Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

217. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, June 3, 1991

SUBJECT

• Finishing START

I wanted to get you some thoughts on this subject right away. I will have more for you for tomorrow’s Principals meeting² later in the day.

Attached is a two-page description of the issues that need to be resolved to complete START. It doesn’t include the third order issues that the Delegation needs to keep up the grind nor the mechanics necessary to prepare a treaty of this length for final signature. I don’t honestly know if we can get there by the last week in June. I think we probably can, but only with terrific and sustained pressure on both sides. Let me also say that we need to do what we can to limit and hedge against the predictable reaction inside and outside the government that we are “rushing to judgment and concessions.”

I think tomorrow’s Principals meeting should do three things:

1. Make sure you all agree on what the issues are that need to be resolved internally and vis-a-vis the Soviets.

2. Direct the Ungroup to develop substantive options for review by the Principals so we will have some real, repeat real, negotiating material.

3. Address timetable and workplan for meetings here and with the Soviets to get this all done.

You expressed some concern this morning about people seeking to reopen finished issues, e.g., the Senate letter on PPCM.³ There are some pressures in this direction, particularly in parts of the Pentagon and the Hill. But thus far it has been manageable and not too disruptive. We will need to keep working to keep it that way.

I think there will be some requirement to develop possible negotiating material and moves on our part. Some might argue that we should at least have a first set of meetings to stiff the Soviets to see if they come around—even citing the CFE precedent. I think START is a different case altogether and that if we don’t have something to work with and offer ourselves—if only to prime the pump—we are going to find a dry hole. After all, the President’s letter on CFE opened the way to a solution in part by offering Gorbachev some reasonable steps.

Finally on timetable, it just seems to me hard to get the necessary decisions here in time for me to meet with Moiseyev in Geneva much before the first of next week. The Ungroup needs to develop substantive options on the outstanding issues. And then we have to have another Principals meeting to make decisions when you get back from your next trip either this Saturday⁴ or Monday.⁵

It is not inconceivable that we get to a draft of a substantive letter from the President to Gorbachev before then and even without going through a Principals meeting, i.e., in the course of this week with us checking with you long range. That said, I think the more likely thing is it will require the face to face Principals meeting I mentioned.

As I said above, I will give you more on this later in talking points for the Principals meeting tomorrow.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

Washington, June 3, 1991

Issues that need to be resolved to complete START

Downloading

○ In February the US toughened its position to permit downloading only of the SS–N–18 and the Minuteman III.

○ The Soviets want the right to download the SS–N–18 plus two other existing types on each side.

○ This issue is not being addressed in Geneva, pending consideration at a higher level.

Data denial

○ The US plans this week to introduce a major new proposal on telemetry transmission practices for existing and new missiles. The Soviet position is to defer most of this subject to subsequent negotiations in the JCIC. The new US proposal may precipitate serious negotiations on this issue.

○ Also unresolved is the extent to which each side will provide assistance in interpreting its telemetry for the other side. In particular, the Soviets are resisting the national security exception.

○ Satisfactory resolution on data denial is important to ratification, as this is one of the big plusses for the agreement.

PPCM

○ PPCM will be established at the facilities where the SS–24 and SS–25 missiles and Peacekeeper first stages are produced. If the Small ICBM is produced as a mobile ICBM, PPCM will be established where its first stage is produced.

○ There are a number of other PPCM issues (e.g. the size criterion for inspecting objects coming out the portal), that are hung up in part because the Soviets are not prepared to provide information on precisely what comes out of these facilities in addition to complete missiles.

Suspect-site inspection

○ To supplement PPCM, we have proposed the right to inspect a list of 4 facilities in the USSR where mobile ICBMs might be illegally assembled.

○ The Soviets have accepted 3, denied the 4th, and proposed a list of 4 sites in the US, at least 1 of which is a problem.

○ It is important to get SSI rights at the 4 facilities in the USSR in order for the intelligence community to testify that the combination of PPCM and SSI gives us a good handle on mobile ICBM production.

New types definition

○ The Soviets recently moved from their position that differences in throw weight alone constitute a basis for considering a missile to be a new type. They now propose a difference of 10% in throw weight combined with 5% in length.

○ The remaining issue is to find a mutually acceptable percentage on throw weight combined with another dimension (length or volume). The current gap between our positions is large.

Stage dimensions

○ The Soviets recently moved toward us by offering to provide in the MOU the weights and dimensions of first stages and entire missiles. They also offered to make these missiles available for verification of the dimensions (but not the weights).

○ The remaining issues concern the right to verify the diameters of upper stages, to verify the weights of first stages and missiles, and how to define length in a meaningful way.

40% rule

(designed to prevent circumvention through testing future missiles with fewer than the full complement of RVs)

○ The Soviets agree to this rule for conventional missile designs, but the problem remains how to deal with unconventional missile designs.

Heavy bombers and ALCMs

○ There are a large number of outstanding problems, including an exception for heavy bomber contingency operations, initial accountability of ALCMs, and several inspection and distinguishability issues.

Lesser issues

○ There are a number of lesser issues, including treatment of expended launch canisters, launcher type rule, inspection quotas, procedures for on-site inspection of RVs, and several throw weight issues.

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 5–7, 1991. Secret.
2. No minutes were found.
3. Not found.
4. June 8.
5. June 10.
6. Secret.