Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

238. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

8336.

Geneva, July 26, 1991, 1659Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks-Nazarkin Coffee, July 22, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-441. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: July 22, 1991

– Time: 11:45 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

– Place: Relais de Chambesy Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

• Amb. L.F. Brooks Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin

4. Nazarkin said a signing on August 2 (which Brooks had proposed) was out of the question and that the treaty would be signed July 31. Nazarkin said that the treaty must therefore be finished in time for him to depart on July 29. Nazarkin proposed that all substantive issues be concluded by Wednesday, July 24, and that to this end the sides begin “non-stop” meetings at the head of delegational level.

5. Brooks said he could agree with the approach. The two then discussed specific subjects to be covered during the “non-stop” meetings.

6. Brooks expressed concern about the small number of people in the Soviet delegation working on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); Nazarkin said new experts had arrived and would be assigned to the MOU group.

7. Nazarkin said the Soviet side was prepared to solve the issue of former and retired types on the basis of the U.S. proposal with “some changes.” The Soviet side would be ready to provide its formal proposals soon.

8. Nazarkin said the Soviet side found the contents of a proposed U.S. unilateral statement on the throw-weight of the SS–N–23, which Brooks had provided the previous week,² “totally unacceptable.” General Ladygin insisted that the issue had been completely settled in Washington based on personal assurances of Secretary Baker. (Comment: Ladygin was wrong. While the U.S. side accepted Soviet throw-weight values, it did not discuss the characterization of the SS–N–23 as a type 1(B) missile under the throw-weight protocol. The Soviet side had earlier said that the U.S. side’s statement was acceptable, and even helpful. Nazarkin confirmed subsequently that it was the arrival of Ladygin which led to the change in the Soviet position. End Comment.)

9. Brooks and Nazarkin agreed that the SS–N–17 would be deleted from the list of existing types (since it would not exist at the time of treaty signature), but retained in the MOU (since it had existed in September 1990).

10. Brooks noted that a listing of letters to be exchanged between the sides prepared by Soviet legal advisor Kalinken had implied that the letter on the phasing of reductions of heavy ICBMs was not legally binding. Brooks asked for confirmation that the Soviet side continued to regard the exchange of letters on the reduction of heavy ICBMs as legally binding. Nazarkin said that the Soviet side did consider the letters legally binding. Nazarkin stressed that he could not, however, alter the texts to make the fact clear.

11. Brooks, drawing on prepared talking points which he then handed over,³ suggested that the negotiating record was confused with respect to the issue of what did and did not constitute force majeure. Rather than seek to clarify the record, the U.S. side proposed a voluntary notification when a party was unable to comply with the requirements of the treaty for any reason. Such a notification would not excuse the violation, unless the other party agreed, but could help explain the circumstances and mitigate any political consequences. Nazarkin said he would study the paper.

12. Brooks said that he wished to raise an issue that he would have raised with Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov had Obukhov come to Geneva. On the last night of the Washington ministerial, the Soviet side had, in the middle of the night, unexpectedly claimed that its January offer to exhibit all Bear D aircraft had to be paid for in hard currency and implemented before treaty signature. This was unacceptable.

13. Brooks then used the following talking points:

– The Soviet proposal on maritime Bears (dated 18 January) offered exhibitions. No mention was made of these exhibitions being before signature.

– The U.S. side drafted an agreed statement and formal letters of agreement on 7 March. No response was received from the Soviet side before the break.

– When queried in mid-June, the Soviet side asked for copies of the U.S. March 7 papers.

– During the week of 17 June, Colonel Shemyakin responded that the Soviet side accepted both the agreed statement and the letters, which were ready for conforming.

– At conforming, the Soviet side conformed the agreed statement, but not the letters. The page change on the agreed statement is dated 24 June.

– During Under Secretary Bartholomew’s visit, General-Major Peresypkin confirmed that the letters only needed conforming. This position was documented and agreed in the July 2 issues list.

– At 2300 on the last night of the Washington ministerial, General-Major Peresypkin said the words in the issues list that the “sides must conform language” had to be changed to “sides must agree on language.”

– At that point, General-Lieutenant Ladygin told the U.S. side that visits must occur “prior to signature” and gave the “price list” for the visits.

14. After handing over his talking points,⁴ Brooks asked Nazarkin what lay behind the change in the Soviet position. Nazarkin declined to be specific, but said with a smile that “General Peresypkin had major influence in this area.”

15. Brooks said he wished to raise a potentially serious problem. The year before, the sides had agreed on a solution to the problem of training silos which were less than full depth. The Soviet side had, however, never listed any such silos. Brooks then handed over a list⁵ of 57 such silos. Brooks noted that the failure to list these silos would cause political problems. On the other hand, Brooks continued, the U.S. side had concluded that the silos posed no threat. Thus, Brooks said, he proposed that the U.S. side drop its requirement that these silos be listed in return for Soviet acceptance of U.S. proposals on special purpose submarines. Nazarkin said he would discuss Brooks’ idea with his delegation.

16. Nazarkin said he wished to discuss issues in the inspection protocol and the MOU which the sides should cover at the meeting later that afternoon. Nazarkin then went through four inspection protocol issues, two of which had been solved several days before and the other two of which were minor linguistic issues. (Comment: Nazarkin was reading from prepared text, presumably prepared by Zaytsev. The fact that Zaytsev was unaware of the status of the protocol for which he is responsible is almost certainly directly related to the fact that substantial progress is being made in resolving inspection protocol issues. End Comment.)

17. Brooks noted that the U.S. side believed that the sides had a common understanding that if ICBMs or SLBMs of a type differed among themselves by three percent or more, different variants would be declared. Unfortunately, the language mandating this had inadvertently been dropped from several locations, each time in the belief that it was already covered somewhere else. The U.S. side was prepared to have this language in Annex J of the MOU, in the inspection protocol, in the definitions Annex, or in an agreed statement. The language needed to be somewhere, however. Brooks asked Nazarkin what the Soviet preference was. Nazarkin said he would return to the issue at a later time.

18. Documents exchanged: U.S. side: Additional shallow training silo launchers of ICBMs, talking points on maritime Bears, and talking points to present text on force majeure issue; Soviet side: IP Annex III, paragraph 13.⁶

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.
2. See Document 243.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. Not found.
6. Not found.