Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

35. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

5317.

Geneva, June 22, 1989, 0823Z

SUBJECT

• START: U.S. START Statement for Joint Plenary, June 21, 1989

1. This is NST/START-XI-001. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Following is the text of the statement that the U.S. side presented at the joint plenary meeting on June 21, 1989:

3. Begin Text:

Statement by Ambassador Richard Burt at a Joint Plenary Session Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Geneva, Switzerland, June 21, 1989

Mr. Ambassador:

I

Today marks the first joint plenary session of the eleventh round of the negotiations on nuclear and space arms since their inception in March 1985. The United States has returned to these talks with President Bush’s firm pledge that “we will work vigorously to achieve fair and far-reaching agreements that strengthen peace. Nothing has higher priority.” We have also returned with a well qualified and experienced team prepared to undertake serious and constructive negotiations. Ambassador Henry Cooper and I will serve as the chief negotiators of the defense and space and START negotiating groups, respectively. Mr. Linton Brooks will serve as my NST Deputy Head of Delegation, Mr. James Medas as the deputy START negotiator and Mr. William Courtney as the Deputy Defense and Space Negotiator.

II

The United States views arms control as a key component of its security policy which can reduce the risk of war; promote greater stability and predictability between the sides; and constrain, reduce, or eliminate specific established and emerging threats. The U.S. approach to achieving these goals will focus on practical, sustainable steps that are designed to build confidence and increase stability and security for both sides. The United States will avoid sweeping proposals designed more for their public relations impact than for their practicality. Not only have such proposals not led to progress in the past, but they undermine the mutual confidence necessary for progress.

The United States will measure the value of strategic arms control agreements on the basis of six fundamental principles that provide a sound foundation for concluding agreements that will reduce the risk of nuclear war and enhance strategic stability:

— Stability, which lessens and eliminates incentives, even in a crisis, to launch a nuclear strike or to use military power to achieve national objectives. In as much as reductions should be carefully structured to enhance stability, arms control should promote an evolution of forces that will lead toward a more stable and less threatening U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship;

— Equality, which requires that agreements must assure equal rights and impose equal limits on the parties;

— Predictability, which enhances stability by providing for more transparency in the size, nature, and evolution of each other’s forces;

— Verification, so that both sides know with confidence that agreements are being complied with;

— Compliance, which ensures the continuing value of arms control obligations and the entire arms control process; and

— Allied security, which precludes a separation of U.S. security interests from those of our allies and precludes bilateral agreements that could compromise the security of our allies.

III

Mr. Ambassador, in the months since the President’s inauguration, the administration has conducted a comprehensive review of American security and arms control policies based in part on the principles that I just outlined. As a result of this review, the President has concluded that the primary objective for strategic arms control is to achieve verifiable agreements that reduce the risk of nuclear war. The risk of nuclear war can be reduced by creating a more stable nuclear balance, in which deterrence is strengthened and the incentives perceived by either side, even in a crisis, to launch a nuclear strike are reduced and eliminated.

Strategic force reductions can enhance stability if they are properly applied. Based on the fundamental principles that I have just outlined, the United States will pursue in START reductions that would result in a genuine diminution of the risk of nuclear war. However, both sides should as well consider options to enhance stability through force restructuring and confidence-building measures that create greater openness.

The U.S. approach in START, complementing our own force structuring decisions, will ensure a stable nuclear balance by reducing the nature and scope of the threat posed to each side, thereby decreasing the vulnerability of our respective retaliatory forces to the threat that remains, and by lowering uncertainties in the evolution of forces between the sides. Vulnerability can be reduced by focusing reductions on the most threatening systems, especially highly-MIRVed, increasingly accurate heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles, by curbing specific emerging and currently deployed threats, and by taking other steps to ensure the survivability of retaliatory forces. Conversely, a START treaty should permit each side to retain adequate retaliatory capability, particularly those systems less suitable for conducting a first strike or short-warning attack.

To ensure that improvements in force survivability remain valid over the long term, they must be balanced with the requirement that the size and nature of current and evolving strategic forces be transparent and predictable to the other side, and that agreements be effectively verifiable. Mobile ICBMs provide a case in point: the same aspect of mobile ICBMs that makes them more survivable also complicates effective verification. The U.S. position on mobile ICBMs remains unchanged for now: unless we can devise and reach agreement on a regime that would provide for effective verification of numerical limits on such systems, mobile launchers of ICBMs must be banned under a START treaty. Otherwise, they would be a source of serious compliance concern. The U.S. remains prepared to continue our previous efforts to develop an effective verification regime for mobile ICBMs.

