Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

4. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 23, 1988, 8–9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Vice President Bush
  • Secretary Shultz
  • Dr. Zarechnak, interpreter

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Amb. Bessmertmykh
  • P. Palaznchenko

The Vice President began the conversation by telling Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that he appreciated his coming to see him in spite of his busy schedule. Secretary Shultz was the expert on all of the issues which were being discussed with the Foreign Minister, so the Vice President wished to make a few remarks from the heart about U.S. policy and its future, without dwelling in detail on the issues which were being covered between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister.

The Vice President indicated that he did not want to use this meeting for political purposes, or to say, directly or indirectly, that it would affect the political race. Perhaps at the end of the meeting they could discuss what they would say to the press. But first, he wished to give the Foreign Minister equal time.

Shevardnadze said that he first of all wished to express best wishes from General Secretary Gorbachev. Just recently Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz had spoken about the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations and had noted that during the past three or three and a half years a unique relationship had developed compared to what it had been in the past.

Shevardnadze continued that he agreed with the Vice President that they ought not to go into specific issues, specially in view of the fact that the Vice President had already participated in the establishment of the new directions and the new atmosphere of U.S.- Soviet relations and of the international political climate as a whole.

The Vice President noted that he would like very much to ask Shevardnadze to convey to General Secretary Gorbachev and to others his convictions that the U.S.- Soviet relationship was on a sound basis and moving in right direction, and that if he were elected President, he would continue the relationship on the basis of the four pillars that the Foreign Minister and Secretary Shultz had established, as well as another area that the Vice President felt strongly about in which progress could be made if he won the election. This was an area in which the Vice President knew that the Soviet side was also interested, i.e. chemical and biological weapons. He recalled the ghastly sight of a mother protecting her child in the Iran-Iraq war from an invisible and deadly gas. This must have affected people in the Soviet Union and it certainly affected people in the United States.

The Vice President continued that this issue involved difficult verification problems. It concerned not just the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but many other countries. If he won the election he would work very hard to do more about this issue. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should lead other countries in the elimination of this barbaric weapon.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet side had been watching the election campaign and the Vice President’s statements, and the U.S. side had probably been watching the Soviet Union as well (the Vice President agreed). Judging from the Vice President’s statements Shevardnadze said that one could hope that the political level of cooperation which has existed between our countries for the past several years would be continued. The main thing was that the relationship had become less ideological. There was a tendency to seek a balance of interest between our two countries as well with other countries. We had gone from confrontation to cooperation, from competition to mutual understanding, and this was more difficult. A very important stage had been reached. This was the overall situation.

Shevardnadze continued that the Soviet side hoped that the Vice President would try to conclude the treaty on 50% reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet side was glad to hear about the Vice President’s approach to conventional arms. This was a very important issue. Shevardnadze said that if he was not mistaken, the Vice President had said that conventional arms should be put on the same level of importance as strategic weapons. He also said that he was aware of the Vice President’s stance on chemical weapons, and that the Vice President had said that the world should be freed of this terrible thing. He was also familiar with the Vice President’s statement at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.²

Shevardnadze continued that he was aware of the Vice President’s stance on human rights and regional issues, so that he felt that there was a base on which to think and build plans for the future on the basis of the experience of the past. He wished to stress the importance of the Vice President’s personal participation in the policies of the current U.S. administration. The Soviet side was in favor of a continuation of this policy without interruption and in favor of making it a dynamic one in all areas.

The Vice President thanked the Foreign Minister for his words and said that he and Secretary Shultz had just been recalling their first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev when the latter had just become General Secretary. There has been a heated discussion about one of the areas that had subsequently become one of the pillars of our relationship, i.e. human rights. He and the Secretary of State saw that the General Secretary was clear in what he said about the subject. He knew where he stood, and that was good. But it was at that meeting that the General Secretary proposed that both sides get to work on this issue and start looking at each other’s records on this. This is a difficult area, but a lot of progress has been made on it, and the Vice President would like to build on that progress.

The Vice President continued that he was aware of the progress which had been made in the area of arms control. He wished that the Foreign Minister could have been with him in East Texas the other day. Ambassador Bessnertnykh had probably told the Foreign Minister that East Texas was a very conservative part of the country. It was rural America. Historically, the people there had been very cautious about foreign affairs (Shevardnadze interjected that Bessmertnykh had told him about Texas, but not that it was conservative). There there had been a symbolic ceremony of missiles being destroyed, as the Foreign Minister was aware. The Vice President was interested in seeing the reaction of the people of East Texas—not the bigshots, but the ordinary people. He was interested in how the local newspaper would depict this historical event and how the mayor, the county commissioners and the policemen would react. The reaction was a positive one. The local newspaper welcomed the Soviets as friends and approved of the agreement which had been worked out between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State and between the General Secretary and the President. It had been interesting to see what people at the grass roots were saying.

