Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

223429.

Washington, July 9, 1991, 2132Z

SUBJECT

• Official-Informal

1. Secret—Entire Text

2. I talked to Karen Groomes last night, mostly about who is coming to help from the delegation and the other agencies. As you know, she keeps track of such things. I took the opportunity to ask her about the schedule. What she says JAB plans, and Ross has since confirmed this, is to meet with Bess 1-on-1 at 3:00 on Thursday.² On completion of that meeting, Baker and Bess would meet briefly with the larger group up on the 8th floor to tell them where the ministers left things and give them guidance. Then you and Moiseyev would take over for the rest of the day. Friday morning, you would report to Baker and Moiseyev would report to Bessmertnykh on what has been accomplished, and at 10:00 Friday Baker and Bess would get back together in a small group to tackle whatever is left to be done.

3. I told Ross that if this scenario is to have a prayer of success, the ministers will need to mix it up on the big three plus heavy bomber contingency operations at that first meeting. Ross agrees and he has since gotten JAB to agree to that. I have put together a first cut at points for that meeting, and they are at para 10 at the end of this cable. They are designed to make clear to Bess right off the bat what we need on data denial and HBCO, what we are prepared to offer on new types. And let Bess do the talking on downloading. That way, when we decide what our real position is on downloading Thursday night or Friday, we can do that in light of whatever Bess has to say on downloading, data denial, HBCO, and new types. I have proposed that once JAB has felt out what Bess has to work with in the 1-on-1 format, he bring in you and Moiseyev for the deal-making. Ross agrees, and points out correctly that Bess may have his own reasons for wanting Moiseyev in the room when the deal is cut. In any event, the plan is for you and Brooks and Moiseyev and Obukhov to be the “small group” that meets with the ministers at 10:00 on Friday to work out the remaining issues.

4. As I mentioned yesterday. Larry Gershwin, the NIO for strategic programs, came in this morning to talk about downloading. I wanted to see him because his estimates play a role in my suggestions on how to play downloading. [13 lines not declassified]

5. In talking to Larry it is sad to see how far from reality we have let the downloading issue get. From the point of view of a quite hard-nosed NIO, if the Sovs do what he thinks they will do he doesn’t think there will be much of a breakout risk at all. [2½ lines not declassified]
[4 lines not declassified] This week, we may want to exploit some of these ideas—e.g. allow downloading of 750 RVs but require that downloading of more than 2 RVs per missile be accomplished not by offloading RVs but by deploying a new variant, require that the new variant meet the 40 percent rule and not be tested with more than the downloaded RV number, no tests of the older variant after a certain point, etc. Arnie would have a hard time selling this to Brent, but it does correspond to reality. Incidentally, Gershwin was amazed when the Sovs went from 1250 to 750, and says he doesn’t see how they can deploy their force with only 750. He predicts the Sovs will resist going lower.

6. The crew from Geneva is planning to come back on the TWA flight from Paris. You may see them there.

7. The plan for Baker and Bess to meet at 3:00 Thursday and 10:00 Friday raises again the question of whether you should plan to meet with Moiseyev Thursday morning. I still recommend that we make no proposal for such a meeting, and let the ministers collide at 3:00. If the Sovs have something to say and ask for a meeting, we would agree. I have told everyone that you would plan to get the US team together before 3:00 on Thursday, time to be determined. (2:00 in the afternoon might work, but we can decide that later.)

8. Goebel asked for my thoughts on whether Powell should ask to see Moiseyev. We talked it over and left that question the same way—Powell would take no initiative, but would be receptive (and prepared to hit him with what we need on START) if Moiseyev asks to see him (as is likely).

9. Looking forward to seeing you again. Plan to get a good night’s sleep Wednesday night, you may not get much Thursday night.

10. Draft points for Baker/Bess 1-on-1:

○ We approach this as a serious and important meeting. The president suggested it as a way—the only way—to resolve the remaining START issues so we can schedule a summit for the end of July.

○ We assume from your agreement to hold this meeting that you approach it the same way and have come prepared to complete START.

○ We are both taking a risk. Just by setting up this meeting, we have created expectations. We knew that would happen, and were prepared to take that risk to get the treaty done. Now we need to make every effort to make this meeting a success.