The negotiations to date have produced a joint draft treaty text that reflects the areas of agreement and disagreement between the sides. Reaffirming Secretary Baker’s commitment to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the U.S. side intends to proceed on the basis of the existing JDT. The United States is also pleased to reaffirm our continued acceptance of the structure of limits and sublimits that have already been agreed: L600 strategic offensive delivery systems; 6000 accountable warheads; 4900 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs; L540 warheads on L54 heavy ballistic missiles; and a reduction of approximately 50 percent in Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. The U.S. side will be prepared to address all issues on which agreement has not been reached as the negotiations proceed.

While we reaffirm our support of the basic agreed numerical limits in the JDT, we reserve the right to suggest new ideas and other changes that we believe would contribute to force survivability and stability. Furthermore, the United States believes that some of these measures could usefully be discussed with the objective of reaching agreements independent of the basic START treaty. Implementation of these measures would be useful in their own right, but also would contribute to our overall confidence that the ultimate START treaty will fulfill the principles that I have outlined.

Critical to determining whether START enhances our security and strategic stability is the issue of verification. As part of our overall negotiating effort, the United States will propose that the sides make a special effort to agree on, and to begin implementing as soon as possible, certain verification and stability measures that we believe will enhance verification of a START treaty and contribute to strategic stability. We propose to work out measures now to establish perimeter/portal monitoring of certain ICBM production facilities; to conduct, on a reciprocal basis a prompt exchange of data for the agreed categories of the MOU; to halt ballistic missile telemetry encryption and data denial; to demonstrate, on a reciprocal basis, procedures for ballistic missile RV inspection; to conduct a joint experiment to demonstrate the U.S. concept of unique identifiers for ballistic missiles and the Soviet concept for registration; to address the problem of short time of flight SLBMs; and to notify the other side of strategic exercises. We will provide additional detail on these measures at future meetings.

Early agreement and implementation of these measures will give both sides early practical experience in verification, which will speed resolution of outstanding issues, and give added momentum to the efforts of our two countries to conclude a START treaty. These measures do not represent a comprehensive verification regime, nor do we intend that they detract from the START negotiations or suggest preconditions for resolution of START issues. On the contrary, we believe that implementation of these measures would facilitate early agreement on START.

IV

In a moment, I will ask Ambassador Cooper to make some comments on defense and space issues. As in START, the fundamental U.S. objective in the defense and space negotiations is to reduce the risk of war by enhancing stability and predictability. The U.S. interest in the Strategic Defense Initiative, which complies fully with the ABM Treaty, is the result of our belief that advances in technology may present new opportunities for risk reduction based on strengthening deterrence through increased reliance on strategic defenses. In the defense and space negotiations, we want to encourage hard thinking about how a balance of offensive and defensive forces could lead to a more stable strategic relationship. We want to encourage serious discussion of how both countries might cooperate in moving toward a more stable balance that relies increasingly on effective strategic defenses, should they prove feasible. Further, we will preserve our options to deploy advanced defenses when they are ready.

V

Because stabilizing reductions are in the interests of both countries, the United States does not believe that completion of a START agreement should await resolution of defense and space issues. Since the ABM Treaty was signed and ratified in 1972, the magnitude and power of the nuclear threat has grown several fold. That is why we urge that the Soviet Union join with us in working toward the conclusion of a START treaty expeditiously without any preconditions.

Furthermore, I must remind you that the United States cannot conclude another strategic arms control agreement without resolution of the Krasnoyarsk radar violation. The United States considers the only appropriate resolution of this issue to be the dismantlement of the radar and the destruction of the transmitter and receiver buildings and their foundations in a manner observable by national technical means. To date, Soviet responses to this problem have been unsatisfactory and have failed to meet U.S. concerns. The United States is willing to consider other Soviet proposals provided our criteria are met.

VI

Mr. Ambassador, the American delegation has returned to Geneva prepared for constructive, business-like negotiations so that the sides may make serious progress toward effective treaties. The U.S. side envisions round eleven as an opportunity to reestablish the working relationships of our negotiating groups, and to reaffirm previous positions and to present some new ideas where appropriate, and to hear Soviet ideas. As Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have agreed, after seeing the lay of the land over the course of the next six weeks, the negotiations will recess to allow both sides sufficient time to analyze in our respective capitals the results of the dialogue during this round.

The conclusions of our strategic review and the history of negotiations on these issues have convinced the United States that the task ahead is large. Both delegations must be patient, serious and hard-working; we cannot be rushed by artificial deadlines. President Bush concurs fully with his predecessor that we seek good treaties, not quick treaties.

Much has been accomplished already, yet a great deal of work lies ahead. I believe that through serious, constructive negotiations we will be able to make significant progress. The United States is committed to building on our achievements thus far to reach agreements that fulfill our objectives of reducing the risk of war and enhancing security and stability. Thank you.

End text.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890534–0827. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.