The Vice President continued that people were still wondering how far the changes in the Soviet Union would go, and some historical differences still persisted at the grass roots level, but a big change had occurred. Among the sophisticated political right there was a feeling that we could no longer return to the standoff stance vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. that had existed before, and the Vice President shared this conviction. Some right-wingers were critical of this, but it was not so at the grass roots.

Shevardnadze replied that it was good, as the Vice President had said, that we had begun to destroy the weapons of destruction. This was, without exaggeration, a new stage of civilization, and it was the fruit of the cooperation between our countries and was an event of international significance. He wished to stress the special role of the Secretary of State in this unique cooperation between the two countries.

Shevardnadze continued that with respect to the processes which were now taking place in the United States and in the Soviet Union, account should be taken of the special characteristics and values of each system and differences between them, and that the two sides were learning to do that. The Soviet Union understands that the U.S. wants to be strong, and the Soviet Union also wants to be strong—economically and in other ways. This is in the interest of all nations. The main thing is how we use our potential, and in this regard the events of the previous years were hopeful signs.

The Vice President said that he wished to say something and hoped that it would not sound self-centered. When President Nixon went to China, politically he could do that, whereas it would not have been possible for a liberal president to do it. President Reagan could take the steps which were necessary on our side to get a good arms control agreement, whereas it was not certain that a continuation of the Carter presidency could have achieved that aim politically. With the coming of glasnost and perestroika the lines had become more blurred, but there was still a greater desire on the part of the American people to continue on the course which the Foreign Minister and Secretary Shultz had said.

The Vice President said that, in comparing himself with his opponent, the American people still had the “Missouri” attitude, i.e. “show me”, that is, if he were to win the election, he would have a better chance than his opponent to get the support of the Senate, the House and the American people for an agreement with the Soviet Union. He firmly believed this, although the lines had become less clear than they were when President Nixon went to China or President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev.

Secretary Shultz interjected that the image which struck him in this regard was the picture of President Reagan at Moscow University, standing alone on the stage with a huge bust of Lenin in back of him.³

Shevardnadze replied that Secretary Shultz would recall how they had compared the first Summit meeting in Geneva⁴ with the one which had taken place in Moscow.⁵ In Geneva there was a lot of suspicion, distrust and caution. In Moscow and in Washington⁶ it had been completely different. This was possible because of the real steps which had been taken. If such big steps had not been taken no change in the relationship would have occurred. So the Soviet Union believed that if Vice President Bush were elected President, contacts between the two countries would continue and acquire new dimensions. But he added that he did not have the right to vote in the U.S. elections.

The Vice President wished to add one more observation to what he had said. Politically and philosophically there was no credible room to the right of President Reagan at present. Although the Vice President was identified as a believer in the Reagan program, there was some political room to the right of the Vice President, although this could change if he were to win the election by a large margin. His point was that he would need to demonstrate to the American people that any agreement between the two countries was a sound one from the American point of view. Any president would need to do this, but he would need to work at it with respect to people whom it would be a snap for President Reagan to bring along.

The Vice President continued that it would be easier for him to get the support of the American people in such a case, due to the continuity of policy, than for his opponent, who had no political standing. If his opponent won the election, he would be the president and would have everyone’s support. But at the moment he does not have the support of the political middle, much less the right. As we say in the U.S., he and his advisers are coming out of left field.

Shevardnadze said that perhaps this was his personal belief, but he was convinced that a big change had occurred recently in Soviet and American society. He hoped that the American people were convinced that it was in the U.S. interest to have a stable relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Vice President confirmed this.

Secretary Shultz said he wished to say something in support of what the Vice President had said. At the moment the two sides were working on the details of the 50% reduction of strategic weapons. Just the other day they had talked about ALCMs, verification of mobile missiles, some aspects of the ABM Treaty and SLCMs. All of these were hard issues. It remained to be seen if the two sides could conclude this agreement (and he thought that one should never say never) but the probability of this was not very great (Shevardnadze agreed).