○ Propose we proceed as follows:

— Want to address with you now four issues—data denial, a bomber issue, new types, and downloading.

— When we are finished with this session, we can meet with the larger group, report to them where we stand, and give them some guidance.

— Then for the rest of today Bartholomew and Moiseyev can take over. They can reserve some subjects to themselves, and delegate others to subgroups, an approach that worked well at the meetings last week in Geneva.

— If you have brought with you good responses to the proposals Bartholomew gave you last week in Geneva, many of the secondary issues could be brought to a quick conclusion.

— Tomorrow morning Reg would report to me and Gen. Moiseyev would report to you on where we stand.

— I propose that we meet again tomorrow morning at 10:00 in a small group. I will have Bartholomew and Brooks with me, and you would have Moiseyev and Obukhov. We would take up any issues that still remain. Let’s do everything we can to keep that list short.

○ We can set a good example for the others by doing our part on the 4 issues reserved for us.

Data Denial

○ What I need from you on data denial is your agreement to exchange telemetry tapes on a routine basis.

○ The data denial provisions have to be resolved now, not put off to subsequent negotiations after signature. So we will know—and be able to demonstrate to our legislatures—how we will verify the treaty.

○ We are encouraged by the statement in President Gorbachev’s letter that he shares our view of the importance of this issue, and the need for substantive and mutually acceptable solutions by the time of signature of the treaty.

○ The only way we can see to get the data denial provisions done so START can be signed this month is to agree to use exchange of telemetry tapes on a routine basis.

○ If you and I can agree on this one point, we can set aside our complex data denial proposal, and set aside your complex data denial proposal, and quickly work out a much simpler approach.

○ Amb. Obukhov asked for, and Amb. Bartholomew provided, a radical simplification of the US proposal showing how much of the complexity would fall away if we can agree to use tape exchange.

○ If we can go out and tell our experts that you and I have agreed on the principle of tape exchange on a routine basis, so they can get to work on treaty provisions, that would be the breakthrough we need to put us on track to sign START this month.

Heavy Bomber Contingency Operations

○ Most of the remaining bomber issues can be left to the experts. One cannot—heavy bomber contingency operations. It is a sensitive political issue you and I need to address.

○ As you know, B–52s carrying conventional weapons played a major role in restoring the independence of Kuwait.

○ It is absolutely essential to the US that START not inhibit our ability to use bombers in similar operations in the future, operations unrelated to the central strategic relationship between the US and the Soviet Union.

○ Inspections at airbases preparing for contingency operations could preclude such operations in the future. The purpose of inspections is to monitor compliance, not to observe sensitive operations.

○ Such operations are rare, and inspections of airfields are subject to a quota, so in practice the situation may never arise in which a side asks to conduct an inspection of an airfield which is engaged in a contingency operation. But we need to provide for this possibility.

○ Therefore, last December we proposed a very limited exemption from the inspection regime in order to allow heavy bombers to be used under special circumstances for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty.

○ Ever since, we have repeatedly adjusted our proposal to take into account Soviet concerns:

— Our proposal now includes timely information to the other side if a request for an inspection is made during such an operation.

— We have offered an extra inspection not counted against the quota if an inspection is cancelled because of a contingency operation.

— We made adjustments to take into account your concern that you don’t want any implication that the Soviet Union supports operations against third countries.

○ Last week during the Bartholomew/Obukhov talks, Amb. Brooks put forward a package that would resolve this and several other issues.

○ On Monday,³ after you agreed to this meeting at which we are to resolve all issues, your representatives in Geneva told Brooks that Moscow rejects any form of exemption for contingency operations.

○ Mr. Minister, there is not going to be a treaty if we can’t protect the US ability to conduct such operations, operations that are not nuclear, not directed against the Soviet Union, and not related to this treaty.

○ Where you have concerns and sensitivities, we we are prepared to take them into account. We have demonstrated that. But you can’t just say no. We need an exemption for heavy bomber contingency operations.

(If he suggests that provisions for operational dispersals be used:)

○ Those provisions are for major confrontations between the US and the Soviet Union. We should not pervert them for these lesser operations.

○ Operational dispersal provisions would cause a massive cessation of inspections. Should not use an axe when a scalpel will do.

