Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

244. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

8824.

Geneva, August 9, 1991, 1629Z

SUBJECT

• START: Conversations in Moscow

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-544. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: July 30–31, 1991
Time: Various
Place: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow; Gorbachev Dacha, Novo-Ogarevo; St. Vladimir’s Hall, Kremlin

3. Participants:

U.S.	USSR
Amb. L.F. Brooks	Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin
Mr. T.R. Sample	Gen-Maj. A.S. Peresypkin
ACDA Gen Coun T. Graham	Mr. B.R. Ivanov
Asst Legal Adv R. Dalton	Mr. I.I. Yakovlev
Mr. M.L. Brown	Mr. Eh. Sviridov
Ms. J.R. Zdravecky	Ms. A.V. Molokoyedova
Ms. C.S. Scott	Mr. (UNK) Boyarshchinnov
Ms. E.B. Sutter	Mr. N.N. Sokov
Ms. A. Herr

4. This cable reports significant START conversations during the July 1991 Moscow summit. Four separate encounters are reported:

(A) Initialling and exchange of letters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 a.m.–11 a.m., July 31.

(B) Conversations incident to the signing of all documents other than the treaty itself. These conversations took place at Gorbachev’s Dacha at Novo-Ogarevo, 12:30 p.m.–2:30 p.m., July 31.

(C) Conversations on the margins of the public signing ceremony 3 p.m.–4 p.m., July 31 in the Kremlin.

(D) Followup conversations between legal advisors, 6:00 p.m.–11:30 p.m., August 1, at the Ministry of Foreign affairs.

Signing, Letter Exchange and Photo Exchange: Last Walkback in Moscow

5. Brooks, Sample, Brown, Scott, and Zdravecky met with various Soviet representatives at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on the morning of July 31. Brooks and Nazarkin completed initialling of the treaty, the agreed statements annex, the definitions annex, and the memorandum of understanding (less annexes). Time did not permit initialling of the inspection protocol or its annexes. By prior agreement, no attempt was made to initial the various side agreements.

6. Brooks and Nazarkin reviewed the contents of the seven letters scheduled to be signed and exchanged by the heads of delegation. These letters had been planned for signature in Geneva, but were not fully conformed before the departure of the Soviet delegation. Nazarkin informed Brooks that Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh had signed a letter, dated July 30, stating that the Soviet letter on the phasing of heavy reductions of the same date was legally binding. Based on this, Brooks and Nazarkin agreed that the letters on the phasing of heavy reductions would be dated July 30, while all other letters would be dated July 31.

7. Nazarkin then vanished, taking the texts of all letters with him. Shortly thereafter, Nazarkin called Brooks from another office in the Foreign Ministry. Noting that General Peresypkin was with him, Nazarkin claimed that there was a problem with the letter on the Bear-D maritime patrol airplane. Peresypkin asserted that the Soviet side had never agreed that if production of Bear-D resumed, any future Bear-D airplanes would be treated as former heavy bombers. Nazarkin said that he and Peresypkin would meet with Brooks shortly.

8. Once Nazarkin and Peresypkin arrived, Brooks explained the logic of the various documents. The TU–95 was listed as an existing type of heavy bomber. Some TU–95’s were now treated as former heavy bombers. The Soviet side had sought, and the U.S. side had agreed to, an exception for 37 TU–95RTs (Bear D) which would not be considered as either heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. An agreed statement made it clear that this exemption was limited to the existing 37 airplanes. Thus, any further construction of TU–95RTs (Bear-D) would be treated as former heavy bombers.

9. Peresypkin asserted that this provision was a U.S. proposal. Brooks noted that (a) the proposal had been in the U.S. draft given the Soviet side in March, (b) the specific language had appeared in the Soviet text handed over in Geneva on July 29, and (c) the Soviet side had never raised this point previously. Peresypkin said that there would be future construction of maritime aircraft in the Soviet Union which were not of the TU–95RTs design. These aircraft could not be considered former heavy bombers. Brooks said that the letter on the TU–95RTs covered only that specific airplane and none other. Peresypkin said he was satisfied. Brooks and Nazarkin then signed and exchanged the letters, including the commitment that future TU–95RTs airplanes would be treated as former heavy bombers.

10. Brooks then sought to exchange photographs. Nazarkin said that he was prepared to exchange those photographs slated for exchange on the date of signature. Photographs slated for exchange prior to signature had been sent to Geneva, packed with the delegation records, and could not yet be located. Brooks and Nazarkin agreed they would exchange these photographs at the signing ceremony.

