Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

42. Draft Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹

Washington, August 15, 1989

NON-PAPER ON THE NEXT BIG MOVES IN START: MOBILE ICBMS & THE BOMBER/ALCM ISSUES

The mobile ICBM issue in START is politically and technically complex. Failure to handle it effectively could deal a major blow to the Administration by undermining its strategic modernization program and its success in START. Permitting mobile ICBMs will weaken the verifiability of the START agreement and create certain stability problems such as enhanced rapid reload. Failure to permit mobile ICBMs will deny this means of improving ICBM survivability. Whichever way the President ultimately goes, the decision will draw criticism. Indeed, many of those favoring mobile ICBMs will still be critical of mobile ICBM verification, and many who oppose mobile ICBMs will criticize START because it won’t solve the ICBM survivability problem. Nevertheless, the President and the United States could be well-served by taking an initiative on mobile ICBMs in the START negotiations early which would clarify what the US position would be “if mobile ICBMs were permitted.” A sound proposal would permit the President to gain support from the Congress for his strategic modernization program and once again place the arms control “ball” squarely in the Soviet court, thus enhancing our leverage. At the same time, the proposal must be carefully designed to avoid disrupting the momentum of the negotiations or fueling a backlash from the Hill either from liberals or conservatives. Below I offer a package which I believe could gain broad support within the Administration, build bridges with a number of diverse Congressional constituencies, and enhance negotiating momentum and leverage in START. (S/NF)

After, or if necessary during upcoming congressional action on ICBM funding, the President should meet with Congressional leadership again and state that in START he is prepared to permit a limited number of warheads on mobile ICBMs, assuming that verification provisions can be agreed and that the overall package enhances stability. The President should make clear that in so doing he expects the Congress to continue to support his two-missile mobile ICBM modernization program so that the United States will be able to deploy as many warheads on mobile ICBMs as the Soviet Union is permitted to deploy under the treaty. The President should also make clear that although he believes that we can effectively verify a limited number of mobile ICBMs, the Congress must understand up front—before the ratification debate—that the verification of mobile ICBMs will not be as tight as the verification of some other central provisions. Finally, the President would make clear that as part of the package permitting mobile ICBMs he will propose additional measures designed to enhance stability, while maintaining momentum in the negotiations. (S/NF)

Specifically, the President would propose to the Soviet Union that, if conditions for permitting mobile ICBMs were met, i.e., verification resolved and US modernization assured, the sides could then agree to a ceiling somewhere between 400 and 800 warheads on mobile ICBMs, but that MIRVed mobiles would also count against the 1540² ceiling on heavy ICBMs which is already recorded in the joint draft text. In short, if the Soviet Union insists on MIRVed mobiles as part of a survivable second-strike force, it may have them in limited numbers, but only in exchange for reductions in its principal first-strike force on a one-for-one basis.³ To further enhance stability, the United States would be prepared, if the Soviet Union desired, to make room for further de-MIRVing by agreeing to an overall SNDV limit a bit higher than the currently agreed 1600, perhaps 1700, or even the 1800 number once proposed by the USSR. The President could present this package to the Soviet Union as appropriate without committing to permit mobile ICBMs. The package would always be accompanied by “if permitted” language. (S/NF)

The Soviet Union has stated that it wishes to have 1600 warheads on 800 mobile ICBMs; that is, the Soviet Union wants a large number of both single warhead and MIRVed mobile ICBMs. The current US position is to ban both types. This proposal would permit the Soviet Union not only single-RV mobile ICBMs but also a limited number of MIRVed mobile ICBMs. Some Soviet sources have indicated that the Soviet Union might be prepared to reduce their heavy SS-18 ICBMs below 1540; this proposal tests their seriousness. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union would prefer to keep the full 1540 heavy ICBMs as thus far agreed in START, they could do so, but only at the price of not being able to deploy MIRVed mobile ICBMs. They have the freedom to choose whether to trade or not—their MIRVed mobiles are banned in essence only if they refuse to make further reductions in their heavy ICBMs. I believe that a proposal or a “probe” to get the Soviets to agree simply to direct further cuts in heavies or to ban heavies will invite a “March 1977” backlash or undesired counter proposals. The heavies-for-MIRVed-mobile-ICBMs tradeoff reduces that danger, which would be high also if we push for tight ceilings or a ban on all MIRVed ICBMs. (S/NF)

I believe that the President should propose a range of numbers to enhance our negotiating leverage and disarm criticism from the Soviet Union and the Congress. The low number, for example 400, will appeal to those who are concerned about verification, are convinced that Congress will never fund a large mobile ICBM program, or desire us to propose levels that would require cuts in our total planned buy of 500 mobile MX RVs. The higher number, say 800, would appeal to those who believe that this is more consistent with negotiability, stability, and a true two-missile program. The range gives us greater flexibility in negotiating verification measures and constraints with the Soviets. (S/NF)

