position in
Geneva on those issues still being addressed.) But we should have a good
idea of future deployment plans, and some confidence that those plans
can receive sustainable Congressional and public support, before we
finalize our arms control positions.
[Page 27]
To this end, I recommend the Administration engage key Congressional
figures early in the review process, with the objective of determining a
strategic modernization program that will enjoy strong bipartisan
support over an extended period. In so doing, we should recall the
experience of the past, in which support for a widely accepted
compromise (i.e. the Scowcroft
Commission recommendations) fell apart over time, and seek a program
that is maximally immunized against year-to-year buffeting.
Force Structure Issues
For strategic offensive forces, the key force structuring issues concern
the land-based and air-based legs. You are well aware of the ICBM vulnerability problem. The top
priority for strategic forces should be to find a survivable ICBM that can be deployed. I am skeptical
of the rail-garrison MX, because of the
warning time it requires; more attractive options are the single-RV Midgetman (with perhaps some deployed in
silos to save money and the rest road-mobile), a road-mobile 2-RV missile, and, the one I prefer, a
single- or 2-RV missile deployed in a
shell-game scheme. For the air-based leg, we need to determine the best
mix of B-52s, B-1s and B-2s, given B-1 performance problems and the cost
of B-2s. The number of B-2s we buy could affect the availability of
funds for the ICBM program.
For strategic defense, the Administration needs to address some basic
questions about SDI. How fast do we
wish to proceed with the program, given the state of technology and
resource constraints, and with what goal in mind? I favor a program that
is robust without being wasteful in allocating more funds than can be
efficiently absorbed and without skewing funding away from other
priority needs. I believe the current level of funding, perhaps with
modest growth over the next several years, fits that criterion. (Senator
Nunn expressed a similar
view on the Brinkley show recently.) As for the goal, I recommend
seeking a system that would be survivable and cost effective against
existing and future Soviet threats; I do not believe limited protection
against a third-country ballistic missile threat would be worth the
cost. Regardless of how fast the program proceeds, it is likely at some
point to reach a level where ABM Treaty
compliance questions arise. Accordingly, the Administration should begin
soon to work out internally and with the Congress an agreed
understanding of the constraints the ABM Treaty places on ABM
development and testing activities.
START Issues
There are two tasks for the START
review: to revisit agreed elements and to assess U.S. positions on
outstanding issues. I believe the
[Page 28]
basic START approach is sound, as
long as we deploy a survivable ICBM.
(If we don’t do that, we’re in trouble with or without START.) There are a few agreed elements
we may wish to reconsider, however. The limit of 1600 on delivery
vehicles will not bind us in the near term, because near-term options
for deploying our 6000 warheads would leave us with fewer than 1600
missiles and bombers. But over the long term, we may want to distribute
our warheads among more missiles and bombers to enhance survivability,
and we cannot assume a START Treaty
would have been superseded by another agreement by then. Allowing the
1600 limit to increase over time, excluding single-RV missiles from the limit, or replacing it
with a limit only on bombers (which is needed due to the permissive
bomber weapon counting rules), may be preferable.
We may also want to augment the plan for verifying mobile ICBMs, if we choose a deployment concept
other than road- or rail-mobile, on which the currently agreed
verification regime is based. Finally, we may need to take another look
at the ballistic missile RV counting
rules agreed on at the Washington Summit. The U.S. proposed these rules
to prevent overcounting of our warheads, but they create possibilities
for Soviet breakout that may cause us problems.
As for unresolved issues, four stand out:
- (1)
- Our proposal to ban mobile ICBMs serves only to undercut our efforts in
Congress to secure support for our ICBM program. It is also unrealistic; regardless of
our ICBM plans, the USSR has deployed mobiles and
will sign no START Treaty
that bans them. We should formulate a proposal that protects our
program and, in any event, replace our ban with a warhead
limit.
- (2)
- Our ALCM proposal currently
seeks to exclude from START
limits any nuclear ALCM with a
range less than 1500 KM. This has been strongly opposed by the
Soviets, who would exclude only those nuclear ALCMs with a range less than 600
KM, and has held up resolution of several ALCM issues. We should determine
if we really need to protect a nuclear ALCM with a range between 600 and 1500 KM (State is
unaware of any such program in the defense budget).
- (3)
- The Reagan Administration struggled for years on two key
aspects of verification—suspect-site inspection and
perimeter-portal monitoring—and, in the end, came up with
approaches that walk a reasonable line between our need for
access to Soviet facilities and our need to protect sensitive
sites of our own. But since verification would dominate any
ratification debate, our positions should be carefully reviewed,
with thorough Congressional consultation.
- (4)
- SLCMs may be more of an
end-game issue, but since I believe the Soviets will insist on
binding limits as a condition for a Treaty, and since
[Page 29]
verification of such
limits will be extremely difficult, the Administration should
begin now to address the problem of how limits could be
verified. I have done some work with PM and S/P that
could serve as a starting point for this effort; Bill Burns also
has some ideas.
Defense and Space Issues
As the SDI program has evolved, our
Defense and Space position has failed to keep pace, to the point where
there are now substantial inconsistencies between the two:
- (1)
- We are proposing in Geneva to conduct limited testing in space
of ABM weapons during the
period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty (probably through 1996). This initiative
was formulated at a time when SDIO was anticipating such testing
between now and 1996. The latest SDI Report to Congress indicates that space-based
weapons testing is no longer planned during that period, so our
testing in space proposal serves no programmatic purpose.
- (2)
- The instructions to the Defense and Space delegation for the
last two rounds set as one of their primary objectives securing
Soviet agreement to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Since the SDI program now intends to remain
within the narrow interpretation during the anticipated
nonwithdrawal period, this objective no longer makes
sense.
- (3)
- Our proposal would effectively free the sides from ABM Treaty constraints at the end
of the nonwithdrawal period; since the current program will not
be at the deployment stage at that time, this provision would
serve only to free the Soviets to deploy.
Clearly, the review should thoroughly rethink our Defense and Space
position. Our objective in these talks has been to facilitate our SDI program while providing a measure of
predictability for the Soviets. If we decide to continue the talks, we
should maintain this goal. If the President decides on an SDI program similar to the current one, we
should be able to agree to a framework (nonwithdrawal through 1996, no
testing of space-based weapons, return to the status
quo ante after 1996) that will satisfy the Soviets while
affecting our program not at all. Even if we do this, however, we may
find it advantageous to negotiate some physical parameters delineating
what amount of testing is allowed by the ABM Treaty, to avoid future compliance disputes that might
arise due to the ambiguity of certain Treaty provisions. Alternatively,
we might explore with the Soviets the possibility of shutting down the
Defense and Space talks, addressing broad Soviet concerns through a
Summit statement or exchange of letters rather than a formal agreement,
and dealing with ABM Treaty ambiguities
through other channels, such as in the Standing Consultative
Commission.