Secretary Shultz continued that the more of these difficult details could be worked out to pass on to Mr. Bush with President Reagan’s approval, the better he would be able to pass this on to the Senate and say that he agreed with President Reagan’s decisions and added some of his own in order to complete the agreement. It would be advantageous to have such a joint Bush/Reagan structure. The two countries should not do this if they were not ready but if they could nail things down it would be an advantage.

The Vice President agreed with this and added that the two basic elements of his policy would be continuity and no surprises.

Shevardnadze replied that the Soviet side was convinced of this. They had analyzed the Vice President’s statements and programs. There were elements with which the Soviet side could not agree, but they realized that the campaign creates a special kind of situation. But the basic direction of which the Vice President had spoken would be a good base for cooperation between the two countries. He had no doubt that on this basis and on the basis of the experience which had been gained, the Soviet side could work well with President Bush.

The Vice President said that he was smiling because he was recalling that when he was in China in 1974 a statement was made by the Chinese which caused him a lot of concern since it was very negative with regard to the U.S. He had gone to the Foreign Minister (who was subsequently dropped after Mao’s departure) to complain about the statement. The Chinese Foreign Minister replied, quoting Mao, that these were “empty cannons rhetoric”. The Vice President told Shevardnadze that they had known each other for a long time, and it was not that people would say things that they did not believe in, but that sometimes they would stress certain things, and that there were elements of the rhetorical cannons.

Shevardnadze replied that in the present campaign there was less anti-Soviet rhetoric than in previous ones. There was a new feeling, a new content. The Soviet side had noticed that in his statements the Vice President had taken a responsible stance with regard to Soviet-American relations.

The Vice President replied that this was the pulse of East Texas. The election campaign had been criticized for not dealing with substantive issues but this was (was there a Georgian word for it?) “bullshit”. But the American people want continuity. And continuity and no surprises were the Bush policy now and if he won the election.

Secretary Shultz said that the Vice President probably needed to return to his campaign work, and the time for their meeting had expired, but he wanted to make a suggestion. In reply to the reporters’ questions after the meeting, they might say that the meeting had gone well, that they had known each other before and had renewed their acquaintance, and had had a good review of questions of interest to both sides. The Vice President might also stress his concern about chemical weapons.

Shevardnadze joked that perhaps he might say that the Vice President had spoken from a position of strength.

The Vice President replied that he would have to think about whether he would like that or not. He added that, knowing the reporters that were stationed outside, he presumed that they would ask Shevardnadze questions dealing with the political situation in the U.S. If it were okay, he would prefer to go with what Secretary Shultz had said.

Shevardnadze replied that he would say that they had had an in-depth discussion, and that this had not been their first meeting.

Secretary Shultz interjected that this would have advantage of being true.

Shevardnadze added that he would say that the Vice President had indicated that he would continue to develop the level of cooperation which had been achieved between the two countries.

The Vice President wished to add one more “technical detail”. This meeting had been exactly the type of meeting which he had hoped to have. The Foreign Minister should know that the notes about the meeting would be passed on only to Secretary Shultz and the Vice President, and not enter the bureaucracy, although no secrets were discussed. It ought not to be viewed that the Foreign Minister was looking over the horizon at the future American political structure. And the Vice President would treat this in the same way, and for this reason he was glad that the breakfast had been so limited in composition. He did not want it to be seen as an element in his political campaign. The joint work being carried out between the two countries was too important for that.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, FAIM/IS Records, Lot 89D250, Miscellaneous Papers of George Shultz and Charles Hill, Personnel Sensitive ’86. Secret. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place in the Vice President’s Residence. For the memoranda of conversation of Shevardnadze’s September 22–23 meetings with Shultz and Reagan, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 170–177.
2. For Bush’s April 18, 1984, speech before the Conference on Disarmament, in which he presented a draft treaty on chemical weapons, see Department of State Bulletin, June 1984, pp. 40–43.
3. See Reagan, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the Students and Faculty at Moscow State University,” May 31, 1988. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1988, Book I, pp. 683-692)
4. For the memoranda of conversations from Reagan and Shultz’s meetings with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in Geneva, November 19–20, 1985, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 150–159.
5. For the memoranda of conversations from Reagan and Shultz’s meetings with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in Moscow, May 29–June 1, 1988, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 156–163.
6. For the memoranda of conversations from Reagan and Shultz’s meetings with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in Washington, December 8–10, 1987, see Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 107–115.