Counting the MIRVed ICBMs under the 1540 limit will appeal to those who want to ban MIRVed mobiles and to those who are concerned about the military threat and breakout capability posed by the SS-18 heavy ICBMs. To the degree that some critics believe Soviet MIRVed mobiles are more threatening, then a reduction in heavies would appeal as compensation. Our own MIRVed rail-mobile Peacekeeper (MX) would be permitted, would be limited, and thus would not be undermined politically as would be the case if the US proposed to ban MIRVed mobiles outright. (S/NF)

The United States should not propose to change any of the agreed numbers in the basic START framework, i.e., the 1600 SNDV limit or the warhead limits of 6000, 4900, and 1540. However, offering to permit an increase in the 1600 SNDV number to say 1700 or 1800 is a far better and more direct way to address the warhead-to-target ratio issue, i.e., de-MIRVing, than essentially cosmetic proposals to limit MIRVed ICBMs. Even if, in the end, we continue to ban mobile ICBMs, a higher SNDV number such as 1700 or 1800 would permit us to keep a larger ICBM force of de-MIRVed ICBMs (Minuteman II, Minuteman III, or Midgetman) in existing silos at low cost and it would also give us greater flexibility on bombers, especially if B–52s for the conventional mission get captured in START. (S/NF)

The above approach is far superior to MIRVed ICBM ceilings. MIRVed ICBM ceilings at levels between 1800 and 2200 do not reduce the threat to us in the long run, will invite Soviet efforts to limit MIRVed SLBMs, which is unacceptable, and will cost us in bargaining chips and momentum. Likewise, radical proposals such as banning MIRVed ICBMs will have a Reykjavik-like effect of forcing a debate about conflicting visions of the future, more suitable for START II or START III, while disrupting the real negotiations of START I. (S/NF)

Politically, it is important that we make a move like this in START, in part because it is not in our interest at this time to make fundamental changes in our Defense & Space position or in certain other critical aspects of START where more technical and political work needs to be done. This proposal would defuse pressures to put forth at this time major concessions in other areas. In particular, I am concerned that some may press us to agree to the Soviet approach to counting ALCMs (“as equipped”), rather than proposing some variant of the current US approach which “attributes” to a bomber a number in the same way that we and the Soviets agreed to deal with the counting of gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles. I understand that the “as equipped” rule, by reducing the number of US ALCMs permitted, would highlight the importance of the B–2 bomber. Such a rule, however, would mean that the single system cut the most under START would not be the Soviet heavy SS-18s or Soviet ICBMs, or even Soviet ballistic missiles. It would be the US slow-flying, second-strike ALCM force. (S/NF)

Furthermore, once we open the “as equipped” verification issue, the Soviets will ask why similar approaches cannot be taken to verify gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles, thus reopening the important Reykjavik bomber counting rule. Also, “as equipped” for ALCMs will only encourage the Soviets to push harder on SLCMs.

The bomber/ALCM issues may be ripe, however, for further moves, the Soviet negotiators have indicated that although they still insist on an “as equipped rule” for ALCM bombers which is “factual,” it would be something like the number of actual attachment points provided rather than something like the maximum theoretical (or perhaps even demonstrated). The Soviet side characterizes this as a more “realistic” approach, but does not provide for legal ACLM discounting nor does it provide for the easier verification associated with the American “attribution” approach. Rather, the new Soviet “realistic” approach complicates verification further and now also provides for the “breakout” threat which had been one of the criticisms of the American “attribution” approach. Actually, we have not expressed great concern about ALCM “breakout” because the deployment of additional ALCMs in ALCM bombers normally requires the displacement of a significant, and sometimes larger, number of gravity bombs and Short Range Attack Missiles and are “slow flyers” anyway. Nevertheless, the Soviet propose that Bears be counted at 6 ALCMs (U.S. estimate is 6 internal for a total of 18 AS–15s or a total of 14 if AS-X-19s are carried externally) and that the Blackjack be counted as 12 (its current internal carriage capability). Our next step on ALCM should be to pick up on this “differentiation” among ALCM carriers and propose that Bears and B–52s be attributed with 6 to 8 ALCMs and that the Blackjacks and B–1Bs (if and when they are deployed with ALCMs) would be attributed with 10 to 12 ALCMs. We should submit this in a package which includes a strong position on ALCM range, ALCM armament, and conventional bombers.

Finally, some have suggested that we will be unable to conclude a START treaty that meets our standard of “effective” verification if we permit mobile ICBMs or take certain positions on bombers or ALCMs. I personally believe that we can sell the START treaty with our current definition of “effective verification.” A relatively straightforward work program can prepare the way. We must acknowledge, of course, that no verification regime can be perfect, but, if we appear to lower our standards in order to sell START, we will dig ourselves into a political hole on ratification from which we may not recover. (S/NF)

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard A. Davis Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF1590–007, START Initiatives. Secret. Kantor sent the draft to Gordon and Davis and wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “This is a non-paper that Ron Lehman left with Brent yesterday. Please treat as close hold.—Arnie.”
2. Davis underlined “MIRved mobiles” and “would also count against the 1540,” drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin beside the portion of this sentence that begins with “assured, the sides” and ends with “the 1540 ceiling on,” and wrote: “hardly compelling.”
3. Davis drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.