Office of the Historian

30. Summary of Conclusions for a Meeting of the Deputies Committee1

Washington, June 9, 1989, 10–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Mobile ICBMs (S)

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Vice President’s Office

    • Carnes Lord

  • State:

    • Reginald Bartholomew
    • Edward Rowny
    • Roger Harrison
    • Linton Brooks

  • Defense:

    • Donald Atwood
    • Stephen Hadley

  • Energy:

    • John Tuck
    • Victor Alessi

  • OMB:

    • William Diefenderfer
    • Frank Hodsoll

  • CIA:

    • Richard Kerr
    • Douglas MacEachin

  • JCS:

    • John Baldwin
    • Thomas Fox

  • ACDA:

    • George Murphy
    • William Fite

  • White House:

    • Robert Gates

  • NSC:

    • Arnold Kanter
    • Richard Davis

Summary of Conclusions

All agencies approved the interagency papers on Mobile ICBMs and Mobile ICBM Verification as adequate bases for decision. Richard Kerr expressed concern that the discussion in the papers tended to overemphasize the need to protect operational flexibility and did not give comparable weight to verification arguments. William Diefenderfer cautioned that we should be prudent in projecting what ICBM programs Congress will fund. (S)

Concerning mobile ICBM programs, Donald Atwood suggested that our two programs comprise a massive investment, that we need Congressional agreement before we can lift our ban in START. The problem is that we will have to commit money in the future, but there is no continuity in our political commitment to mobiles. (S)

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Reginald Bartholomew stated that the central problem is the destabilizing character of vulnerable, fixed ICBMs with their hard target capability. We have made a strategic commitment to improve stability in terms of the two mobile ICBM programs we have proposed on the Hill. We have a serious conceptual problem if our arms control position forces the Soviet ICBMs to remain in fixed silos. (S)

Robert Gates suggested that a question for the NSC is whether our mobile ban in START is doing a disservice to our programs on the Hill. Our hedge against Congressional uncertainty looks like a tactical matter, not like strategy. Should we go to the Congress and the Soviets now with a plan to permit mobiles? (S)

William Diefenderfer reminded that verification costs will be massive and, unless we take steps to separate them from the DOD budget, they will be traded off against hardware programs. (S)

On mobile verification, Robert Gates commented that even if we had a blank check, there are still several elements of START that cannot be monitored. No level of money will give us the verification certainty that the Hill has demanded. The tradeoff between the strategic value of mobiles and their verification problems needs to be presented frankly to principals. (S)

Reginald Bartholomew asked if Gates were talking about a different verification concept from the traditional concept of a militarily significant threshold above which we would have the ability to discover cheating in time to respond. Gates explained that because of our problems in producing military risk assessments, many are now insisting that we have the capability to detect any violation. We should try to return to the former standard. (S)

Douglas MacEachin said that a major problem is keeping track of non-deployed missiles. A possible answer is to have a data exchange now, so we can build needed confidence by the time we are ready to sign an agreement. (S)

  1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSC/DC Meetings Files, OA/ID 90010–012, NSC/DC 033—June 9, 1989—NSC/DC Meeting on NSR-14 re: U.S. START Position on Mobile ICBMs, Mobile ICBM Verification and New Initiatives. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room.↩