11. Nazarkin then summoned an unidentified army colonel who handed over the Soviet photographs specified for exchange on the date of signature. Brooks handed over the comparable U.S. photographs. Brooks and Nazarkin each verified that all required photographs were present, based on the letters they had just signed.

12. Nazarkin said he wished to raise one issue concerning the SLCM declarations. The format of the SLCM declarations included a series of statements “for the year beginning (blank), the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America will not exceed (blank).” Nazarkin noted that the sides had agreed that numbers would not be inserted in these blanks until entry into force. Nazarkin asked if the declarations handed over that day would include the blank formats for exchanging numbers. Brooks said he was indifferent. Nazarkin noted that the Soviet declarations referred to the year ending 1990. It would thus be silly to exchange that page of the declaration. Brooks and Nazarkin then agreed that the declarations would be exchanged without the accompanying formats.

13. Brooks then provided Nazarkin with the English original of the December 1990 letter on ALCMs with multiple warheads. Noting that the original had never been handed over, Brooks said he was providing it for the Soviet files. Nazarkin thanked Brooks for the copy.

Signing at Novo-Ogarevo: But for a Babushka . . .

14. The signing of the START protocols and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had been moved, by agreement between the sides on the previous day, from the Kremlin in the mid-afternoon to Gorbachev’s Dacha at Novo-Ogarevo in the early afternoon. Brown, Dalton, and Sutter, accompanied by Chief MFA Legal Advisor Yakovlev and Deputy Chief Sviridov, were scheduled to head to the Dacha at 11:00 a.m. in two MFA Black Volga Limousines for the signing of all the START documents except the treaty, the signing of all START-associated separate agreements, and the exchange of related declarations and letters. All this signing and exchanging was to occur during a scheduled break in the presidents’ talks at the Dacha.

15. Departure of the group for the Dacha was held up for approximately one hour due to last minute problems with the English “alternat” of the agreement on geographic coordinates, uncovered by Brezhnev look-alike Boyarshchinnov at 9:00 a.m. while both sides were still at the MFA. As the time approached 12:00 and the “alternat” had still not arrived from the U.S. Embassy, the Soviet lawyers became increasingly agitated.

16. As soon as the “alternat” arrived at the MFA, the two groups were quickly shuttled out past increasingly less populated areas outside the Moscow ring road, passing at regular intervals militia guards standing alongside of the road. As the road narrowed and the guards became more frequent, the Volga turned sharply off the highway onto an unmarked and unpaved one-lane country road. About five minutes after making that turn, the lead Volga, in which Brown, Dalton, and Sutter were situated, slowed down as a Babushka approached along the left side of the road, clutching a jar half full of raspberries. The driver leaned out and asked whether he was on the correct road to Gorbachev’s Dacha. The Babushka, pointing back through the woods to the highway from which the two Volgas had turned, motioned that the Volgas had gone a crossroad too far. The Volgas were promptly put into reverse for the return trip to the highway, and the Dacha was found shortly afterwards.

17. Once at the Dacha, the sides waited for about forty-five minutes for the presidents to break, and the signing of the six START protocols and the memorandum of understanding was accomplished in short order. The only event of note was that each of the presidents initially missed signing one of the protocols, due to the large number of signatures required in one of the three treaty binders and the small number of pages for several of the protocols. The omissions were quickly noted by Brown and rectified. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister signed the three separate agreements (early exchange of lists, early exhibitions, and geographic coordinates), signed and exchanged the letters on third-country basing, and initialled the SLCM declarations. Bessmertnykh handed over a letter on the legally binding nature of the phased reduction of heavy ICBMs exchange of letters and initialled the backfire declaration.

Holding the Protocols “Open” for Technical Changes

18. During one of the breaks at Novo-Ogarevo, Brown and Dalton asked Yakovlev about the requirements for “sealing” the START treaty documents. Yakovlev responded that the sealing of the treaty proper would have to be done on August 1 at the MFA, showing absolutely no flexibility on that point. Pressed by Brown, Yakovlev stated that the protocols and MOU could be sealed at a later time, to allow for final checking of references and other conforming changes, allowing that this was perfectly reasonable and would in fact be done by the Soviet side. The sides agreed that four weeks would be a sufficient amount of time to hold these other documents open to permit such technical changes to be made, and that the exchange of replacement pages and sealing could be done through diplomatic channels.