(If he proposes the US make a unilateral statement:)

○ A unilateral statement can’t change the treaty’s inspection rights. We need something formal.

(If he raises reciprocity or costs:)

○ If there is a reciprocity problem here, we can add a provision that if we exempt airbases for such operations you could exempt the same number of airbases without actually conducting such operations.

○ We can add that if an inspection is cancelled, we will pay for the wasted trip.

New Types Definition

Agreed criteria:

— Number of stages

— Type of propellant (liquid or solid)

— 10% change in launch weight

— 10% change in length of the missile or the largest stage

— 5% change in diameter of the largest stage

Soviet position:

— 15% increase in throw weight combined with 5% change in length of the largest stage.

— No cap on increase in throw weight for existing types.

US position:

— At least 30% increase in throw weight combined with 5% change in length of the largest stage.

— 20% cap on increase in throw weight for existing types.

Flexibility to close:

— Can accept 22.5% increase in throw weight.

— Can accept same throw weight value (22.5) for the cap on increase in throw weight of existing missiles. (FYI: We don’t want the cap to be higher than 22.5)

Points to make:

○ The new types definition is important because we have one set of rules for existing missiles and another set for new types of missiles. We need a meaningful way to distinguish the two.

○ The exchange of letters between our presidents has brought us close on this.

○ We are prepared to go the rest of the way and settle this. This subject is closely connected with the subject we haven’t talked about yet—downloading. Assuming a resolution there, we can move to close new types:

— We can accept a throw weight number substantially lower than at least 30, as in the president’s letter.

— And we can agree to use the same number for the cap on the throw weight of existing missiles, something Obukhov raised with Reg in Geneva.

— We would need agreement on rigorous ways of measuring both the increase in throw weight and the change in length. That will need to be part of the package. Reg and the others can spell this out in more detail, but that will need to be nailed down.

○ This is a big move on our part, and involves real risks. It will make the treaty harder to verify, and harder to defend. We are only prepared to do this if we are at the end of the negotiations.

(In the context of resolution on downloading:)

○ We can close with 22.5 as the throw weight number in the new types definition, and the same number for the throw weight cap on existing types.

○ This solution is contingent on agreement on a rigorous way to measure and compare the throw weights of the new missile and its predecessor, and a rigorous way to measure and compare the length of the new missile and its predecessor. We don’t have an agreement on new types until these are settled; experts need to resolve them.

Downloading

Soviet position:

— Change attribution of the Soviet SS–N–18 from 7 to 3; US can download Minuteman III from 3 to 2 or 1 before entry into force.

— In addition both sides could download 2 other existing types by up to 4 RVs each and a maximum of 750 RVs.

US position:

— Change attribution of SS–N–18 from 7 to 3; US can remove 1 or 2 RVs from MM-III. Any additional downloading only by mutual agreement in the JCIC.

Points to make:

○ This is a hard issue for me. Warheads removed from missiles can be readily restored, leading to unpredictability and instability.

○ START is supposed to enhance stability, not undercut it. Accepting more downloading is like giving opponents of the treaty a stick to beat us with.

○ Want to look at this issue in light of what you have to say on downloading, and in light of what we can accomplish on data denial, contingency operations, and new types.

New Types

○ We want to be in a position to say tomorrow that we have resolved the remaining START issues and have scheduled the summit for the end of July.

○ To get there, we need to tell our teams now that:

— We agree on the principle of tape exchange on a routine basis, and they should proceed to develop the data denial provisions for the treaty on that basis in time for signature.

— We agree on the concept of an exemption from the inspection provisions for heavy bomber contingency operations, and they should work to promptly settle all the other heavy bomber and ALCM issues.

— That you and I are addressing new types and downloading. The solution will require a rigorous way to compare throw weight and stage length, and they should work those issues.

— They should also work to resolve the other remaining problems, including data denial exemptions, the 40% rule, PPCM and suspect-site inspections, throw weight values, costs, submarine tunnels, and use of ICBMs and SLBMs for space launch from airplanes.

○ Any of these that are still problems in the morning, we can take up then.

Baker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N910005–0215. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Timbie; cleared in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Timbie.
2. July 11.
3. July 8.