Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

219. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Bush¹

Washington, June 6, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: June 6, 1991

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 3:45–4:45 pm

I. PURPOSE

To review U.S. negotiating positions designed to accelerate completion of a successful START agreement. These revised positions would be incorporated in a letter from you to Gorbachev (draft at Tab D)² that Jim Baker would deliver to Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh this weekend.

II. BACKGROUND

It may be possible to wrap up a START treaty by the end of July if both sides have the will to do so. There is a relatively large number of minor issues that can be resolved quickly in Geneva once there is top-down direction from you and Gorbachev to do so. However, there are a handful of issues that are particularly stubborn, especially missile warhead downloading, the definition of new types of missiles, and data denial.

These are the focus of your proposed letter to Gorbachev. The idea is to follow the model that has been successful on CFE: directly engaging Gorbachev and his stake in the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship to overcome the objections of the Soviet hardliners. By the same token, the U.S. arms control bureaucracy needs to hear from you directly that you want a START treaty that is in the U.S. interest as soon as possible. The NSC meeting will be a good place to deliver that message.

The two sides are far apart on these three issues and we do not know how much flexibility the Soviets have. Yet in view of Gorbachev’s eagerness for a summit, we believe it is important to maintain the linkage between the signing of START and the summit, and to make a direct appeal to him for a deal. The U.S. proposals for a deal is the subject of this NSC meeting.

Simply to insist that Gorbachev accept the current U.S. positions on these issues as his ticket to a summit is almost certainly self-defeating. At the same time, these are important issues to the United States and we cannot accept the Soviet positions simply in the interest of wrapping up the treaty. The approach outlined in your letter would present a new U.S. proposal on data denial that gives the Soviets more latitude than our earlier position, and move toward the Soviet position on the new types definition while holding firm on missile downloading. This, in effect, has us moving on two of the three most stubborn issues, while protecting our security concerns and defining a treaty that is clearly in our interest.

The positions we are proposing are designed to elicit either Soviet acceptance or, more likely, a substantive Soviet counter-offer. This should give us an early indication of whether or not signing a treaty within the next few weeks will be possible.

If you approve the letter after hearing out the Council members, we envisage Jim meeting with Bessmertnykh in Geneva this weekend to deliver the letter and tell him that if Gorbachev responds positively, you will immediately send a U.S. team led by Reggie Bartholomew and Arnie Kanter to work with the Soviets to complete START. Their goal would be to reach agreement on all issues by the end of the month, leaving sufficient time for the negotiating delegation to complete text details, conform the treaty, and print it in time for a late July summit in Moscow.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab C.³

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

You should open the meeting with a few remarks on the importance of moving ahead with START with solid, defensible positions. I will then outline the approach in the proposed letter and the major elements of the U.S. proposal.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON START

— I am pleased that we finally seem to have gotten the Soviets to live up to their obligations under the CFE Treaty. That clears the way for us to see if we can conclude a START treaty we have been negotiating for some eight years.

— We are at a critical point in our relationship with the Soviet Union. A solid START treaty not only is important on its own merits, it also could encourage the improvements in Soviet behavior and policies we are starting to see again. A good treaty would also fit well with all the other areas where we are seeking cooperation.

— My sense is that we are within striking distance of a START treaty that serves our interests, and that if we can show a little flexibility on two or three of the most stubborn issues, it may be possible to wrap it up very quickly. It takes two to make a deal, but I want to make sure we do everything we can to conclude a solid START agreement as soon a possible.

— To that end, I know that our negotiator, Ambassador Linton Brooks, will get the full support of your people to resolve quickly the many relatively minor issues that remain.

— What I want to address today is an approach that could lead to closure on those last few “stubborn” issues.

— I am convinced that simply to insist that Gorbachev accept all our negotiating positions as his price for a ticket to a summit would be self-defeating. At the same time, the issues are too important to accept the Soviet positions just to expedite final agreement on START. But I do think that we can adjust some of our positions while still protecting our most important security concerns and lock up a treaty that is clearly in our interest.

— The strategy we used to resolve CFE proved successful. I want to apply that same approach in START.

— I want to make a proposal directly to Gorbachev on an approach to conclude the treaty quickly. I want to engage him personally, using our relationship and his stake in the U.S.-Soviet relationship to encourage him to overcome the resistance of his hardliners.

— Arnie Kanter’s “Ungroup” has drafted a letter that I could send to Gorbachev outlining those areas in which we may have some flexibility and those where we have very little.

— Brent, will you lay out the approach for us?

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSC Meetings Files, NSC0058—June 06, 1991—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Secret. Attached but not printed is the meeting agenda. A stamped notation indicates Bush saw the memorandum; beneath the notation, an unknown hand wrote “6–6–91.” Gordon, Davis, and Kuehne sent the memorandum to Scowcroft for his signature under cover of a June 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) According to the Presidential Daily Diary, Bush presided over a meeting of the National Security Council from 3:49–4:32 p.m. No minutes were found.
2. Attached but not printed. For the final version, see Document 218.
3. Not attached.
4. Secret.