Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

196267.

Washington, June 21, 1989, 0418Z

SUBJECT

• Letter to Gorbachev on Nuclear and Space Talks

1. S—Entire Text

2. Ambassador should deliver text of President’s letter to Gorbachev as soon as possible on June 21, either to Gorbachev himself (during CJCS Crowe’s meeting) or to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Signed original will follow via pouch.

3. Begin text:

June 20, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman

As we resume negotiations at the nuclear and space talks, I have been giving considerable thought to the challenges before us and would like to share my views with you. It is my hope that we can have frequent and personal exchanges between the two of us on this and other subjects, exchanges that will be as free as possible from ritualistic formulations. We bear enormous—and mutual—responsibility to take advantage of the promise of these extraordinary times to improve international security. Direct and substantive communication between us is essential in building the kind of relationship between our countries that I believe we both seek.

One of our most pressing concerns is to reduce the risk of war and the nuclear and space talks are an essential component of efforts to do so. Dedicated Soviet and American negotiators have worked painstakingly over the past few years to forge understandings and agreements on a number of issues. I was supportive of that process as Vice President and remain so today. As Secretary Baker noted when he met with you in May, while we reserve the right to make changes in our position and introduce new ideas, the United States believes that the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement.

It is imperative that we work in these negotiations to remove any incentive to attack first. Vulnerable systems with short time of flight are particularly troubling in this regard. We must also minimize the concentration of warheads on vulnerable systems, since they increase the incentives for attack.

You and I have both directed the modernization of our strategic forces in order to improve their survivability. But arms control gives us an opportunity, working together, to push the evolution of both arsenals toward more stable systems and to introduce predictability into military planning so that we can slow the pace of military competition. We must work to insure that the forces that remain after an agreement are survivable.

I am also concerned about the verification challenge before us. The introduction of mobile land-based systems has improved survivability but, at the same time, made verification extremely difficult. Traditional means of monitoring are insufficient and even with intrusive inspection, confidence in monitoring may not be high. This problem is exacerbated when mobile systems are MIRVed, because undetected missiles carry so many warheads. We need to cooperate more intensively and creatively to address this problem.

Toward this end, I believe that the two sides should try, as a part of our effort in START, to agree on and begin implementing as soon as possible some verification and stability measures drawn from proposals that both sides have advanced in START or in other contexts.

The measures we are proposing do not constitute a comprehensive verification regime and I understand that either side may choose to alter or augment them in the context of a final START agreement on the basis of experience gained. The objective is to reach agreement promptly in as many specific areas as possible so that we can set in place concrete verification measures and gain practical experience that will help the negotiations.

Specifically, the United States will propose:

(1) Immediate establishment of perimeter/portal monitoring of certain ICBM production facilities along the lines described in the U.S. START proposal.

(2) Prompt exchange of data. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R on a reciprocal basis would begin to exchange numbers for the agreed categories in the memorandum of understanding which are now blank. We can also begin to conduct familiarization visits to learn more about the forces, operations, practices and procedures that would be subject to inspections.

(3) Cessation of ballistic missile telemetry encryption and data denial.

(4) Ballistic missile reentry-vehicle inspection. Each side would demonstrate its reentry-vehicle inspection procedures on one of its missiles chosen by the other side.

(5) Demonstration of the U.S. concept for tagging ballistic missiles and the Soviet concept of registration in order to facilitate technical exchanges on promising approaches.

In addition, I believe that we can benefit by agreeing to two additional measures that, while not a part of the START treaty, would enhance strategic stability.

(1) Following on your suggestion to Secretary Baker, the United States is prepared to address the problem of short-time-of-flight (depressed trajectory) SLBMs.

(2) The United States suggests that the two countries implement the proposal to notify the largest strategic exercise each year that was discussed in an exchange of letters between then-Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Minister of Defense Yazov.

I am confident that if we can reach agreement and implement measures such as these, it would facilitate early agreement on the START treaty.

Finally, let me note that I remain committed to preserving U.S. options for development and deployment of strategic defenses when they are ready. We believe that defenses can enhance mutual security and stability, particularly when introduced at a measured pace and in a cooperative manner. Although I know you have disagreed with this view in the past, I hope that you will rethink your position and that we can continue to discuss the subject between the two of us. We need to narrow the conceptual gap that now divides us on this issue.

The United States will work hard to find creative approaches to address the problems outlined above. An agreement that contributes to a stable environment at the strategic nuclear level will enhance our joint security, that of our allies and of the international system as a whole. Personal communication between us will help bridge our differences.

Sincerely, With Respect,

George Bush

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow

End Text.

4. Embassy should note that “with respect” in signature block was written in by hand by the President.²

Baker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash, Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to NST Geneva. Drafted by Vershbow upon text from the White House; cleared by Timbie, Kamman, and Sittman, and in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Thomas.
2. In telegram 16627 from Moscow, June 21, the Embassy transmitted a report on Crowe’s meeting with Gorbachev at the Kremlin. The report closed: “The Ambassador delivered the President’s letter of June 20, 1989, to Gorbachev. Gorbachev promised careful study and a reply in due course and ended the meeting with a reiteration of his pleasure that Crowe had visited the Soviet Union and his hope that U.S.-Soviet relations would continue to develop ‘on a realistic basis.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890532–0880)