Photo Exchange at the Signing Ceremony

19. As the delegations were filing in for the signing ceremony, Brooks sought out Nazarkin and raised the question of the exchange of photographs specified for exchange before signature (emplacement equipment, B–1 support equipment, launch associated support vehicles, driver training vehicles.). Nazarkin said he had located the photographs. The two then exchanged the necessary photographs.

Conforming and Classification Problems After the Fact

20. Brown was contacted by the MFA, through U.S. Embassy officials, on August 1 to discuss several matters that had emerged since the signing of the treaty on the previous day. Brown telephoned Boyarshchinnov at the MFA, who stated that there were still problems with the English “alternat” of the geographic coordinates agreement, and that the Soviet side was insisting on making that agreement “confidential”, and having both originals and both alternats marked “confidential” before any of the copies left Moscow. Further, Brown learned from Herr that, earlier in the day, Sokov had provided replacement pages in Russian, for the “alternat” on U.S. treaty paper, for about ten mistakes in references that occurred in Russian only; Sokov separately identified two probable mistakes in references in the English text. Brown set up an appointment to meet with Boyarshchinnov and Sokov in the early evening.

21. Arriving at “Gastromid” (the branch of the MFA that is situated above a “Gastronome” about a block from the central MFA building, and the home of the MFA legal advisors) around 8:30 p.m., Brown and Herr met with Boyarshchinnov, Sviridov, Molokoyedova, and Sokov for about two hours. Boyarshchinnov again complained about the faulty English “alternat” of the geographic coordinates agreement; Brown responded that he would either spend an extra day in Moscow to finish it or would finish it in Geneva and provide it to NST Executive Director Zharkov, who was leaving from Geneva for Moscow on August 3. The latter approach was eventually agreed upon. (Comment: The corrected “alternat” was handed to Zharkov on August 2 in Geneva. End comment)

22. The sides then engaged in a long discussion of the requirement of the U.S. side to classify the original English and Russian “alternat” prior to the departure of the U.S. treaty binder containing that agreement from Moscow. Sviridov, Molokoyedova and Boyarshchinnov stated that the only way that the sides could be certain that the agreement would be kept “confidential” was to classify it. In the Russian text (both Soviet original and U.S. “alternat”), they asserted, the word “confidential”, in Russian, should be typed in the upper right hand corner of the first page; they pressed for a similar marking in the U.S. original English and Soviet “alternat”. Brown, gaining some support from Sokov, responded that the U.S. side had assumed an obligation not to disclose this information to the public, and that it was up to the U.S. to determine how such information would be safeguarded. Sviridov, not persuaded, again requested that the U.S. side classify this document, to guarantee that it would not be inadvertently released once it reached Washington, and to comply with the terms of the agreement. Brown finally agreed to stamp the front page of the agreement “confidential”, and to permit the Soviet side to type “confidential,” in Russian, on the Russian “alternat.”

23. Sokov told Brown that he and Polyakov had gotten together earlier in the day to go through the signed inspection protocol, and their quick review had resulted in the proposed changes to references that had been provided by Sokov to U.S. embassy officials in the early afternoon. Brown noted that the U.S. side would be going through a similar process, and that it was likely that some additional conforming changes would have to be introduced. Sviridov, who was listening to this conversation, agreed that this was likely and acknowledged that this should not present any problems for either side, since it was in the interests of both to have a clean text.

24. As he was escorting Brown and Herr out of the MFA offices, Sokov (protect) took Brown aside, saying that he had something to say personally to Brown. He then made the following comments: Obukhov would be taking Karpov’s position in the MFA, but this should not necessarily be viewed as a positive factor by the U.S. side, since Karpov was willing to stand up to the Soviet military, while Obukhov clearly would not stand up to the military. Sokov also alluded to his desire to leave the department, probably related to Karpov’s departure.

25. Documents Exchanged:
By Brooks and Nazarkin: Letters on: phased reduction of heavy ICBMs, Bear D, B–1, silo launch control centers, launch canisters, engineering site surveys, and providing photographs; the photographs themselves); U.S. letter of December 1990 on ALCMs with multiple warheads.
By foreign ministers: SLCM declarations; backfire declaration (Soviet only); letters on the legality of the heavy phasing agreement (Soviet only); letters on third country basing.
By Brown and Zharkov in Geneva: corrected English “alternat” of the geographic coordinates agreement.

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910763–0629. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Moscow and USNMR SHAPE.